The late 1990s witnessed a dramatic change in the perception and policy of juvenile justice in America. Reacting to a sudden increase in juvenile crime, many states took a hard-line approach against the perceived threat of “super-predators.” North Carolina exemplified this shift. In February 1998 Governor Jim Hunt’s Commission on Juvenile Crime and Justice (“Commission”) provided its Final Report to the General Assembly (“Report”). The Report addressed juvenile crime, which “ha[d] escalated to unacceptable levels,” and predicted that “the growth of juvenile crime could be three times higher than that of adults” if current trends persisted. The Report suggested substantial changes to the Juvenile Code, with sixty-one recommendations. The recommendations “call[ed] for accountability,” noting that “[j]uveniles must be held swiftly and appropriately accountable for delinquent behavior.” The result of the recommendations was a juvenile code that focused on punishment rather than prevention, accountability rather than adolescent development.
The juvenile crime wave never happened. In fact the exact opposite occurred. Juvenile violent crime in North Carolina only rose 9% between 1996 and 2005, then dropped 38% between 2005 and 2014. While there is no clear explanation for the decline in the juvenile violent crime rate, what is certain is that juvenile disproportionality has not improved as a result of the recommendations. In particular, the level of overrepresentation is particularly high for black youth placed in confinement as compared to white youth.
For at least a quarter of a century, the reality of minority overrepresentation at stages of juvenile proceedings has been apparent and documented. In 1988 Congress required, pursuant to the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 (“JJDPA”), that the states address “disproportionate minority confinement” (“DMC”) in their state plans. Specifically, if the proportion of minority youth detained or confined in secure facilities exceeded that of such groups in the general population, then states could only receive funds under the Formula Grants Program by addressing efforts to reduce the proportion of the detained or confined minority youth. In 2002 the legislature amended “confinement” to “contact” in the JJDPA, requiring an examination of possible disproportionate representation of minority youth at all decision points along the juvenile justice system continuum.
North Carolina criminal and juvenile justice entities were aware of the issue, at least as early as 1991, as evidenced by the state’s selection as a national pilot to research DMC. Despite the awareness of overrepresentation, the Commission relegated DMC to a side issue, scant on detail or directive. Caught in the grip of a national panic fearing a future overrun with violent juvenile offenders, the Commission declined to consider the DMC evidence available and chose instead to crack down on serious offenders.
Did the “get tough” approach of the Juvenile Code recommendations and subsequent changes contribute to the problem of overrepresentation, especially for black youth confined in juvenile facilities?
