Wake Forest Law Review
10Nov

Fourth Circuit Remands Burglary Case with Sentencing Guidelines

Categories: 4th Cir. Blog Criminal Cases
Comments Off on Fourth Circuit Remands Burglary Case with Sentencing Guidelines

qtq80-qCx3wT

By Sophia Blair

On November 10, 2016, the Fourth Circuit issued a published opinion in the criminal case, United States v. Williams. Earnest Lee Williams Jr. (“Williams”) was charged with attempting to enter a bank with the intent to commit a felony and larceny in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). Williams pleaded guilty to the charge and was sentenced under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1, pursuant to its robbery guidelines. Williams appealed his sentence, arguing that the district court erroneously applied the robbery guideline under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1 instead of the burglary guideline under U.S.S.G. § 2B2.1. The Fourth Circuit agreed with Williams, vacated his sentence, and remanded to the district court for resentencing under the burglary guideline.

Facts and Procedural History

In January 2014, Williams approached a Southern Bank building (“Bank”) in Rocky Mount, North Carolina. Williams was unarmed and, as he later admitted to police, simply planned on telling the bank tellers to place the Bank’s money in his bag. Williams entered the exterior doors of the Bank into an anteroom. Before he could enter the interior doors into the Bank, a teller who thought she recognized Williams from a previous robbery locked all of the doors. The teller asked Williams through an intercom whether he had an account and he said he did, though he had left his bank card in his car. The teller unlocked the exterior doors and told Williams to use the drive-through window. Williams went back to his car and drove off. The police were called and they quickly apprehended Williams. After being read his rights, Williams admitted to the police that he was in need of money as well as his plan to rob the Bank.

In August 2014, a federal grand jury indicted Williams for violating 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). Williams pleaded guilty to the charge. § 2113(a) is covered by four Sentencing Guideline section including U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1 (Robbery) and § 2B2.1 (Burglary). The probation officer calculated Williams’ imprisonment range at 37–46 months according to the robbery guideline.

Williams objected to the application of the robbery guideline for sentencing because he pled guilty to an indictment for burglary without reference to force or violence. Specifically, Williams was charged with “attempting to enter a bank . . . with the intent to commit in such bank a felony affecting such bank . . . .” Given the lack of force or violence, the burglary guideline was more applicable, and would yield an imprisonment range of 10–16 months.

The probation officer contended that the robbery guideline was more applicable because it contained a sentencing enhancement for targeting a financial institution, while the burglary guideline did not. The district court agreed with the probation officer that the robbery guideline would apply, and sentenced Williams to a term of 38 months. Williams appealed.

Improper Application of Robbery Guideline

The Fourth Circuit agreed with Williams that the burglary guideline should apply. When a conviction falls under the express terms of multiple guidelines, the sentencing court must apply the most applicable one. Relying on United States v. Boulware, the Fourth Circuit held that the most applicable guideline is determined by comparing the guideline texts with the charged misconduct. The court should not compare the guidelines to the statute or the actual conduct because they may implicate several guidelines or include factors of indicted offenses instead of elements.

18 U.S.C.  § 2113(a)

2113(a) may be violated either by robbery or burglary. Bank robbery involves attempting to take from a bank by force, intimidation, or extortion, while burglary simply involves entering a bank with the intent to commit a crime. Because there was no element of force in the indictment, the Fourth Circuit held that Williams should have been sentenced under the burglary guidelines.

Disposition

Because there was no element of force in the indictment to which Williams pled, the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for resentencing under the burglary guideline § 2B2.1.

Tags:
9Nov

Fourth Circuit Rules Virginia’s Geriatric Release Program Violates Eighth Amendment Rights of Juveniles Serving Life Sentences for Non-Homicide Offenses

Categories: Civil Cases
Comments Off on Fourth Circuit Rules Virginia’s Geriatric Release Program Violates Eighth Amendment Rights of Juveniles Serving Life Sentences for Non-Homicide Offenses

By John Van Swearingen

On Wednesday, November 9, 2016, the Fourth Circuit issued a published opinion in the civil case LeBlanc v. Mathena. This matter was a habeas corpus petition brought by a juvenile offender sentenced to life without parole for a non-homicide offense. The District Court of the Eastern District of Virginia had previously concluded that Virginia’s Geriatric Release program, which provides offenders sentenced to life without parole the opportunity to petition for conditional release after the age of sixty, violated the minimum standards of the incorporated Eighth Amendment as held in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010). In Graham, the Supreme Court of the United States held that the Eighth Amendment forbids the sentencing of juveniles convicted of non-homicide offenses to life without parole. Juvenile life sentences for non-homicide offenses must provide a meaningful and realistic opportunity to obtain release based on “demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” Here, the circuit court affirmed the district court’s ruling, holding that Geriatric Release does not meet the requirements of Graham.

Facts and Procedural History

On January 1, 1995, Virginia enacted Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-165.1 (2015), abolishing parole for felonies convicted after that date. On July 6, 1999, the Petitioner committed the crimes of rape and abduction, and on July 15, 2002, he was convicted and sentenced to two life sentences.

After the Supreme Court decided Graham in 2010, the Petitioner filed a motion in Virginia state court to vacate his sentence of life without parole. In 2011, the state trial court denied Petitioner’s motion based on Angel v. Commonwealth, a contemporaneous Virginia Supreme Court decision holding that Virginia’s Geriatric Release program satisfied the requirements of Graham.

In June of 2012, the Petitioner filed a writ of habeas corpus in the District Court of the Eastern District of Virginia. The district court granted the habeas petition, holding that the Geriatric Release program did not meet the standards established in Graham. The Respondents in this case, the state, timely filed this appeal.

Virginia’s Geriatric Release Program

Virginia’s Geriatric Release program is a two-stage process by which convicted offenders with life sentences can apply for conditional release. Unlike Virginia’s abolished parole doctrine, the Geriatric Release program is not automatic. Offenders must initiate the process with a petition to the Parole Board – and again, they may only do so after their sixtieth birthday.

The first stage of the Geriatric Release process requires the offender’s petition demonstrate a “compelling” reason for the release of the offender. The term “compelling” is not defined in the relevant statute or administrative regulations. The Parole Board is able to deny the petition for Geriatric Release for any reason at this point.

Should the Parole Board permit the petition to go to the second stage, the offender will be provided the opportunity to make oral and written statements to the Parole Board to advocate for his or her release. If at least four out of five members of the Board agree, the offender’s petition for Geriatric Release will be granted.

