Learning throughout history has been neither linear nor guaranteed. In spite of the existence of a postrevolutionary paradigm of change, both reform and revolution continue as historical possibilities. This is all the more true because the new paradigm is path determined, a function of deep political and constitutional conflicts where neither new forces representing radical change nor defenders of the old order are capable of imposing their own preferred options. Where either new or old forces are in such a position, top-down reform—as in Chile in 1980 and to an extent even in 1989, or in the recent revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt—remain live possibilities. The same goes for constitutional change. Where established political forces dominate, they will at the very least try to enact constitutional amendments capable of preserving inherited principles of political identity. And where new forces are dominant, as in several Andean republics, the constitution-making paradigm of a sovereign assembly can be adopted without the overthrow of an old regime by insurrection.
With the confession of path dependency, I nevertheless wish to maintain in the following Parts that learning from the new paradigm is possible and desirable even where its full development is not likely—in other words, during reform and revolution. In particular, the legitimating principles should provide important lessons for actors in all contexts. But the lessons can be adopted, in my view, only if there is also learning from the new paradigm with respect to its treatment of time and sequence. I illustrate this claim with the contrasting cases of Colombia and Venezuela, and more recently, Tunisia and Egypt. Using the examples of the latter, namely Egypt, I argue moreover that given the international dissemination and diffusion of constitutional ideas, not learning from the new paradigm, or learning in the wrong sequence, can have negative and disruptive consequences. Comparing the case of Chile to Turkey, I make the parallel argument for processes of reform, and with a short survey of Hungarian reform, I illustrate the possible dangers of leaving a reform process indefinitely open. Finally, I consider the case of Chile, where reform and rupture are both possible, and different political actors advocate alternatives based on legality on the one hand and popular sovereignty (such as legitimacy, understood in populist terms) on the other. Here, while the postsovereign paradigm is not made especially likely because of the political path, or a particular balance of highly polarized forces, it could still prove especially valuable. I also discuss the reasons for comprehensive constitutional change in Chile, and tentatively show how learning from the new paradigm could be helpful in developing a constitution-making methodology in a setting that, as far as I can tell, is currently still open.
