On April 2, 2026, the North Carolina Supreme Court put the final nail in the 30-year-old coffin that was the Leandro school funding case.[1] The Court’s opinion ended the litigation on jurisdictional grounds,[2] putting a stop to the education funding case without addressing the underlying merits of the suit. Finding that there was no jurisdiction over a statewide action, the Court nullified multiple orders entered as part of the case, including its own opinion in Hoke County III.[3]
To understand the impact of the Court’s opinion, one must, as usual, understand the facts and procedural history underlying it. The litigation at issue began in 1994.[4] From this initial complaint, the nearly three-decade ordeal ensued, involving multiple trips to the appellate courts and back to the trial courts. Multiple school districts and children, through their guardians, brought suit against the State of North Carolina for allegedly failing to adequately fund certain public schools, namely in rural counties.[5] At the core of the plaintiffs’ argument are provisions of the North Carolina Constitution. One such provision provides: “The people have a right to the privilege of education, and it is the duty of the State to guard and maintain that right.”[6] Another: “The General Assembly shall provide by taxation and otherwise for a general and uniform system of free public schools[.]”[7] According to the plaintiffs, the state legislature neglected its responsibility by failing to provide adequate funds to school districts in low-wealth counties.[8] Eventually, they succeeded in the trial court. On November 10, 2021, an order was entered by the Wake County Superior Court ordering the legislature to increase funds for the affected school districts.[9]
However, the Leandro saga entered its fourth act.[10] In its most recent, and seemingly final, trip to the North Carolina Supreme Court, the litigation was dismissed with prejudice.[11] The majority, led by Chief Justice Paul M. Newby, reasoned that the original complaint in Leandro presented as-applied challenges, not facial challenges.[12] The as-applied challenge, the majority notes, was against an education system that no longer exists—namely, the education system of 1997.[13] Given that fact, the majority held that the Court lacked jurisdiction to issue statewide injunctive relief in the case.[14] The main point of contest concerned whether the complaint was facial or as-applied, with Justice Anita Earls pointing to allegations in the original complaint. Amongst these were allegations that “the public education system of North Carolina, including its system of funding, violates the state Constitution”[15] and that “[t]he end result of the inferior educational opportunities caused by this unconstitutional system is poorly educated students.”[16] Needless to say, the majority was unconvinced, accusing the dissent of misquoting or otherwise misconstruing the allegations of the complaint.[17]
However, disagreement between the majority and the dissent is not the only instance of the new Leandro case striking the notes of a dissonant chord. Justice Phil Berger, while joining the majority in full, wrote in concurrence that the Court had not gone far enough in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.[18] Rather, Berger would have explicitly rejected the reasoning of Hoke III,[19] which originally upheld the lower court’s order, and remanded the case with instructions to review the 2022 Budget and issue directives on how to make the proper appropriations to affected school districts.[20]While the majority found it possible to dispose of the case without taking that additional step, Berger observed that the majority “allow[s] appeals to the inherent power of the judiciary to linger in the background of every education policy and spending debate.”[21]
Berger’s primary complaint is the implications of the Hoke III opinion on the separation of powers. As he puts it, “[f]or separation of powers stalwarts, this is a demoralizing head scratcher.”[22] Berger also takes note of the numbers, pointing out that four of the seven justices seem to support “exorcis[ing] this aberration from our jurisprudence.”[23] As he colorfully opines, “the time to kill a snake is when you’ve got the hoe in your hand.”[24]
While Berger and the majority’s only contest is over the fate of Hoke III, the key holding of the new opinion is itself not universally accepted. Of course, as discussed above, Earls notes her objection in her lengthy dissent. And Justice Allison Riggs notes her own objections in a separate dissent, saying she “agree[s] with Justice Earls’s detailed analysis of the myriad flaws in the majority’s ruling today,” but writes separately to note the historical significance of the case.[25] A third dissent, from Justice Richard Dietz, purports to strike a middle ground. Dietz provided a three-step framework to maintain a comprehensive statewide solution while avoiding the pitfalls mentioned by the majority.[26] First, Dietz would order the court below to join the General Assembly as a defendant.[27] Second, he would certify a class action to represent a more comprehensive sample of the statewide education system.[28] Finally, he would move away from designating a single “Leandro judge” at the superior court level and instead designate superior court judges in every district, or county, to handle Leandro claims in that area.[29]
Of course, neither Dietz, Earls, nor Riggs could secure a majority in support of their view of the case. As such, the bell tolls for Leandro, and one of the most notable education cases in North Carolina judicial memory comes to an end. At least, for now, as the Court has demonstrated its power to revive an issue, calling a case for rehearing even when a party has not petitioned such.[30]
[1] Hoke Cnty. Bd. of Educ., et al v. State, No. 425A21-3 (N.C. Apr. 2, 2026).
[2] Id. at 7.
[3] Id. at 10.
[4] Id. at 3.
[5] Id. at 3-4.
[6] N.C. Const. Article I Sec. 15.
[7] N.C. Const. Article IX Sec. 2.
[8] Hoke, No. 425A21-3, at 3–4.
[9] Id. at 76–77.
[10] While a “fourth act” is a helpful analogy borrowed from the world of creative writing, the author notes that Leandro in actuality involved more than a “four act” structure.
[11] Hoke, No. 425A21-3, at 10.
[12] Id. at 4.
[13] Id. at 10, n.5.
[14] Id. at 83.
[15] Id. at 123.
[16] Hoke, No. 425A21-3, at 124.
[17] Id. at 8, n.4.
[18] Id. at 112 (Berger, J., concurring).
[19] Id. at 113 (Berger, J., concurring).
[20] Id. at 80–81.
[21] Hoke, No. 425A21-3, at 114 (Berger, J., concurring).
[22] Id. at 114–15 (Berger, J., concurring).
[23] Id. at 115 (Berger, J., concurring).
[24] Id. at 114 (Berger, J., concurring).
[25] Id. at 210 (Riggs, J., dissenting).
[26] Hoke, No. 425A21-3, at 201–02 (Dietz, J., dissenting).
[27] Id. at 202 (Dietz, J., dissenting).
[28] Id. at 204–06 (Dietz, J., dissenting).
[29] Id. at 207 (Dietz, J., dissenting).
[30] Id. at 118 (Earls, J., dissenting).