Again, the process is distinguishable from the old parole system. Geriatric Release cannot be initiated until the offender turns sixty. Virginia’s parole process typically initiated after offenders had served about fifteen years. The Petitioner would likely have been eligible for parole, under the old system, after around twenty years. Under the Geriatric Release program, that length of time is approximately doubled. Further, only three out of five members of the Parole Board had to agree to grant parole. The Geriatric Release program requires one more member of the board for approval.

Standard of Review for Habeas Corpus Petitions

When a habeas petition is filed, the standard of review turns on whether the petition involves a question of law or fact. This case presents a question of law, meaning the standard of review is stated at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) (2012). If the court’s decision was an “unreasonable determination” of how the law applies to the facts in this case, then the court’s decision was improper. If the decision was reasonable, it stands.

Habeas petitions in federal district courts must review the case at hand in addition to the most recent state case addressing the issue. In this case, the most recent state case was the Angel decision, which held that the Geriatric Release program met the requirements of Graham. Since the state decision is contrary to the district court’s decision, either Angel or the district court’s decision will be determined unreasonable, and one holding will be affirmed.

The Standard Established in Graham

The holding in Graham was based on the Supreme Court’s conclusion that juveniles are less culpable for crimes than adults. Juvenile brains, the Court noted, are still developing. Because of this, the Court stated, juvenile offenders are less likely to be “irretrievably depraved” than adults. With that in mind, the Court examined the prospect of life without parole for juveniles convicted of non-homicide offenses in the context of the Eighth Amendment.

The Court noted that life without parole is only second to the death penalty in its harshness and ability to deprive convicted persons of hope. Life without parole is, therefore, an ultimate judgment of the irrevocable nature of an offender’s character. Given those points, the Court held that life sentences for juveniles convicted of non-homicide offenses must meet three requirements.

First, the sentence must provide an opportunity to obtain release based on “demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” Second, this opportunity must be meaningful and realistic. Third, the state’s parole and release programs at large must account for the lesser culpability of juveniles.

The Geriatric Release Program Does Not Satisfy the Graham Requirements

The Fourth Circuit held that the Virginia Geriatric Release program does not meet any of the three requirements set out in the Graham decision, thus overturning Angel and affirming the district court’s holding.

First, the Geriatric Release program does not require the Parole Board to consider any factors relevant to the juvenile’s maturity or rehabilitation. Additionally, because of the two-stage review process, a petition can be denied at the first stage – before the presentation of oral and written arguments. Also, over 95% of the denials of Geriatric Release petitions were based on the nature of the underlying crimes, which, again, precludes consideration of maturity and rehabilitation. Therefore, the program does not meet the first requirement of Graham.

Second, the circuit court held the extended duration of time compared to parole, coupled with the lack of consideration for juvenile-specific factors, rendered the opportunity provided under the Geriatric Release program neither meaningful nor realistic for juvenile offenders facing life sentences. Therefore, the program does not meet the second requirement of Graham.

Finally, the Geriatric Release program fundamentally contravenes the concerns underlying the Court’s third requirement in Graham. Unlike the abolished parole program, which counted time served regardless of age, the Geriatric Release program requires juveniles serving life sentences to spend a longer percentage of their life incarcerated than an adult serving the same sentence. Essentially, the program ensures that juveniles, though deemed to be less culpable by the Supreme Court, will bear a harsher punishment than adults.

Disposition

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order remanding the Petitioner’s case for resentencing. The Virginia Geriatric Release program permits the denial of offender’s petitions without requiring consideration of demonstrated maturity or rehabilitation. The program, in execution, results in more comparably harsh sentences for juvenile offenders than adult offenders. Therefore, the Geriatric Release program does not meet the requirements of the incorporated Eighth Amendment as enumerated in Graham.

Tags:
26Oct

Fourth Circuit Declines to Invalidate Petitioner’s Guilty Plea

Categories: 4th Cir. Blog Criminal Cases
Comments Off on Fourth Circuit Declines to Invalidate Petitioner’s Guilty Plea

By Ali Fenno

On October 25, 2016, the Fourth Circuit issued a published opinion in the criminal case of Dingle v. Stevenson. In Dingle, the Fourth Circuit addressed whether the Supreme Court’s holding in Roper v. Simmons, which invalidated the use of capital punishment against juvenile offenders, should apply retroactively to undo a guilty plea made by Ronald Donald Dingle (“Dingle”). After examining the scope of the holding in Roper and the nature of plea bargains, the Fourth Circuit held that Roper cannot apply retroactively to undo a guilty plea and affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of Dingle’s petition.

Lower Courts Repeatedly Dismiss Dingle’s Petitions

In 1993 the state of South Carolina (the “State”) charged Dingle with murder, assault and battery with intent to kill, first degree burglary, kidnapping, pointing a firearm, two counts of possession of a weapon during a violent crime, and two counts of possession of a sawed-off shotgun. Because the State intended to pursue the death penalty, Dingle plead guilty in exchange for life imprisonment with the possibility of parole.

When it was later discovered that the consecutive nature of Dingle’s sentences precluded parole, an integral part of the plea bargain, Dingle filed an application for post-conviction relief (“PCR”). The PCR court vacated his sentences and remanded for sentencing consistent with the intent of the plea agreement or for a new trial.

Several years later, a hearing still had not been held, so Dingle filed a motion for a speedy trial. The hearing was then held on July 28, 2005, and Dingle contended that his guilty plea should be withdrawn. He argued that the benefit of his plea bargain, avoiding the death penalty, was removed by the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Roper, which held that it was a violation of the Eighth Amendment for the death penalty to be used against juvenile offenders. The Court of General Sessions disagreed, rejecting Dingle’s request for a new trial and holding that pleas should be evaluated based on the law that existed in 1995. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed this decision, finding that Roper did not remove the benefit of the plea bargain.

Dingle again filed an application for PCR in 2009, arguing that Roper retroactively applied to his case and, as such, his guilty plea was involuntary because it was made to avoid cruel and unusual punishment. However, the PCR court found that Dingle’s claim was barred by res judicata. Dingle’s subsequent appeal and third petition were unsuccessful.

Dingle also filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2554 in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina. He raised four claims of error, but the district court dismissed the claims without prejudice.

