The “interjurisdictional abortion wars” that the Dissent in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization warned the country about have arrived.[1] On December 12, 2024, the Texas attorney general filed a petition for injunctive relief and civil penalties in the District Court of Collin County, Texas, against Dr. Margaret Carpenter, a New York physician, alleging that she violated Texas law by prescribing abortion-inducing medication via telemedicine to a Texas resident.[2] The complaint asserted that, although Dr. Carpenter never set foot in Texas during the time of the alleged acts, her conduct constituted a violation of Texas law because it was directed at and produced effects within the state.[3] After Dr. Carpenter failed to respond, the Texas court entered a default judgment against her, imposing $113,219.59 in statutory civil penalties.[4] The Texas attorney general then sought to enforce the judgment against Dr. Carpenter in New York.[5] New York Governor Kathy Hochul, invoking the state’s telehealth abortion shield law, refused to enforce the Texas judgment.[6]
In early 2025, Dr. Carpenter was charged with a crime in Louisiana for similar actions after a state grand jury indicted her for “Criminal Abortion by Means of Abortion-Inducing Drugs.”[7] Louisiana Governor Jeff Landry subsequently signed an extradition warrant seeking her surrender.[8] Governor Hochul similarly invoked New York’s shield law and refused to extradite Dr. Carpenter to Louisiana, also arguing that Dr. Carpenter never set foot in Louisiana during the alleged acts.[9] These abortion wars raise three important questions. First, can Texas enforce its civil default judgment against Dr. Carpenter in New York? Second, is New York legally required to extradite her to Louisiana to face criminal charges for helping to induce an abortion in the state? And third, what are the implications for North Carolina?
Louisiana’s Extradition Request
Turning to Louisiana, a textualist reading of the Extradition Clause reveals only one answer to the issue of Dr. Carpenter: physical presence matters. The clause states that a
[P]erson charged in any state with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another state, shall on demand of the executive authority of the state from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the state having jurisdiction of the crime.[10]
Two elements must be met to activate the clause. First, the person in question must be “actually charged with a crime in the demanding state. . . .”[11] Second, the person demanded “must have fled from [justice in] the demanding state.”[12]The latter imposes a physical presence requirement on the “fled from justice” element, that is to say, the person charged must have been physically present in the demanding state during the commission of the crime.[13]
There is no evidence that Dr. Carpenter ever set foot in Louisiana during the time of her alleged acts, so she cannot have “fled from justice” under the Extradition Clause. SCOTUS has soundly rejected the concept of “constructive presence” in extradition jurisprudence,[14] so Louisiana cannot argue that Dr. Carpenter’s Telehealth calls gave her a “constructive presence” in the state by virtually interacting with and prescribing medicine to her patients. A federal court cannot compel the extradition of Dr. Carpenter in this case because the Extradition Clause does not bind New York to extradite her to Louisiana. Extradition concerns physical custody, not regulatory reach, and although Louisiana can establish jurisdiction over Dr. Carpenter, it cannot establish that it has the legal right to compel New York to extradite her to the state.
Texas’s Default Judgment
Turning to Texas, the state cannot compel a New York court to enforce its default judgment against Dr. Carpenter. The Full Faith & Credit Clause requires states to recognize and honor the public acts, records, and court judgments of all other states.[15] The framers intended for it to “transform[] an aggregation of independent, sovereign States into a nation” through mutual respect of each state for other states’ laws and judgments.[16] The clause states that:
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.[17]
Under the Full Faith & Credit clause, the Texas default judgment is presumptively enforceable. Texas has valid personal jurisdiction over the matter,[18] and a final judgment rendered by a court of sound jurisdiction is presumptively enforceable throughout the country.[19] However, the Penal Judgment Exception is a narrow limitation on the Full Faith & Credit Clause, existing outside the narrow confines of Baker.[20] It “permits state courts to refuse to enforce an out-of state judgment that is penal.”[21] The exception is grounded in the principle of sovereign equality: no sovereign state should be compelled to enforce the penal laws of another sovereign.[22] SCOTUS articulated the exception in Huntington v. Atrill,[23] where it explained that “[a] judgment is penal when it does not satisfy a private right and punishes an offense against the state.”[24]
The purpose of the Texas law and its penalties is to punish a public wrong. Dr. Carpenter was found in violation of a Texas statute stating, “[a] person may not knowingly perform, induce, or attempt an abortion.”[25] Violators of this law can become subject to civil penalties of at least $100,000 for each violation, recoverable by the Texas attorney general.[26] However, the mere existence of civil penalties does not inherently prove that a statute remedies a private injury.[27] Texas law enables the state to charge violators of § 170A.002(a) with a felony,[28] which is strong evidence that the law punishes a public wrong.[29] Felonies are among the most prominent examples of penal laws, and this principle of law is so clearly established that, in Pelican Insurance, SCOTUS argued that civil judgments, in addition to crimes, can also constitute penal judgments.[30] Additionally, the civil penalty can be recovered via the state attorney general filing an action to recover against the violator.[31] This illustrates that the “harm” of abortion is indeed a public wrong, specifically a public wrong strong enough to warrant the intervention of the state attorney general. Because the purpose of the Texas Law is to punish the “public wrong” of abortion, it is a penal judgment, and Texas cannot compel a New York court to enforce it against Dr. Carpenter.
