North Carolina’s SB 153 and the Hidden Costs of Mandatory ICE Cooperation

On June 24, 2026, the North Carolina General Assembly overrode Governor Josh Stein’s veto, and Senate Bill 153 (SB 153), the “North Carolina Border Protection Act,” became Session Law 2026-19.[1] The passage represents an important benchmark of how immigration policy is currently being set in North Carolina’s divided government. The Act’s preamble makes its political goals explicit. It states that the American people, as well as the people of North Carolina, “clearly communicated their strong desire to create a safer country through increased border security and stronger immigration policies” by electing Donald Trump as president.[2] This preamble further faults the Governor for not directing state agencies to support federal immigration initiatives, and it invokes his constitutional duty to “tak[e] care that the laws are faithfully executed.”[3]

As of October 1, SB 153 is now in effect in North Carolina.[4] SB 153 has four main components. First, the bill requires many state law enforcement agencies to collaborate with ICE through 287(g) agreements.[5] Second, if a local government violates the state’s anti-sanctuary law, the bill strips governmental immunity from that local government. This section of the bill opens the door to tort suits that governmental immunity would have otherwise prevented.[6] Third, the bill implements new requirements for state agencies distributing public benefits.[7] The aim of these additional requirements is to block undocumented individuals from accessing public benefits.[8] Fourth, the bill restricts North Carolina’s public universities’ abilities to implement policies that would limit cooperation between the university and federal immigration enforcement.[9]

The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has been swift in pointing out its criticism of this new bill and its potential effects. In its summary of the law on the organization’s website, the ACLU labeled SB 153 as “a blatant attack on immigrant communities.”[10] The bill’s first component, the requirement that state agencies enter into 287(g) agreements with ICE, raises several political concerns. This section of the bill requires major state law enforcement agencies (including the Department of Public Safety, Adult Correction, the State Highway Patrol, and the State Bureau of Investigation) to enter into 287(g) agreements with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), verify the legal status of individuals in custody, and share data with federal agencies.[11]

A 287(g) agreement is a legal mechanism that grants local law enforcement the power to enforce federal immigration law, a practice that local law enforcement would otherwise be typically barred from engaging in.[12] In addition to raising concerns about the separation of state and federal authority, these kinds of agreements also raise public safety concerns. Research suggests immigrant communities report fewer crimes when local police become involved with ICE and federal immigration enforcement.[13] For example, in a survey by political scientist Tom K. Wong of the University of California, San Diego, undocumented respondents who were told that local police worked with ICE were 61 percent less likely to report crimes they witnessed, and 43 percent less likely to report being the victim of a crime than respondents who were told the police did not work with ICE.[14] Those findings are consistent with an earlier 2012 survey. In it, 70 percent of undocumented Latino respondents said they were less likely to contact police after being victimized because they feared being asked about their own or others’ immigration status.[15]

Laws like SB 153, which mandate that local law enforcement cooperate with federal ICE agents, may inadvertently erode public safety by undermining immigrant communities’ trust in local law enforcement. SB 153’s full effects will not be known until it has been in force for some time. Even so, a statute justified in the name of public safety may alienate the very communities police need cooperation from to solve crimes.


[1] North Carolina Border Protection Act, S.L. 2026-19, 2025-2026 N.C. Sess. Laws.

[2] Id. pmbl.

[3] Id. pmbl. (citing N.C. Const. art. III, § 5).

[4] Julian Berger, North Carolina State Law Enforcement Agencies Sign Immigration Enforcement Agreements with ICE, WUNC (Oct. 1, 2026), https://www.wunc.org/2026-10-01/north-carolina-state-law-enforcement-agencies-sign-immigration-enforcement-agreements-with-ice.

[5] S.L. 2026-19.

[6] Id.

[7] Id.

[8] Id.

[9] Id.

[10] SB 153: Border Protection Act (Anti-Immigrant), ACLU of North Carolina (June 24, 2026), https://www.acluofnorthcarolina.org/legislation/sb-153-border-protection-act-anti-immigrant/.

[11] S.L. 2026-19.

[12] SB153 – Anti-Immigrant “North Carolina Border Protection Act” Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ), ACLU of North Carolina (July 1, 2026), https://www.acluofnorthcarolina.org/news/sb153-faq/.

[13] Laura Muñoz Lopez, How 287(g) Agreements Harm Public Safety, Ctr. for Am. Progress (May 8, 2018), https://www.americanprogress.org/article/287g-agreements-harm-public-safety/.

[14] Tom K. Wong, Sanctuary Cities Don’t ‘Breed Crime.’ They Encourage People to Report Crime., Wash. Post (Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/04/24/sanctuary-cities-dont-breed-crime-they-encourage-people-to-report-crime/.

[15] Nik Theodore, Insecure Communities: Latino Perceptions of Police Involvement in Immigration Enforcement, Nat’l Immigr. Just. Center(May 2013), https://greatcities.uic.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Insecure_Communities_Report_FINAL.pdf.