On September 13, 2013, Dingle filed the instant § 2554 petition. The petition contested Dingle’s conviction on six grounds, but the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation to deny the petition in its entirety.

Issues on Appeal

The Fourth Circuit granted a certificate of appealability to determine the single issue of whether Roper may be applied retroactively to invalidate Dingle’s guilty plea. Dingle argued that the holding in Roper invalidated his guilty plea because (1) it was a substantive rule so applied retroactively to his case, and (2) if it would be improper for the state to seek the death penalty against him now, then it was also improper in 1995. Thus, his plea was invalid because it was attempt to avoid cruel and unusual punishment. However, the Fourth Circuit disagreed, concluding that (1) plea bargains are outside the scope of the Roper holding, and (2) the nature of plea bargains support upholding their validity.

Plea Bargains Are Outside the Scope of Roper

The Fourth Circuit first concluded that the holding in Roper was never intended to apply to plea bargains. Although the court conceded that Roper was indeed a substantive rule that could be applied retroactively, it found that the scope of the rule was limited to the actual sentence delivered in a case. Because Dingle did not actually receive the death penalty, attempting to apply the holding in Roper to his own case was “compar[ing] apples and oranges.” The court further noted that the Supreme Court had never before allowed “a substantive rule to stretch beyond the proscribed sentence to reopen guilty pleas with a different sentence.”

Future Legal Developments Cannot Invalidate Plea Bargains

The Fourth Circuit next concluded that the holding in Roper could not invalidate Dingle’s guilty plea because plea bargains are “a bet on the future,” whereby defendants accept both the benefits of a lighter sentence and the risks of losing out on future favorable legal developments. A defendant’s remorse at missing out on those favorable legal developments is not enough to rescind an entire bargain.

The court found support for this contention in Brady v. United States, where the Supreme Court held that a defendant who entered into a plea agreement to avoid capital punishment could not later withdraw his plea agreement when subsequent legal developments made him ineligible for the death penalty. The Supreme Court suggested that defendants who are offered plea bargains must weigh the benefits and risks of such bargains, and the fact that they did not anticipate certain legal developments could not “impugn the truth or reliability of [their] plea.” Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit concluded that when Dingle entered his guilty plea, he accepted the trade-off between present benefits and future risks that is “emblematic” of plea bargains, and his inability to anticipate the favorable outcome in Roper could not invalidate his plea.

Conclusion

The Fourth Circuit concluded that (1) Roper, even applied retroactively, could not invalidate Dingle’s plea, and (2) precedent and policy argued against setting aside Dingle’s plea bargain. Accordingly, it affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Dingle’s petition and held that Roper could not be applied retroactively to invalidate Dingle’s guilty plea.

Tags:
30Mar

Fourth Circuit Refuses to Prosecute Juvenile as an Adult

Categories: 4th Cir. Blog Criminal Cases
Comments Off on Fourth Circuit Refuses to Prosecute Juvenile as an Adult

By Malorie Letcavage

On March 30, 2016, the Fourth Circuit released its published opinion in the criminal case of U.S. v. Under Seal Defendant. The Defendant was a juvenile and federal law prohibits the public release of that juvenile’s name in association with the proceedings, so the juvenile was referred to as Defendant. Defendant was charged with murder in aid of racketeering in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1959(a)(1). This statute has a mandatory sentence of either death or life imprisonment. The government filed a motion in the district court to transfer the Defendant for prosecution as an adult for this offense. The district court denied the motion because the prosecution would be unconstitutional. The government appealed, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed, agreeing with the lower court that it would be against precedent and the constitution to sentence juvenile offenders to death or life imprisonment.

District Court Denied Motion for Transfer

The government’s motion for transfer was based on 18 U.S.C. § 5031, which removes juveniles from the ordinary criminal process. The act allows juveniles who are fifteen years old and above to be transferred from juvenile status if they have committed certain crimes and the transfer would be in the interest of justice. The court consider factors such as age, social background, nature of offense, and prior record in determining whether to transfer the juvenile.

In this case, Defendant was a few months shy of being eighteen when he participated in a gang-related murder. After the government’s motion to transfer the defendant, Defendant opposed the motion arguing that Supreme Court decisions held that juvenile offenders could not be sentenced to death or mandatory life imprisonment. Despite the interest of justice factors supporting a transfer, the district court agreed with Defendant that it would be unconstitutional to transfer and impose either of those mandatory sentences.

The court reviewed the recent court cases on point, stating that Roper v. Simmons held that juvenile offenders could not be sentenced to death, while Graham v. Florida prohibited sentencing juvenile offenders to life in prison without parole for non-homicide offenses. In Miller v. Alabama, the Court held that juveniles could not be sentenced to life without parole for all but the rarest cases where juveniles were irreparably corrupt. 18 U.S.C. §1959, which Defendant is charged under, only authorizes death or life imprisonment as punishments but the case law does not allow these punishments for a charge of murder in aid of racketeering.

Severability and Combination of Penalties Not Allowed 

The government posited the argument that the statute could be read to sever the problematic portions. The court explained that if legislation can function independently after an unconstitutional portion is severed, then it could be saved. The court found that the defining feature of a criminal statute is its punitive effect, and that if the unconstitutional punishments are removed from 18 U.S.C. §1959 there is no penalty provision. This lack of a penalty in a criminal statute invalidates it, and thus the statute cannot function independently.

The government also suggested that the statute could be restructured so that the punishment for kidnapping in aid of racketeering could be applied to murder in aid of racketeering, The Fourth Circuit soundly rejected this argument because to do so would be to overstep the judiciary’s role and trespass on the legislative role. The court refused to combine the penalties for two distinct criminal acts in the statute.

The Fourth Circuit also distinguished United States v. Booker by finding that nothing in that case allowed the judiciary to replace language in one provision with language not previously applied in a wholly separate provision. Booker looked to legislative intent in determining severability, but in this case there was no legislative intent available.

Government’s Arguments Rejected 

Furthermore, the court found that combining the penalties would violate due process. One of the notions of fairness stemming from the Constitution is the right to notice of what conduct is illegal and how severe the punishment for that conduct will be. The Fourth Circuit refused to look outside the boundaries of the statute for an alternative penalty since death and life imprisonment were not allowed because this would not give the Defendant fair notice of the punishment the crime would entail. The court held that it would not create new punishments outside of the authorized statutory punishments in the statute.