Implications for NC
North Carolina sits at a peculiar crossroads in the interjurisdictional abortion wars. Abortion is not entirely illegal in the State, but it is only legal until twelve weeks and six days of pregnancy.[32] Unlike New York, North Carolina has no statutory shield law. Its protections rest solely on an executive order, first issued by Governor Roy Cooper in 2022 and renewed by Governor Josh Stein in January 2025, which bars state agencies from cooperating with out-of-state abortion investigations and commits the governor to decline extradition requests for abortion providers and patients.[33]
North Carolina’s exposure to Carpenter-style litigation is real. State law prohibits the mailing of medication abortion and requires providers to administer it in person.[34] Yet in the first six months of 2025, approximately 18 percent of total abortions in North Carolina were obtained via telehealth through out-of-state shield law providers,[35]meaning North Carolina residents are already receiving abortion medication prescribed by physicians in shield states. Additionally, North Carolina healthcare providers induced abortions in more than 17,000 out-of-state patients in 2025, constituting over one-third of all procedures performed in the state.[36] This exposure to out-of-state patients makes North Carolina and its physicians targets for future litigation. A North Carolina physician who remotely assists a patient in a total-ban state could face a Texas-style civil judgment, and without a shield law, the governor’s executive order may be the only barrier to enforcement.
The Carpenter litigation has shown the country that shield laws can constitutionally protect healthcare providers from out-of-state extradition and default judgments. However, it has also shown that civil judgments and criminal extradition requests are no longer hypothetical. Though New York’s shield law protects its healthcare providers from extradition and out-of-state penal judgments, North Carolina lacks these statutory protections for its providers. The North Carolina General Assembly should consider enacting a statutory shield law to provide durable protection for providers and patients alike, before a North Carolina physician becomes the next Dr. Carpenter.
[1] Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, 597 U.S. 215, 394 (2022) (J. Breyer, dissenting).
[2] See Texas v. Carpenter, No. 471-08943-2024 (471st Dist. Ct. Collin County Tex. Feb. 13, 2025). The Texas Attorney General had the option to file criminal charges against Dr. Carpenter, but declined to do so. Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 170A.004–005.
[3] Carpenter, No. 471-08943-2024, at *1.
[4] See Texas v. Bruck, EF2025-2536 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Ulster County Oct. 31, 2025).
[5] Id.
[6] Michael Hill, NY County Clerk Refuses to File Texas’ Fine for Doctor Accused of Prescribing Abortion Pills, Associated Press (March 27, 2025), https://www.texastribune.org/2025/03/27/new-york-texas-abortion-doctor-pills/.
[7] State of Louisiana Executive Department, Extradition Warrant for Margaret D. Carpenter (Feb. 11, 2025); La. R.S. 14:87.9(A) and (B)(1).
[8] State of Louisiana Executive Department, Extradition Warrant for Margaret D. Carpenter (Feb. 11, 2025).
[9] Chloe Atkins and Fallon Gallagher, New York Governor Rejects Louisiana’s Extradition Request for Doctor in Abortion Pill Case, NBC News (Feb. 13, 2025).
[10] U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2.
[11] Alejandra Caraballo et al., Extradition in Post-Roe America, 26 CUNY L. Rev. 1, 28 (Winter 2023).
[12] Id.
[13] Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 289 (1978).
[14] Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911).
[15] U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1.
[16] Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 355 (1948).
[17] U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1.
[18] Texas v. Bruck, EF2025-2536 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Ulster County Oct. 31, 2025).
[19] Baker by Thomas v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998).
[20] Walker McKusick, Comment, The Penal Judgment Exception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause: How to Bind the Bounty Laws, 99 Wash. L. Rev. 649, 651 (2024).
[21] Id.
[22] The Antelope, 23 U.S. 66, 122 (1825) (analogizing “The Courts of no country execute the penal laws of another”).
[23] 146 U.S. 657 (1892).
[24] McKusick supra note 20 at 651.
[25] Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 170A.002(a).
[26] Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 170A.004–005.
[27] Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 290 (1888)
[28] Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 170A.004–005.
[29] Pelican Insurance, 127 U.S. at 289–90.
[30] Id. at 289–90 (1888) (quoting The Antelope, 23 U.S. 66, 123 (1825)).
[31] Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 170A.005.
[32] N.C.G.S. § 90‑21.81A.
[33] N.C. Exec. Order No. 263 (May 31, 2022).
[34] N.C.G.S. § 90‑21.83B.
[35] Rachel Crumpler, With Stricter Laws Across the Southeast, NC Remains an Access Point for Abortion Care, WUNC (Mar. 30, 2026), https://www.wunc.org/health/2026-03-30/abortion-care-laws-north-carolina-access-point-southeast.
[36] Id.