The court then distinguished other cases the government had relied on. It held that the cases cited did not give persuasive support because in this case the crime was committed after the Miller decision. It also held that other case law relied on only considered how to remedy a mandatory life sentence that was validly imposed at the time but later found to be unconstitutional, which was different than Defendant’s case. The court also rejected the government’s argument that its holding would cause the reversal of many convictions.

Fourth Circuit Affirms Denial of Motion to Transfer

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to deny the government’s motion to transfer the Defendant to be tried as an adult. It held that because the charge had mandatory sentences that were prohibited when applied to juveniles, a transfer that would impose those sentences would be unconstitutional.

Tags:
22Feb

Thirty-Three Month Sentence for Sex Offender Who Failed to Register Found to be Procedurally Unreasonable by Fourth Circuit

Categories: 4th Cir. Blog Criminal Cases
Comments Off on Thirty-Three Month Sentence for Sex Offender Who Failed to Register Found to be Procedurally Unreasonable by Fourth Circuit

gavel-judge-court-410-l

By Daniel Stratton

On February 19, 2016, the Fourth Circuit issued a published opinion in the criminal case United States v. Berry, vacating a sex offender’s thirty-three month sentence for failing to register on the grounds that it was procedurally unreasonable. The Fourth Circuit found that the defendant, Brian Berry, had been incorrectly categorized as a tier III offender under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and remanded the case to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina for resentencing under the appropriate standard.

Berry is Released From Prison, Fails to Register as a Sex Offender

In 2002, Berry pleaded guilty in New Jersey to endangering the welfare of a child in violation of New Jersey state law, after engaging in inappropriate sexual conduct with a five-year-old victim. Upon his release from prison, Berry was required to register under the federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA).

After initially registering, law enforcement discovered in 2013 that Berry no longer lived at his listed address in New Brunswick, New Jersey. SORNA requires a sex offender to update their registration upon every change of residence. Subsequently, New Jersey issued a warrant for Berry’s arrest for violating parole. He was found in North Carolina, where he pleaded guilty to one count of failing to register as a sex offender in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250.

SORNA classifies sex offenders into three tiers depending on the nature of the underlying sex offense.  More serious sex offenses are classified under the second and third tiers, while tier I is a catch-all for all others. The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines assign a base sentence depending on the tier. Under SORNA’s definition, an offender who engages in abusive sexual contact against a minor who is under thirteen years old falls under tier III. The district court determined that Berry was a tier III sex offender under SORNA and used that determination to calculate a sentencing range of thirty-three to forty-one months. He was ultimately sentenced to thirty-three months in prison, followed by five years of probation. Berry appealed his sentence, arguing that the district court classified him in the incorrect tier.

How SORNA’s Tier Classification System Works

To determine a sex offender’s tier classification, a court will compare the underlying sex offense with those listed in each of the tiers’ definitions. Generally, courts have adopted two frameworks for analyzing which tier an offender should be placed in. The first is the categorical approach, which compares the elements of the prior offense with the elements of the “generic” offense of that tier as defined in SORNA. If the elements of the prior offense “are the same as, or narrower than” the elements of the generic offense, then the offender is classified in that tier. If the statute encompasses broader conduct, which could fall outside of the offense enumerated in the federal statute, then the prior offense is not a match. Some jurisdictions also apply a modified categorical approach, which allows the categorical approach to be used where the prior conviction is for violating a “divisible statute.” A divisible statute is one that sets out one or more elements in the alternative. This approach allows courts to consult a limited number of court documents to determine which alternative formed the basis of the prior conviction.

The second approach is known as the circumstance-specific approach. It focuses on the circumstances underlying the prior offense. Under that approach, the court does not focus on the elements of the prior offense, and instead looks at whether it involved conduct or circumstances required by SORNA.

The Fourth Circuit Adopts the Tenth Circuit’s Hybrid Approach to Applying Tier III When Involving Minors

Noting that the Tenth Circuit recently concluded that “Congress intended courts to look to the actual age of the defendant’s victim, but to otherwise employ a [categorical] approach,” the Fourth Circuit adopted a similar view. The Fourth Circuit explained that when a statute makes reference to a generic offense, it is evidence that Congress intended a categorical approach to applying the statute. It also noted that when a statute refers to specific conduct or circumstances, it was evidence of Congress’s intent to apply a circumstance-specific approach.

The Fourth Circuit explained that SORNA’s use of generic offenses in its text indicated that a categorical approach should be used when analyzing a prior offense.  However, the element specifying a victim be under the age of thirteen indicated that the court should consider the specific circumstances of a victim’s age, rather than mechanically apply the categorical approach. Based on this, the Fourth Circuit concluded that it should apply a categorical approach to sex offender tier classification, with a limited-purpose circumstance-specific comparison for determining the victim’s age.

The Fourth Circuit Applies the Categorical Approach to Berry; Holds that He Was Improperly Classified

Applying the categorical approach to Berry’s case, the court looked at the New Jersey statute under which Berry was convicted.  The New Jersey Supreme Court interpreted the statute as to not require actual or attempted physical contact in order to be convicted of child endangerment. As a result, the statute could encompass conduct much broader than what fell within the generic elements of tier III. The Fourth Circuit found this to mean that the elements of the underlying statute were not “comparable to or more severe than” the elements of the generic tier III offense. This, the court concluded, meant that Berry could not be properly classified as a tier III offender. As a result, Berry’s sentence was improperly calculated using a higher base offense level, making Berry’s sentence procedurally unreasonable.

Berry’s Case is Sent Back to the District Court for Resentencing

After finding Berry’s sentence procedurally unreasonable, the court vacated the sentence and remanded the case back to district court. On remand, the Fourth Circuit instructed the district court to determine the appropriate tier level, calculate the new sentencing range, and impose a new sentence.

Tags:
17Feb

Fourth Circuit Allows Sentence Reduction

Categories: 4th Cir. Blog Criminal Cases
Comments Off on Fourth Circuit Allows Sentence Reduction

jail photo for blog

By Malorie Letcavage

On December 14, 2015, the Fourth Circuit released its published opinion in United States v. Lance Williams. The Court vacated the district court’s denial of Lance Williams’ motion for a reduced sentence under 18 U.S.C. §3582(c)(2). The Court’s opinion made it clear that when there is an amendment to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”) that explicitly allows for retroactive effect, this overcomes case law precedent prior to the amendment.

District Court Denies a Sentence Reduction

In 2008, Williams plead guilty to distributing cocaine. The United States Attorney filed a motion for an enhanced penalty under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) due to Williams’s prior drug conviction. Williams’ sentence was calculated but the enhanced penalty triggered the mandatory minimum sentence of 240 months. Before the sentencing hearing, the prosecutors filed a downward departure for the sentence based on William’s substantial assistance to the authorities, which reduced the sentence to 180 months.

Three years after the conviction and sentencing, Williams filed a pro se motion for a reduction under 18 U.S.C. §3582(c)(2) because of Guidelines Amendments 750 and 782, which were affected by Amendment 780. The district court, relying on United States v. Hood (“Hood“), denied this motion because Williams did not meet the criteria of §3582(c)(2) due to his sentence not being based on the Guidelines range, but instead being based on a statutory minimum and a reduction for substantial assistance.

Fourth Circuit Describes the Legal Framework

The Guidelines are the result of a commission created by Congress to help federal courts decide sentences. The commission is allowed to amend the Guidelines, and must clearly state if the amendments are to have retroactive effect. A sentence reduction is authorized only when an amendment has the effect of reducing the applicable guideline range. In order to determine if an amendment is applicable the Court uses a two-step test. First, the sentencing court must determine the prisoner’s eligibility for a detention modification, and then if he is eligible, the court can then determine the extent of the reduction.

The Fourth Circuit has recognized the power of the amendments to the Guidelines to override case law precedent because these amendments resolve disagreements among the courts of appeals. Thus, precedent in sentence reduction cases yields if it conflicts with the Guidelines amendments.

The Fourth Circuit’s decision to deny a sentence reduction in Hood was premised on the fact that the amendment Hood relied on had no impact on the statutory mandate or substantial assistance departure, which his sentence was based upon. Guidelines Amendment 780 was promulgated after Hood, and served to clarify that there is relief for prisoners who had been sentenced below statutory minimums as a result of substantial assistance motions.

Amendment 780 Precludes United States v. Hood

The Fourth Circuit found that Amendment 780 explicitly makes Williams eligible for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. §3582(c)(2) because it has the practical effect of changing the law. It held that the logic in Hood does not apply.

The Court also held that the amendment helps to eliminate disparity because otherwise a cooperating defendant with a guideline range above the statutory minimum would get relief while a cooperating defendant, like Williams, whose guidelines range was below the statutory minimum would be denied relief. The Court’s ruling thus also helps the policy of rewarding cooperation with authorities.

Williams is Eligible for a Sentence Reduction

Amendment 780 was in effect before the district court ruled on Williams’ motion for sentence reduction. The district court was therefore required to apply Amendment 780 and substitute the retroactive portion. If the Guidelines calculation then reveals a lower range, the prisoner is eligible for a sentence reduction.

Amendment 780 would reduce Williams’ offense level from twenty-seven to twenty-one and thus lower his guideline range to seventy-seven to ninety-six months. Since this range is lower than the original, Williams is eligible for sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. §3582(c)(2).

Conclusion

The Fourth Circuit reversed the lower court’s holding and remanded the case. It also made clear that while Williams is eligible for a reduction, the ultimate decision on amount of reduction is up to the sentencing court. Judge Traxler dissented because he believed only Congress, not the Guidelines, could change the sentencing departures. He also found Hood to be good law, and not completely in contradiction with Amendment 780. For these reasons, Judge Traxler did not think Williams was eligible for a sentence reduction.

Tags:
30Oct

Fourth Circuit Affirms Imposition of Obstruction Enhancement in Robbery Case

Categories: 4th Cir. Blog
Comments Off on Fourth Circuit Affirms Imposition of Obstruction Enhancement in Robbery Case

courtroom-898931_1280

By Kayleigh Butterfield

On October 30, 2015, the Fourth Circuit issued its published opinion in the criminal case United States v. Andrews. In Andrews, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s imposition of a U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 enhancement for obstructing the administration of justice, because the district court’s finding was not clearly erroneous based on the facts of the case.

False Alibi Testimony at Robbery Trial

On March 27, 2011, Andrews robbed a Domino’s Pizza store at gunpoint. Andrews stole the manager’s wallet, along with money from the cash register and other employees. After the incident, the manager reported the robbery to the police. In the following search for Andrews, police officers found a car that had been run off the road. The car contained the manager’s wallet along with numerous articles belonging to Andrews, identifying him as the owner of the vehicle, and placing him at the scene of the crime.

Andrews was subsequently charged and pled not guilty, invoking his right to a jury trial. Prior to trial, Andrews filed a notice of alibi and a brief describing alibi testimony. In his opening statement, Andrews’ attorney previewed the alibi testimony of Andrews’ girlfriend and her mother. Both women testified that Andrews was at their home on the night of the robbery. However, the mother of one of Andrew’s children testified that Andrews’ had visited her on the night in question and had then confessed to robbing the Domino’s store. Andrews chose not to testify and was found guilty on all counts.

On remand for resentencing, the government requested a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. The district court found sufficient evidence to support the enhancement given Andrews’ knowledge of the false testimony and his subsequent silence during trial.

Scope of U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1

The relevant language of § 3C1.1 provides that an enhancement for obstruction applies to defendants who “willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice with respect to the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of conviction . . . .” The commentary on   § 3C1.1 goes on to provide a non-exhaustive list of examples of covered conduct, which includes subornation of perjury. Further, the commentary notes that the defendant is accountable for his or her own conduct as well as for “conduct the defendant aided or abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused.”

Willful Obstruction of Justice

The Fourth Circuit first explained that, while perjury is a common form of obstruction, § 3C1.1 does not require a finding based on such narrow grounds. Nor was the district court’s finding based on perjury. The Fourth Circuit noted that the district court based its decision on facts that indicated a broader finding of a “willful obstruction of justice.”

Next, the Fourth Circuit addressed the facts and found no clear error in the district court’s imposition of the enhancement. The Fourth Circuit reasoned that the extensive evidence found in his car, as well as the testimony against him, showed that Andrews’ alibi testimony was “patently false.” As to whether Andrews knew his witnesses were going to present false testimony, the Fourth Circuit noted that Andrews’ notice of alibi, trial brief, and counsel’s opening statement all referenced the substance of the testimony. Andrews also filed a pro se motion against the prosecution for intimidating his witnesses and blocking them from testifying, and therefore should have known what testimony his motion sought to protect. Finally, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that even if Andrews remained unaware of the testimony up until his first alibi witness took the stand, he would have realized that the witness immediately following was about to present similarly false information. Thus, the Fourth Circuit found that the district court was within its discretion to impose the obstruction enhancement.

Finally the Fourth Circuit addressed Andrews’ argument that his right to remain silent was violated by the imposition of the obstruction enhancement. The Fourth Circuit made clear that the obstruction enhancement in no way overrides a defendant’s right to remain silent or present a vigorous defense. Rather, it prohibits a defendant from knowingly allowing false testimony, just as it would prevent him or her from testifying falsely.

Affirmed

For the aforementioned reasons, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s imposition of the obstruction enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.

Tags:
26Oct

Fourth Circuit Affirms Imposition of Supervised Release on an Alien Who is Likely to be Removed

Categories: 4th Cir. Blog
Comments Off on Fourth Circuit Affirms Imposition of Supervised Release on an Alien Who is Likely to be Removed

By Elizabeth DeFrance

On July 7, 2015, the Fourth Circuit issued a published opinion in the criminal case U.S. v. Aplicano-Oyuela. The Appellant, Gerson Arturo Aplicano-Oyuela (“Aplicano”) pled guilty to illegal reentry after his removal following a felony conviction, and received a term of three years supervised release. He appealed the term of supervised release, arguing that it was procedurally and substantively unreasonable, and the sentencing judge failed to advise him on supervised release before accepting Aplicano’s guilty plea in violation of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 11.

Aplicano had a History of Illegal Entry and Criminal Activity

Aplicano is a native citizen of Honduras, and illegally entered the United States in 2002. Between 2006 and 2011 he plead guilty to second-degree assault and driving without a license, and was convicted of criminal mischief. He was removed to Honduras in January 2012, and illegally reentered the United States within the next year. He was arrested several times in 2013, and plead guilty to another second-degree assault charge.

On July 26, 2013, a grand jury indicted Aplicano with illegal reentry by an alien who had previously been removed after a felony conviction. He initially plead not guilty, but later submitted a letter through his attorney stating that he pled guilty “without benefit of a plea agreement,” and acknowledged that the maximum sentence for his offense included a three year term of supervised release.  During the plea hearing, it was established that Aplicano understood he could be sentenced to the maximum penalty, including supervised release.

Aplicano’s presentence report (PSR) indicated that the Guidelines range for his offense level was ten to sixteen months, and indicated a supervised release term of not more than three years could be imposed if required by statute, if the court sentenced the defendant to a term of imprisonment longer than one year. The PSR also indicated that, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1(c), “the Court ordinarily should not impose a term of supervised release in a case in which supervised release is not required by statute and the defendant is a deportable alien who likely will be deported after imprisonment.” The PSR report recommended a supervised release term of two years due to Aplicano’s criminal history.

Applicano submitted a letter requesting the length of imprisonment be reduced, but did not address the supervised release recommendation or attempt to withdraw his guilty plea. During the sentencing hearing Aplicano urged the court to consider the violent gang attacks his family had suffered in Honduras. The district court did consider § 3553(a) factors, but ultimately found Aplicano’s story unconvincing. The district court focused much attention on Aplicano’s multiple illegal entries and propensity to commit crimes while in the United States.  The district court sentenced Aplicano to sixteen months in prison and a term of three years supervised release.

Alleged Sentencing Errors are Reviewed for Plain Error

Challenges to sentencing not preserved in the lower court are reviewed for plain error, as is a contest to a guilty plea the defendant did not attempt to withdraw. The defendant must prove that the error affects his substantial rights.

Imposition of a term of supervised release is procedurally reasonable if it is within the guidelines. The imposition of supervised release is “not a departure from the Guidelines if the district court finds that supervised release would provide an added measure of deterrence and protection based on the facts and circumstances of a particular case.”

When determining the substantive reasonableness of a sentence, the court must consider the totality of the circumstances, including any variance from the Guidelines. If the sentence is within the Guidelines range, the reviewing court may make a presumption of reasonableness. The defendant may rebut this presumption using the § 3553(a) factors, including the sentencing court’s use of an improper factor not included in § 3553(a).

The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(1)(H) states, “[b]efore the court accepts a plea of guilty [it] must inform the defendant of, and determine that the defendant understands, … any maximum possible penalty, including imprisonment, fine, and term of supervised release.” Fourth Circuit precedent also requires the sentencing judge personally inform the defendant and assure he understands the consequences of his guilty plea.

The Supervised Release Term was Intended as a Deterrent

In determining whether the term of supervised release was procedurally unreasonable, the Court noted that the district court failed to specifically discuss the Guidelines or that expressly state that the imposition of supervised release was intended to deter the defendant and protect the community. However,  the Court followed reasoning from Second Circuit, stating that it is sufficient if the sentencing court “(1) is aware of Guidelines section 5D1.1(c); (2) considers a defendant’s specific circumstances and the § 3553(a) factors; and (3) determines that additional deterrence is needed.” The Court reasoned that the district court was aware of section 5D1.1(c) because it adopted the PSR “without change” which included the recommendations from 5D1.1(c). It Also concluded that the district court adequately considered Aplicano’s specific circumstances because its opinion discussed Aplicano’s description of the violence his family experienced in Honduras, and his criminal history in the United States. Finally, the district court determined additional deterrence was necessary because it stated, “I think you may well try to get back in the country again.” Accordingly, the Court determined that the imposition of supervised release was not procedurally unreasonable.

In his challenge to the substantive reasonableness of the supervised release term, Aplicano argued that the district court’s statement that it would allow the authorities to “get him in jail much faster than if we went through a separate prosecution” indicated the use of an improper factor. However, the Court reasoned that this statement only indicated that the district court intended the term of supervised release to deter and protect the community. Accordingly, the imposition of supervised release was not substantively unreasonable.

In considering whether the district court violated Rule 11, the Court noted that Aplicano was advised during the plea hearing that he could receive the maximum term of three years supervised release. The Court reasoned that even if the district court had erred by failing to properly inform him of the nature of supervised release, a vacatur of his guilty plea was not warranted because the error did not affect his substantial rights. Specifically, Aplicano did not identify anything in the record indicating he would not have plead guilty if the district court had advised him on the nature of supervised release. The Court found it compelling that Aplicano made no effort to withdraw his guilty plea after the term of supervised release was imposed. Therefore, the Court concluded that Aplicano’s substantial rights were not affected.

Judgment of the District Court is Affirmed

The Court held that there was no error because imposition of supervised release was procedurally and substantially reasonable. It also held that Vacatur was unwarranted because the presumed error did not affect Aplicano’s substantial rights.

Tags:
26Sep

Fourth Circuit Affirms Use of Prior Convictions in Supervised Release Violation Sentencing

Categories: 4th Cir. Blog
Comments Off on Fourth Circuit Affirms Use of Prior Convictions in Supervised Release Violation Sentencing

By Sarah Saint

On May 20, 2015, the Fourth Circuit issued a published opinion in the criminal case U.S. v. Wynn, affirming the district court’s judgment. Anthony Wynn was convicted of drug offenses and sentenced to imprisonment followed by supervised release. Wynn violated the conditions of his release by possessing marijuana. The district court considered Wynn’s prior drug offenses when determining the grade of these possession violations, which Wynn argued was against the United States Sentencing Commission’s advisory policy statements for violations of probation and supervised release (the “policy statements”). The Fourth Circuit held that the district court did not err by using Wynn’s prior convictions to select the violation grade and accordingly affirmed the district court’s judgment.

The Marijuana Possessions and Revocation of Supervised Release

In 2003 Wynn was sentenced to a 150-month imprisonment, followed by a five-year supervised release, after being convicted of conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute under 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1). The conditions of the supervised release included refraining from unlawful use of controlled substances and submitting to drug testing.  After Wynn began his supervised release, his probation officer alleged Wynn had violated these conditions, including possession of marijuana on six occasions. Wynn admitted to these possessions and the district court found Wynn had violated the terms of his supervision, revoking his supervised release.

The probation officer used Wynn’s prior drug convictions to determine that his marijuana possessions were Grade B violations and punishable by between twenty-one and twenty-seven months imprisonment. Wynn argued that the marijuana possessions were Grade C violations and that the probation officer could not use his prior drug convictions in determining the violation grade under the policy statement. Because these are Grade C violations, Wynn argued for between eight and fourteen months’ imprisonment. The district court rejected Wynn’s argument and found the acts of possession constituted Grade B violations. The district court then sentenced Wynn to a term of twenty-four months imprisonment.

Standard of Review

Wynn only challenged the procedural calculation of the grade and thus the sentencing range. The Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s judgment de novo because properly applying policies is a question of law. The Court considered whether the district court correctly determined that the marijuana possessions were Grade B violations, or if they were actually Grade C violations as Wynn argued.

Grade B vs. Grade C Violations

Under U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a), Grade B violations are appropriate when the conduct constitutes an offense punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year. Grade C violations are appropriate when the conduct constitutes an offense punishable by a term of imprisonment of one year or less. Under 21 U.S.C. § 844(a), drug possession offenses by a non-recidivist are punishable by a term of imprisonment of one year or less. However, drug possession offenses by a recidivist are punishable by a term of imprisonment greater than one year.

Wynn’s Arguments Against Using Prior Offenses Are Unpersuasive

Wynn argued that the Court should use 21 U.S.C. § 851(a)(1) to hold that when determining imprisonment for supervised release violations, a court cannot consider a defendant’s prior criminal history unless the government files notice. However, the Court did not find this persuasive and determined that this statute only applies to sentencing after a guilty plea in a trial and in immigration proceedings.  Further, the purpose of a supervised release revocation hearing is to determine the breach of trust committed by the defendant by considering the context. Accordingly, the Court determined the government could use Wynn’s prior convictions in selecting the violation grade.

Wynn also argued that, under U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1 application notes, the violation grade should be based only on conduct committed during supervised release. However, the application notes state that the court should consider all of the defendant’s conduct. The Court determined the application notes, then, suggest all conduct affects the violation grade.

The Fourth Circuit Affirmed the Decision of the District Court

Because the district court did not err in selecting Grade B for the supervised release violation based on Wynn’s prior convictions, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment.

Tags:
15Sep

Subsequent Nullification of Career Offender Status Does Not Result in Claim for Collateral Relief

Categories: 4th Cir. Blog
Comments Off on Subsequent Nullification of Career Offender Status Does Not Result in Claim for Collateral Relief

By Elizabeth DeFrance

Is a Claim for Collateral Relief Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 Cognizable When the Petitioner’s Career Offender Designation Was Later Nullified?

On April 27, 2015, in the criminal case U.S. v. Foote, the Fourth Circuit affirmed in a published opinion the district court’s denial of a defendant’s petition for collateral relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The Court held that a Sentencing Guidelines error resulting from a change in the defendant’s career offender status did not rise to the level of fundamental defect when the sentence did not exceed the statutory maximum and the Sentencing Guidelines were advisory.

Foote’s Prior Convictions and Procedural History

On July 13, 2006 Wesley Devon Foote pled guilty to three counts of distribution of crack cocaine, a felony drug offense. Pursuant to the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”), the district court found Foote to be a “career offender” and sentenced him to 262 months in prison. As a result of his career offender designation, Foote’s advisory Guideline range rose from 151–188 months to 262–327 months.

Under the Guidelines, a defendant is considered a career offender if his instant conviction is a felony controlled substance offense and he has at least two prior felony controlled substance offenses. To meet these requirements, the felony controlled substance offenses must be punishable by imprisonment exceeding one year.

In 1995 and again in 2002, Foote was convicted of possession with intent to sell cocaine. He was sentenced to ten to twelve months for the first conviction and thirteen to sixteen months for the second. Although Foote’s 1995 sentence did not exceed one year, at the time of his sentencing, the court determined whether a conviction met the career offender requirements by considering whether the maximum aggravated sentence that could be imposed for that crime exceeded one year. Thus, because the maximum aggravated sentence for his 1995 conviction was well over one year, it was inconsequential that his actual sentence was below the required length.

Foote appealed his career offender designation. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, but he United States Supreme Court        vacated and remanded based on the decision in Kimbrough v. United States allowing sentences for crack cocaine offenses to deviate from the sentencing Guidelines. The district court entered an amended judgement for 262 months, declining to reduce Foote’s sentence below the Guidelines.

Foote appealed again and after the Fourth Circuit affirmed, he filed a petition for collateral relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. While the petition was pending, the Fourth Circuit held in United States v. Simmons that the determination of whether a conviction meets the career offender sentence length requirement should be based on the conviction itself instead of the sentence the defendant could have received. Accordingly, a certificate of appealability based on Simmons was issued allowing Foote to appeal.

Avenues for Relief Under § 2255

 Under § 2255, the only sentencing errors subject to collateral review are those that are (1) a violation of the Constitution, (2) imposed by a court without jurisdiction, (3) excessive of the statutory maximum, or (4) otherwise subject to collateral attack. Where the error does not violate the constitution and the court had jurisdiction, the error is only reviewable if it “amounts to a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice.”

Because the Guidelines Foote Was Sentenced Under Were Advisory Rather Than Mandatory, the Sentencing Error was Not Fundamental

The Court looked to decisions from other circuits on this issue and found that, although the courts were internally divided, the outcomes all indicated that a change in career offender status is not cognizable on collateral review. The Court also noted that Supreme Court cases where the “miscarriage of justice” standard has been met are rare and rely on the actual innocence of the petitioner. However, in this case, none of Foote’s convictions had been invalidated or vacated.

The reasoning the Court most relied on was that the Guidelines Foote was sentenced under originally, and would be sentenced under again if his appeal was successful, are advisory rather than mandatory. Thus, because Foote’s sentence did not exceed the statutory maximum, the Court reasoned that it was not a miscarriage of justice because it was entirely possible for Foote to receive the exact same sentence even if he won the appeal.

Foote’s Sentence Upheld

Although the change in career offender status may have affected the length of Foote’s sentence, it was, and still is, within the statutory limits. Because the sentencing error did not rise to the level of a fundamental defect resulting in the miscarriage of justice, the judgement of the district court was affirmed.

Tags:
9Apr

Fourth Circuit Affirms Drug Conviction & Sentence

Categories: 4th Cir. Blog
Comments Off on Fourth Circuit Affirms Drug Conviction & Sentence

By Michael Mitchell

Today, in the criminal case of United States v. Jenkins, an unpublished per curiam opinion, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the decision of the District Court for the District of South Carolina, upholding the defendant’s drug conviction and 170-month sentence.

Defendant Challenges Plea Bargain and Sentence

The Fourth Circuit considered the adequacy of the defendant’s plea hearing and the reasonableness of his sentence with regard to his immigration status.

Defendant Pled Guilty to Multiple Drug Charges

The defendant Raynard Allen Jenkins pled guilty to conspiracy to possess 280 grams of cocaine base and 500 grams of cocaine with the intent to distribute as well as possession of marijuana.  He was sentenced to 170 months in prison in accord with the Sentencing Guidelines, which provide for an enhanced sentence in certain drug-related convictions.

No Meritorious Grounds for Appeal

In accord with Anders v. California, the Court reviewed the entire record for any meritorious grounds for appeal and found none.  Thus, the court considered whether the defendant’s plea hearing and sentence were reasonable.

No Plain Error in Plea Bargain or Sentencing

The Fourth Circuit considered the adequacy of the defendant’s plea hearing by reviewing the record for plain error, holding that the district court substantially complied with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11.  The court’s failure to alert the defendant of the potential issues with his immigration status as a result of his plea agreement did not affect his rights.  The Fourth Circuit also held that the defendant’s 170-month sentence was procedurally and substantively reasonable.

Fourth Circuit Affirms Conviction & Sentence

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district’s court’s judgment upholding the defendant’s conviction for conspiracy to distribute cocaine and marijuana possession as well as his 170-month prison sentence.

Tags:
7Apr

Fourth Circuit Affirms Sentencing Judgment

Categories: 4th Cir. Blog
Comments Off on Fourth Circuit Affirms Sentencing Judgment

By Katharine Yale

Yesterday, in the unpublished criminal case United States v. Hamilton, the Fourth Circuit reviewed the sentences of the defendant, Thomas Hamilton, and affirmed the district court’s judgment. A jury found Hamilton guilty of manufacturing marijuana and of possessing firearms and ammunition after having been convicted of a felony. The court sentenced him accordingly. On review, Hamilton argued that the court below erred in allowing the testimony of a state trooper and by applying the four-level enhancement under the United States Sentencing Guidelines (the “Guidelines”).

The Court Uses an Abuse of Discretion Standard in Reviewing a District Court’s Decision to Admit Evidence

In reviewing a district court’s decision to admit evidence, the Fourth Circuit uses an abuse of discretion standard. Evidence of prior bad acts, under Rule 404(b), “may be admitted as proof of ‘motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident. . . ’” However, such evidence cannot be admitted to prove a person’s character. Further, to be admissible under Rule 404(b), the evidence must be relevant to an issue other than character, necessary, and reliable. If the probative value of the evidence is “substantially outweighed by its unfair prejudice to the defendant,” the evidence should be excluded.

The District Court Did Not Err in Admitting Trooper Richardson’s Testimony

Here, Trooper Richardson testified that in 2005 he had seen Hamilton in possession of a handgun. The Fourth Circuit found that the testimony met all of the criteria for admissibility, that the district court was careful in its ruling, and the use of limiting jury instructions eliminated the risk of unfair prejudice.

The Court Uses a Clear Error Standard in Reviewing Guidelines Calculations and Reviews the Court’s Legal Conclusions De Novo

The Fourth Circuit reviews the district court’s Guidelines calculations using a clear error standard for findings of fact and reviews its legal conclusions de novo. Section 2k2.1(b)(6)(B) of the Guidelines allows for a four-level enhancement to the sentence if a defendant “used or possessed any firearm or ammunition in connection with another felony or offense.” In general, a firearm or ammunition is possessed “in connection with” another felony offense “if the firearm or ammunition facilitated, or has the potential of facilitating, another felony offense.”

Under the Guidelines, there is a presumption for drug trafficking offenses. A firearm is presumed to have the potential of facilitating another felony offense if it “is found in close proximity to drugs, drug-manufacturing materials, or drug-paraphernalia.”

The District Court Did Not Err in Applying the Four-Level Enhancement to Hamilton’s Sentence

Here, at least one of the firearms was found in close proximity to drug paraphernalia. Additionally, the presence of the firearms was not an accident. The firearms were “‘present for protection [and] to embolden’ Hamilton.” Thus, the district court did not err in applying the four-level enhancement.

The Fourth Circuit Affirmed the District Court’s Judgment

Tags: