15 Wake Forest L. Rev. Online 25

Trinity J. Chapman

“The family, that dear octopus from whose tentacles we never quite escape, nor in our innermost hearts never quite wish to.”

– Dodie Smith, Dear Octopus.

Introduction

“The first bond of society is marriage; next, children; and then the family.”[1] There is no doubt that the face of the modern American family has changed drastically over the past fifty years. As family structures and social norms have changed, so too has the law evolved to reflect this transformation. Today’s reality is that some children—whether by design or circumstance—are being raised by three parents. To best serve North Carolina’s children and families, the state should adopt a statute allowing a child to have three legal parents.

I. Landscape of the Modern American Family

A statute providing for the possibility of three parents would be the legal recognition of an existing reality. The structure of society, types of families, and methods of family formation have evolved greatly in the past century.[2]

Fifty years ago, the word “family” might have evoked ideas of a household comprised of a mother and father, married to each other, and one or more biological children. And while this description always failed to capture the reality of many family structures, the landscape today is even more varied. Recent data shows that only 46 percent of children in the United States live in households comprised of two married parents in their first marriages.[3] Eight percent of American and North Carolinian children live with unmarried, cohabitating parents.[4] Nearly 24 million children (34 percent) live in single-parent households.[5] Most of these children (14.5 million) live in single-mother households, while 3.5 million live in single-father households.[6] In North Carolina, the number of children living in single-parent homes is higher than the national average; 36 percent of children live with a single parent.[7] Five percent of the nation’s children––and 6 percent of North Carolina’s children––reside with neither parent.[8] Further, 4 percent of children nationwide and 4 percent of North Carolinian children reside in the care of their grandparents.[9]

Family formation is also changing.[10] Today, one out of every twenty-five American families has adopted a child, and there are approximately 4.5 million adopted children nationwide.[11] In addition to adoption, the number of children conceived through assisted reproductive technology (ART) is on the rise. In 2019, 83,946 children were born who were conceived through ART.[12]

Even decades ago, any notion of a “traditional” American family was illusory. But today, such a notion could not be further from the truth. “[T]here is no longer one dominant family form in the U.S.”[13] The panoply of American families is more diverse than ever.

As family has changed in tangible ways, social norms and values have also progressed. Americans have become more accepting of diverse family forms. The majority of Americans now report that “a single parent raising children on their own” is “completely acceptable.”[14] A majority of Americans also deem same-sex couples who choose to raise children together to be either “completely acceptable” or “somewhat acceptable.”[15] Moreover, less than half of Americans feel that the declining number of children being raised by two married parents will have a negative societal impact.[16] Only 36 percent believe that fewer people getting married is negative, and only 29 percent believe that an increase in nonmarital cohabitation is negative.[17]

Regarding more controversial ideas, acceptance differs by age. Although most Americans over fifty believe that open marriages, or marriages where “both spouses agree that they can date or have sex with other people” are unacceptable, 51 percent of Americans aged 18–29 find such marriages acceptable.[18] Younger Americans are also more accepting of divorce in reportedly unhappy marriages than their older counterparts.[19] Notably, the strongest predictor of one’s views on family arrangements and forms is one’s own experience.[20] Experience has a greater impact than age, race, religious beliefs, or media.[21] Inasmuch as social norms embody a generational shift, views about nontraditional families are almost sure to become more and more accepting with time, especially as more people experience nontraditional family structures themselves. As such families become increasingly common, more individuals will live in and witness them, and acceptance is likely to grow.

As social norms shift over time, our laws shift too. Perhaps the most notable of such changes took place in 2015, with the recognition of same-sex marriage as a constitutional right in Obergefell v. Hodges.[22] Before the Obergefell decision, same-sex marriage was already legal in thirty-seven states.[23] However, the decade before Obergefell saw a dramatic shift in public opinion and the law surrounding same-sex marriage. In 2003, only twelve years earlier, the Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas[24] struck down a Texas statute outlawing consensual same-sex sexual activity.[25] The next year, in 2004, Massachusetts became the first state to legalize same-sex marriage.[26] By 2014, same-sex marriage was legal in North Carolina.[27]

In 2004, only 31 percent of Americans were in favor of its legalization.[28] By 2019, the number had risen to 61 percent.[29] With the nationwide legalization of same-sex marriage, the American law, ever adaptable, evolved once more to reflect the changing values of its society.

The same concept should apply with regard to non-traditional parenting arrangements. As Americans—and particularly young Americans—change their views on and become more accepting of diverse family structures, the law should shift to embrace, or at least acknowledge and accommodate, the increasingly varied families that make up our nation.

II. Counting up from Zero

Numerous situations exist in which a legal option to recognize more than two parents would be beneficial. The 1989 case of Michael H. v. Gerald D.[30] provides a quintessential example. There, Carole D. and Gerald D. were a married couple.[31] Carole became pregnant after an affair with Michael H.[32] The child, Victoria, was born while Carole and Gerald were still married.[33] Gerald held himself out as Victoria’s father, and Victoria’s birth certificate listed Gerald as her father.[34] Still, shortly after giving birth, Carole informed Michael that he might be Victoria’s biological father.[35]

During the first three years of Victoria’s life, she and Carole lived in several different family arrangements.[36] Gerald moved to New York, while Carole and Victoria remained in California and lived with Michael.[37] During that time, Carole and Michael obtained a paternity test, which revealed a “98.07% probability that Michael was Victoria’s father.”[38] The next year, Carole visited Michael in St. Thomas, where Michael held Victoria out as his child.[39] Two months later, Carole and Victoria returned to California to live with a man named Scott.[40] The same year, Carole and Victoria spent time with Gerald in New York and vacationed with him in Europe, but later returned to California to live with Scott.[41] By this time, both Gerald and Michael had formed quasi-parental connections with Victoria.[42]

Problems arose when Michael attempted to visit Victoria.[43] Carole rejected these attempts, and Michael filed a petition for visitation and to be adjudicated as Victoria’s father, claiming under substantive due process that “he ha[d] a constitutionally protected ‘liberty’ interest in the relationship he ha[d] established with Victoria.”[44] Victoria, through her appointed guardian ad litem, filed a due process claim asserting that “if she had more than one psychological or de facto father, she was entitled to maintain her filial relationship, with all of the attendant rights, duties, and obligations, with both.”[45] Victoria claimed that her equal protection rights had been violated “because she had no opportunity to rebut the presumption of her legitimacy.”[46]

During the pendency of the case, Carole and Victoria first resided with Gerald, moved to live with Michael, and then moved to again live with Gerald.[47] Gerald and Carole proceeded to have two more children.[48]

Gerald intervened in the action, asserting that no issue existed as to Victoria’s paternity since he was entitled to the marital presumption.[49] Ultimately, the Supreme Court acknowledged that Michael was Victoria’s biological father, but held that California’s marital presumption law was not unconstitutional and maintained that Gerald was Victoria’s legal father.[50] The Court went on to reject Victoria’s claim that she had a due process right to maintain relationships with both Gerald and Michael, remarking “the claim that a State must recognize multiple fatherhood has no support in the history or traditions of this country.”[51]

The Court’s holding might seem like a strange result. Victoria had lived with and formed filial relationships with both men.[52] As her guardian ad litem asserted, she stood to reap psychological benefits from both relationships.[53] Recognizing both Michael and Gerald as legal parents would have ensured Victoria’s continued relationship with both men. Yet, relying on an apparent lack of tradition, the Court dismissed Michael’s substantive due process claim and Victoria’s due process and equal protection claims.

While there may have been a lack of tradition for “multiple fatherhood” in 1989, the diversification of family forms in the following thirty-six years has established such tradition. Given the ever-increasing prevalence of non-traditional cohabitation and family arrangements in the three decades since Michael H.,[54] the argument that multiple parenthood lacks legal or cultural grounding has weakened.

Today, multiple parenthood is recognized not only through real-life family structures but also by the law. In 2013, a Florida court approved an adoption by three parents.[55] There, two women conceived a child through sperm donated by a male friend.[56] The sperm donation came after an informal, verbal agreement between the three.[57] However, just before the girl’s birth, the donor decided that he hoped to play a larger role in the girl’s life—rather than merely being a donor, he wanted to be a legal parent.[58] After a lengthy legal battle, the court agreed to make both women and the man the girl’s parents.[59]

In Alaska, a judge approved a child’s adoption by two additional parents without terminating the existing mother’s parental rights.[60] The mother, who was terminally ill, sought adoptive parents for her child but did not wish to relinquish her own rights while she remained alive.[61]

In D.G. v. K.S.,[62] the Superior Court of New Jersey deemed one individual to be a child’s “psychological parent” after three individuals entered into a unique agreement to parent a child together.[63] Each of the three parties took a role in parenting and childcare duties, and the arrangement worked until K.S. wished to relocate with the child.[64] Following a contentious custody battle, the court ultimately divided custody and financial responsibility for the child among the three parties.[65] Although the court was “particularly sympathetic” to S.H.’s attempt to establish legal parentage, it noted that a “‘tri-parenting model’ with three legal parents is supported neither by the statute at hand nor the case law.”[66] Underscoring the potential and need for change, the court remarked that “[a] statutory change is best left to the Legislature, as such change demonstrates a ‘social policy choice,’ not a constitutional question.”[67]

In Dawn M. v. Michael M.,[68] a New York Supreme Court case, a married couple in a romantic relationship with another individual, A, decided to conceive a child together, with Michael and A being the biological parents of the child.[69] Eventually, the relationship became strained, leading to the couple’s divorce. Dawn and A then moved out, bringing the child with them.[70] Custody orders contemplated primary custody with A and liberal visitation by Michael.[71] Dawn sought to ensure her continued relationship with the child.[72] In considering the possibility of a tri-parenting agreement, the court noted that the child was “a well-adjusted ten-year-old boy who loves his father and his two mothers.”[73] During an in-camera session, the child disclosed that he would be “devastated if he were not able to see [Dawn].”[74] Determining that it was in the child’s best interest, the court ultimately ordered a tri-parenting custody agreement.[75]

Three-parent options have provided solutions in circumstances like those described above. But such an option is hardly limited to these circumstances. As more diverse family structures continue to become commonplace, a three-parent option might provide solutions in the following hypothetical situations:

  • A and B marry and conceive Child. The couple divorces. Both parents continue to play an active role in Child’s life and upbringing. Later, A remarries. Stepfather also plays an active parental role in Child’s life. A becomes ill, and Stepfather hopes to continue to play a role in Child’s life in the event of A’s death. A, B, and Stepfather all want Stepfather to be recognized as a parent, but neither A nor B want to relinquish their parental rights.
  • D and E, two women, are married and hope to conceive a child through assisted reproduction. Their close friend, F, agrees to serve as a sperm donor. D, E, and F all agree that they would like F to play a parental role in Child’s life, and F wants to ensure that his rights as a parent will be protected.
  • G, H, and J are together in a polyamorous relationship. G and H conceive a biological child with the expectation that G, H, and J will raise the child together. The child is born, and J takes an active paternal role in Child’s life. Child regards G, H, and J as parents.
  • K and L are Child’s biological parents. K and L are unable to successfully parent as they are experiencing drug addiction, and K’s parents, Grandmother and Grandfather, serve as Child’s primary caregivers. L’s parental rights are terminated, but K recovers and continues to play a secondary parental role in Child’s life. Grandmother and Grandfather, hoping to ensure stability for Child, seek to adopt him. Still, neither grandparent nor Child hopes to terminate K’s rights.
  • M and her husband, N, hope to conceive a biological child. However, M has a mitochondrial disease. Using in vitro fertilization, M and N combine DNA from M’s egg, N’s sperm, and mitochondrial DNA from O. M, N, and O all agree to take an active role in parenting the child. Child is born and has three biological parents.
  • P and Q marry, have two children, and divorce. P remarries R. R, P, and Q all play active parental roles in the children’s lives. After several years, R hopes to be recognized as a legal parent, and P and Q agree that this is a good idea.
  • R and S marry and have two children, T and U. R and S divorce, and S marries V. V adopts T and U. The court does not terminate R’s parental rights. R dies intestate.[76]

III. Other States’ Laws

Understanding the paths to a three-parent option in North Carolina begins with an understanding of how other states have handled the issue. At least ten other states have already embraced the idea that a child may have more than two legal parents through legislation or published case law.[77]

  • California: California allows for multi-parent custody arrangements. In addition, California’s Family Code explicitly states that a court may “find that more than two persons are parents . . . if the court finds that recognizing only two parents would be detrimental to the child.”[78]
  • Connecticut: Connecticut law provides that “the court may adjudicate a child to have more than two parents.”[79]
  • Delaware: Delaware adopted the newest version of the Uniform Parentage Act, which provides for a three-parent option.[80]
  • Louisiana: Louisiana allows multiple fatherhood. It allows a petitioner to “institute an action to prove paternity even if the child is presumed to be the child of another man.”[81]
  • New Jersey: In D.G. v. K.S., New Jersey recognized that a child had two legal parents and an equitable parent.[82]
  • North Dakota: In McAllister v. McAllister,[83] the court granted visitation rights and “parental rights” to a third parent under the doctrine of psychological parenthood.[84]
  • Maine: Maine’s Parentage Act states that “a court may determine that a child has more than two parents.”[85] It also provides clear avenues to de facto parenthood.[86]
  • Minnesota: The Minnesota Supreme Court approved a tripartite custody arrangement.[87]
  • Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania courts have acknowledged the possibility of a three-parent child support order.[88]
  • Washington: Washington adopted the newest version of the Uniform Parentage Act, which provides for a three-parent option.[89]
  • Vermont: The Vermont Parentage Code contemplates the possibility of more than two parents.[90]

Other Countries:

  • Canada: Ontario, Canada has recognized that a child may have three parents.[91]
  • Brazil: Brazil recognizes the possibility of multiple fatherhood.[92] Further, it allowed a three-parent birth certificate with the names of two married women and their child’s biological father.[93]
  • Argentina: Where a same-sex couple and biological parent were involved, Argentina allowed all three to be listed on the child’s birth certificate.[94]

IV. Equitable and Legal Parenthood

As it stands, there are two viable paths to the recognition of three parents: (1) a statutory option and (2) through the operation of equitable parenthood doctrines. Both pathways have been used successfully, but a statutory option is preferable because of the certainty and clarity it could provide. Still, North Carolina families could benefit from either approach.

A. Equitable vs Legal Parents

Notably, while some of the statutes and case law discussed above provide for three legal parents, others only allow for three equitable parents.[95]

Equitable parenthood doctrines evolved out of necessity. Traditionally, legal parent status has hinged upon either biology, marriage, or adoption.[96] Status as a “formal legal parent” carries with it all the traditional notions, rights, and responsibilities of parenthood.[97] Still, for some––particularly same-sex couples before nationwide marriage equality––legal parenthood produced “harsh results.”[98] In families with same-sex parents, at most one of those parents was the biological parent of the child.[99] In pre-Obergefell America, same-sex marriage was often off the table.[100] Adoption of the child by the non-biological parent, while possible, remained a difficult and expensive option for some couples.[101] When these couples split up, the lack of available legal status created uncertain results that had the potential to harm children by removing their access to individuals whom they knew and understood as parents.[102]

To combat this result, some courts turned to “equitable parenthood” doctrines like de facto parentage, psychological parentage, in loco parentis, and parenthood by estoppel.[103] Though the rights of individuals with these statuses vary by jurisdiction, equitable parenthood doctrines typically provide some of the rights and responsibilities of parenthood and place parties in stronger positions to seek visitation and/or custody.[104]

B. Legal Parenthood as a Better Option

Legal parenthood is preferable to equitable parenthood doctrines for two reasons. First, legal parenthood provides greater stability and certainty to families. Second, denying parents in non-traditional family structures the status of legal parenthood relegates them to a lesser status and unjustly denies their access to the privileges and benefits of parenthood enjoyed by more traditional families.

Equitable parenthood, though not ideal, remains a viable and perhaps more attainable alternative. North Carolina has already recognized equitable parenthood,[105] and extending this recognition to multiple parents in the exceptional cases that warrant it would be less of a stretch.

In the 2008 case of Mason v. Dwinnell,[106] the North Carolina Court of Appeals recognized the existence of a psychological parent.[107] There, Dwinnell appealed after the trial court granted shared custody of her child to her and her former domestic partner, Mason.[108] Both women, Dwinell was the child’s biological parent, and Mason was neither a biological nor legal parent.[109] However, Mason and Dwinnell planned and conceived the child together and gave the child both of their surnames, naming him Mason Dwinnell.[110] They shared caretaking responsibilities for the child.[111] When the couple split up, the trial court awarded Mason joint custody because her involvement in the child’s life made her a psychological parent.[112] The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed.[113]

Despite this early case, North Carolina’s case law on psychological parenthood is meager. Some North Carolinians are hostile to the doctrine. The North Carolina Family Policy Council, for example, published an article arguing against de facto parenthood and provided the following hypothetical.[114]

Imagine this scenario: You and your husband are married and have a child named Jane. Five years into the marriage, your husband leaves and moves in with Nancy, his new girlfriend. He files for divorce and gains joint custody of Jane. Your husband and Nancy live together for three years, but never marry. Nancy assumes a number of parental responsibilities, including providing childcare for Jane. Your now ex-husband and Nancy split up, but Nancy misses Jane. She goes to court and gets joint custody over the objections of both you and your ex-husband.[115]

What opponents fail to understand, however, is that this scenario would almost certainly not result in the court deeming Nancy a de facto parent. De facto parenthood doctrines require some type of “holding-out,” meaning that the party seeking de facto parenthood must “present[] the child to others” as their own.[116] In addition, most approaches to de facto parenthood require that any parent-child relationship established between a petitioner and a child must have been formed with the consent of the legal parent.[117]

For example, under the American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, an individual may qualify for de facto parenthood if he (1) lives with the child, (2) has formed a parent-child relationship with the agreement of the legal parent, and (3) performs the majority, or as much, caretaking as the legal parent.[118]

Currently, North Carolina follows a test for psychological or de facto parenthood that requires that the legal parent “ch[ose] to cede [to the petitioner] a sufficiently significant amount of parental responsibility and decision-making authority to create a permanent parent-like relationship with her child” and considers (1) whether there was a parent-child bond; (2) the child’s attachment to the petitioner; (3) the “parent-like duties and responsibilities” that petitioner assumed; (4) whether petitioner provided financial support for the child; (5) whether the petitioner was “viewed as a co-parent by family and friends”; (6) whether the child views petitioner as one of its parents; (7) whether the petitioner “engaged in ‘any conduct inconsistent with her claim to exclusive control of the children’”; and (8) whether petitioner was viewed as a co-parent by “professionals and medical providers.”[119]

North Carolina family courts understand the importance of stability in children’s lives.[120] By allowing for the possibility that a child may maintain a relationship with an individual who has served as a parent in her life, de facto parenthood doctrines work, to an extent, to enhance stability. Still, while equitable parenthood is an option for North Carolina families, it is generally disfavored by courts, and only three published North Carolina cases discuss it.[121] Thus, while equitable parenthood may serve as a tool in some three-parent situations, the general uncertainty of the doctrine in North Carolina makes it a worse option than legal parenthood. Further, given the necessity of litigation in establishing equitable parenthood, the doctrine might be cost-prohibitive for some individuals and families. In addition, given that the legal status of equitable parents varies by jurisdiction and is often a judicial creation, it is subject to the vagaries and uncertainties of common law. For all of these reasons, equitable parenthood is less ideal than legal parenthood.

Second, legal parenthood is preferable because the gravity of the legal status communicates to both parents and children about the integrity of their families. In Obergefell, the Supreme Court recognized the power and impact of legal status on individuals’ perception. Justice Kennedy remarked that, by virtue of “their exclusion from [the] institution [of marriage], . . . same-sex couples [were] consigned to an instability many opposite-sex couples would deem intolerable in their own lives.”[122] Same-sex couples sought marriage equality not in an attempt to demean the institution of marriage; rather, their desire to participate in the institution was a demonstration of their respect for it.[123]

Regarding the children of same-sex parents, Justice Kennedy opined that, “[b]y giving recognition and legal structure to their parents’ relationships, marriage allows children ‘to understand the integrity and closeness of their own family and its concord with other families in their community and in their daily lives.’”[124] While same-sex couples in some states had access to marriage-like regimes, such as domestic partnerships, civil unions, and reciprocal benefit agreements, these doctrines did little to make up for the reality that these individuals, many of whom desired to participate in the time-honored tradition of marriage, were denied that opportunity.

The same paradigm applies to non-traditional parenthood. In the history of our nation, perhaps no legal status besides marriage is so respected and honored as parenthood.[125] Parents in multi-parenting arrangements––and the children being raised in these arrangements––should enjoy the “recognition, stability, and predictability” provided by legal parenthood.[126] Refusing legal recognition for the reality that multi-parent families exist “relegate[s] [these children] through no fault of their own to a more difficult and uncertain family life.”[127] This is wrong. Children raised by more than two parents deserve the stability and certainty of legal parenthood. To relegate third parents who seek official, legal status and their children to a lesser, semiliquid doctrinal status denies them this certainty. Recognizing legal multi-parenthood would serve North Carolina’s longstanding policy of advancing children’s best interests. There is value in a child being able to point to an individual and say, with certainty, that “she is my mom” or “he is my dad.”

V. Three Biological Parents

With the rapid advance of assisted reproductive technologies, the idea of a child with three biological parents is no longer a far-off notion from science fiction; it has already happened.[128] Typically, sperm and egg donors involved in the ART process seek to ensure that they will not have any of the legal rights or responsibilities of parenthood. Though infrequent, an increasing number of ART agreements seek the legal recognition of three parents, all of whom were “involved in the child’s creation and/or the parenting process.”[129]

Today, three-parent families are both a social and biological reality. Notwithstanding the strong social and societal arguments for a three-parent option, the fact that it is already a scientific reality should be enough to warrant legislative recognition.[130]

VI. The Best Interest of the Child (and the State)

Perhaps the strongest argument for the legal recognition of three parents in North Carolina is that, in many cases, it would serve the best interest of the child.

The best interest of the child is the gold standard in family courts across the United States, including in North Carolina.[131] When family courts are tasked with making major decisions about children’s lives, they turn to an evaluation of what would be in the child’s (and not the adult’s) best interest.[132] In Price v. Howard,[133] the North Carolina Supreme Court considered the meaningful parenting role that the petitioner had played in the child’s life and held that he was likely tantamount to a natural parent, such that the child’s best interest favored him retaining custody.[134] Similarly, in In re Montgomery,[135] the court evaluated the best interest of the child in determining whether a parent’s rights should be terminated.[136] It emphasized that “the best interest of the child is the polar star” guiding “North Carolina’s approach to controversies involving child . . . custody.”[137]

Having a third parent also offers a more practical social safety net for children in those situations. In a situation where two other parents are unwilling or unable to care for a child, a third parent could make the difference between a child remaining in parental care or entering foster care.

For children who grow up in family arrangements with three parents, there is no doubt that a legal, formal recognition of these relationships would be in their best interest in at least some instances. Legal parenthood for third parents could provide stability and security for children and their parents—children could have the confidence and security of knowing who their parents are, and parents would have the comfort of ensuring their continued rights to the care and custody of their children.

Legal recognition of a three-parent option would also lessen the financial burden on North Carolina and its taxpayers. As seen in Jacob v. Schultz-Jacob,[138] a third parental figure can be someone whom the state looks to for support.[139] Having multiple sources of support for a child is not only beneficial for the child, but also for the state. Social welfare programs that support children and families are absolutely necessary, but they are also expensive. In 2021, North Carolina spent $554 million on the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program.[140] In 2023, the state’s budget for its Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) was $191 million.[141] Further, North Carolina spent over $21 million on Medicaid in 2023, with some of this total going to find medical care for children.[142] Unlike these programs and others like them, formal child support is unique in that it “enforces the private transfer of income from parents who do not live with their children to the household where the children live” rather than “transfer[ring] public funds to families as most social welfare programs do.”[143] In addition to formal child support orders, informal support from more than two parents would be beneficial in some cases. In 2017, the cost of raising a child born in 2015 was estimated to be $233,610.[144] In 2025, this number is even higher. Undoubtedly, the number of families who would exercise a three-parent option would be very small. Still, if three parental figures are all willing to contribute to a child’s financial support and well-being, the state would be well-served to encourage that. Recognizing three parents might also open some of the “constellation of benefits” conferred on parents and children, like life and health insurance benefits. Thus, allowing for three parents would not only be in the best interest of children but also the best financial interest of the State of North Carolina.

VII. How Many Is Too Many? Attachment & Best Interest

Another way in which a multi-parent option would serve the best interests of children and society is through the stability and encouragement it would provide to significant attachment relationships. In some situations, allowing for three parents may help bolster a child’s psychological health throughout childhood and into adulthood. A child’s attachment to their caregivers is an essential aspect of healthy development.[145] Attachment is a relationship between child and caregiver that is “involved with making the child safe, secure and protected.”[146] Attachment is present where the child “uses the primary caregiver as a secure base from which to explore and, when necessary, as a haven of safety and a source of comfort.”[147] Secure attachments act as a “protective factor against social and emotional maladjustment,” while disorganized attachment is “a powerful predictor for serious psychopathy and maladjustment in children.”[148] As they age, many children with disorganized attachment in infancy struggle in school, both academically and socially.[149] Adolescents who experienced disorganized attachment have higher levels of psychopathy and struggle with self-regulation.[150] In young adulthood, these individuals are more vulnerable to dysfunctional mental processes such as dissociation.[151] Overall, attachment during childhood influences not only one’s inner, mental experience but also her future interactions with her peers and with society.[152]

Notably, children are not limited to a single secure attachment. Attachment is defined, in part, as an “emotional bond that emerges between an infant and one or a few significant adult caregivers.”[153] Attachment literature supports the notion that a child may have more than two significant attachment relationships.[154] However, these relationships are not limitless, and many caregivers do not rise to the level of “attachment figures” in a child’s life.

Secure attachments unquestionably serve a child’s best interests. Accordingly, following the best interest of the child legal standard, North Carolina family courts have already recognized the importance of attachment in a child’s life.[155] Of course, recognition of more than two legal parents would not be appropriate in all situations, even those where a child is securely attached to more than two adults.[156] Still, since the law purports to promote a child’s best interests, in situations where the circumstances are right, the law should allow for legal recognition of more than two parents. Providing a legal avenue through which a parental figure’s relationship can be legally sanctioned encourages the continuity of the parent’s relationship with the child. Given the substantial individual and societal harm that can stem from a child without appropriate attachment relationships, the law should strive to promote potentially positive attachment relationships.

VIII. Three Parents and Family Privacy

North Carolina children and families would be well-served by a statutory option providing for the recognition of three parents. The law must evolve to fit more diverse and ever-changing family structures and social norms. However, acknowledging the situations in which judges have recognized the possibility of three legal parents might evoke a number of reactions. On one hand, the situations reflect complicated, and often tumultuous relationships among adults. For some, it might be difficult not to react negatively, with the sense that situations such as these provide for non-ideal family dynamics, confusing environments, and overall negative impacts on children. For them, a codified three-parent option would be the legal ratification of an unfortunate societal ill. These arguments, while understandable on their face, fall short. Still, it is worth examining them.

First, the idea that a better environment or better family could have been achieved is far from unreasonable. Examining the above cases prompts reflection on whether better choices might have been made by those involved. At times, a more legally reasoned approach from the outlook might have avoided a three-parent custody battle. For example, in the Florida case,[157] the parties would have been well-served by a formal assisted reproduction contract drafted by a lawyer.[158] And yet, the reality stands that these unique situations do occur––and with increasing frequency.[159]

The law recognizes that family situations are often far from ideal. Marriage rarely occurs in contemplation of divorce, for example, and divorce is far from an ideal outcome. But the law, to meet people’s needs, must still provide an avenue through which to exercise personal autonomy and end marriages. The same logic applies to parental relationships. Though it might reflect family structures that some find less than ideal, allowing a three-parent option would enable personal autonomy and give people the capacity to make family decisions that best suit them. In Troxel v. Granville,[160] the Supreme Court opined that “our world is far from perfect.”[161] Noting that “there is normally no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the family,” the Court struck down an overly permissive visitation statute that would have allowed family courts to substitute their judgment for that of fit parents.[162] Troxel reinforced the idea that the law respects family autonomy.[163] Even if judges or lawmakers might have made a different decision, it is the place of a fit parent—and not of the courts—to decide how to run one’s family.

Any decision about family formation is deeply personal, and the decision to have a three-parent family, whether intentional or through circumstance, is no different. To respect this decision and honor family autonomy aligns with deeply rooted constitutional principles.[164] Three-parent families remain relatively uncommon and undoubtedly might face some prejudice. Still, the law must not give legal recognition to a private prejudice. The Supreme Court echoed that sentiment in Palmore v. Sidoti,[165] where it struck down a lower court’s ruling that a white mother was unfit to have custody of her child based on the perceived social unacceptability of her interracial marriage.[166] It remarked that the law must not “bow[] to the hypothetical effects of private . . . prejudice,” even if that prejudice was “widely and deeply held.”[167] Hypothetical prejudice was not a “permissible consideration[] for removal of an infant child from the custody of its natural mother.”[168] Despite the social disapproval that three-parent families might face, the fact remains that they do exist. Such families should not be denied legal recognition on the grounds of such prejudice.

IX. A Statute for North Carolina

North Carolina should adopt a statute that provides for the possibility of legal recognition of more than two parents.

The Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) provides a valuable template for North Carolina. Section 201 of the UPA provides that a parent-child relationship is established between an individual and a child if:

(1) the individual gives birth to the child [outside the surrogacy context];

(2) the individual is presumed a parent, either through the marital presumption or where “the individual resided in the same household with the child for the first two years of the life of the child, including any period of temporary absence, and openly held out the child as the individual’s child”;

(3) the individual is adjudicated a parent of the child;

(4) the individual adopts the child;

(5) the individual acknowledges parenthood of the child, [unless that acknowledgment is rescinded or successfully challenged];

(7) [the individual is the intended parent of the child according to an assisted reproduction agreement]; and

(8) [the individual is the intended parent of the child according to a surrogacy agreement].[169]

Section 613(a) of the UPA specifically states that “two or more individuals” may establish parenthood.[170]

Given North Carolinians’ understandable concerns about a three-parent option, the legislature might even adopt a provision whereby the family court would only allow for more than two parents where “it would serve the child’s best interests and would be detrimental to the child to refuse to do so.”

Conclusion

As our world and society continue to shift, family law must evolve with it. Such a statute would serve to modernize North Carolina family law in a way that best serves families today. North Carolina values and respects family, and its family laws serve to enhance those policies. A three-parent option would be the legal recognition of the existing reality that some North Carolina children have three parents.

A three-parent option would tailor North Carolina law to best serve all its residents, including those living in nontraditional family forms. It would provide parents with the dignity and security of legal parent status. It would provide financial benefits for children who might not otherwise receive them, serving to further protect the state and taxpayers from the burden of supporting minor children. It would honor North Carolinians’ autonomy and liberty to structure their families and personal lives in the ways that they see fit. And perhaps most importantly, it would serve the best interest of so many children––now and in the future––by providing them the legal protections and security that come along with having legal parents.

At the precipice of an ever-changing family landscape, North Carolina has the opportunity to put aside private bias and prejudice to truly embrace and support families and children.[171] To that end, North Carolina should allow for three legal parents.

Trinity J. Chapman[172]

  1. . Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 657 (2015).
  2. . James Fletcher Thompson, South Carolina Adoption Law and Practice: A Guide for Attorneys, Certified Investigators, and Families 306–07 (2d ed. 2023).
  3. . Pew Rsch. Ctr., Parenting in America 15 (2015), https://www.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/20/2015/12/2015-12-17_parenting-in-america_FINAL.pdf. In 1960, by contrast, 73 percent of children lived in households with two married parents in their first marriage. Id.
  4. . Children Living with Cohabitating Domestic Partners in United States, Annie E. Casey Found.: Kids Count Data Ctr. (2025), https://perma.cc/CLT8-FZMR.
  5. . Children Living in Single-Parent Families in United States, Annie E. Casey Found.: Kids Count Data Ctr. (2025), https://perma.cc/6RKM-X92J.
  6. . Child Population by Household Type in United States, Annie E. Casey Found.: Kids Count Data Ctr. (2025), https://perma.cc/L2SW-53ZZ.
  7. . Children Living in Single-Parent Families in North Carolina, Annie E. Casey Found.: Kids Count Data Ctr. (2025), https://perma.cc/5Z2L-W5PE.
  8. . Children Living with Neither Parent in North Carolina, Annie E. Casey Found.: Kids Count Data Ctr. (2025), https://perma.cc/C5ND-VXC6.
  9. . Children in the Care of Grandparents in North Carolina, Annie E. Casey Found.: Kids Count Data Ctr. (2025), https://perma.cc/V6KX-NYAP.
  10. . Thompson, supra note 2, at 306–07.
  11. . U.S. Adoption Statistics, Adoption Network (2025), https://perma.cc/7Y7J-25A3.
  12. . Ctrs. for Disease Control, 2019 Assisted Reproductive Technology Fertility Clinic and National Summary Report 37 (2021), https://archive.cdc.gov/www_cdc_gov/art/reports/2019/pdf/2019-Report-ART-Fertility-Clinic-National-Summary-h.pdf. Although rates dropped in 2020, presumably as a result of COVID-19, overall trends show an increase in the use of and in live births resulting from ART. In 2011, by comparison, only 61,599 children were born as a result of ART. Id. at 104.
  13. . Pew. Rsch. Ctr., supra note 3, at 15.
  14. . Kim Parker & Rachel Minkin, Pew Rsch. Ctr., Public Has Mixed Views on the Modern American Family 7 (2023), https://perma.cc/D8TT-LFXQ.
  15. . Id.
  16. . Id. at 12.
  17. . Id. at 13.
  18. . Id. at 26–27.
  19. . Id. at 25.
  20. . Id. at 23.
  21. . Id. at 23–24.
  22. . 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
  23. . Bill Chappell, Supreme Court Declares Same-Sex Marriage Legal In All 50 States, NPR (June 26, 2015), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/06/26/417717613/supreme-court-rules-all-states-must-allow-same-sex-marriages.
  24. . 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
  25. . Id. at 578–79.
  26. . Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003).
  27. . Gen. Synod of the United Church of Christ v. Resinger, 12 F. Supp. 3d 790, 791–92 (W.D.N.C. 2014).
  28. . Attitudes on Same-Sex Marriage, Pew Rsch. Ctr. (May 14, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/fact-sheet/changing-attitudes-on-gay-marriage/.
  29. . Id.
  30. . 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
  31. . Id. at 113.
  32. . Id.
  33. . Id.
  34. . Id. at 113–14.
  35. . Id. at 114.
  36. . Id.
  37. . Id.
  38. . Id.
  39. . Id.
  40. . Id.
  41. . Id.
  42. . Id. at 113–14.
  43. . Id. at 114–15.
  44. . Id. at 111, 114.
  45. . Id.
  46. . Id. at 111.
  47. . Id. at 114–15.
  48. . Id. at 115.
  49. . Id. at 115. “[T]he marital presumption treats the woman who gives birth and her spouse as the legal parents, unless someone challenges the presumption.” June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Marriage and the Marital Presumption Post-Obergefell, 84 UMKC L. Rev. 663, 664 n.8 (2016).
  50. . Michael H., 491 U.S. at 131–32.
  51. . Id. at 131.
  52. . Id. at 115.
  53. . Id.
  54. . See supra text accompanying notes 3–9.
  55. . Kevin Gray, Florida Judge Approves Birth Certificate Listing Three Parents, Reuters (Feb. 7, 2013), https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSBRE91618M/. This case did not lead to published case law, so the situation described will hereinafter be referred to as “The Florida Case.”
  56. . Id.
  57. . Id.
  58. . Id.
  59. . Id.
  60. . Jennifer Peltz, Courts and ‘Tri-Parenting’: A State-by-State Look, AP News (June 28, 2017), https://apnews.com/general-news-parenting-4d1e571553a34cfbb22b72249a791a44.
  61. . Id.
  62. . 133 A.3d 703 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2015).
  63. . Id. at 706.
  64. . Id. at 709.
  65. . Id. at 727, 731.
  66. . Id. at 727.
  67. . Id.
  68. . 47 N.Y.S.3d 898 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2017).
  69. . Id. at 900.
  70. . Id.
  71. . Id. at 900–01.
  72. . Id. at 901.
  73. . Id.
  74. . Id.
  75. . Id. at 902.
  76. . Section 2-118(a) of the Uniform Probate Code allows a child to have three parents for inheritance purposes if a biological parent’s spouse adopts the child. See Unif. Prob. Code § 2-118(a) (amended 2019). Under subsection (b)(2)(A), T and U remain R’s and S’s children, and under Section 2-118(a) are V’s children for all purposes of intestate succession. See id. § 2-118(b)(2)(A).
  77. . In her article Mom, Mommy & Daddy and Daddy, Dad & Mommy, Colleen Quinn provided a comprehensive list of various jurisdictions’ multi-parenthood laws as they existed in 2018. This article reflects Quinn’s research but also includes jurisdictions who have changed their laws since Quinn’s article was published in 2018. See Colleen M. Quinn, Mom, Mommy & Daddy and Daddy, Dad & Mommy: Assisted Reproductive Technologies & the Evolving Legal Recognition of Tri-Parenting, 31 J. Am. Acad. Matrim. Laws. 175, 180–200 (2018).
  78. . Cal. Fam. Code §§ 3040(f), 7612(c) (2023).
  79. . Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-475(c) (2022).
  80. . Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 8-201(c) (2013); see also Unif. Parentage Act § 201 (2017).
  81. . Quinn, supra note 77, at 183 (citing La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 197 (2005)).
  82. . 133 A.3d 703, 709 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2015).
  83. . 779 N.W.2d 652 (N.D. 2010).
  84. . Id. at 661–62.
  85. . Me. Stat. tit. 19-A, § 1853 (2023).
  86. . Id. § 1891.
  87. . LaChapelle v. Mitten, 607 N.W.2d 151, 168 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000).
  88. . In Jacob v. Schultz-Jacob, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania arranged for a three-parent child support order, noting that, “since all of the three persons involved in these matters have been awarded formal rights of custody, all three are obligated to provide support.” 923 A.2d 473, 479 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007).
  89. . Wash. Rev. Code § 26.26A.460 (2024).
  90. . Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15C, § 206 (2025).
  91. . Quinn, supra note 77, at 185.
  92. . Id. at 186–87.
  93. . Id. at 199.
  94. . Id.
  95. . Quinn, supra note 77, at 187–88.
  96. . Jessica Feinberg, Whither the Functional Parent? Revisiting Equitable Parenthood Doctrines in Light of Same-Sex Parents’ Increased Access to Obtaining Formal Legal Parent Status, 83 Brook. L. Rev. 55, 55 (2017).
  97. . Id. at 56.
  98. . Id.
  99. . Id. at 55.
  100. . See id.
  101. . See What to Know About the History of Same-Sex Adoption, Considering Adoption (2025), https://perma.cc/YS6S-VQUY.
  102. . Feinberg, supra note 96, at 55–56.
  103. . Id. at 56.
  104. . Id. at 56–57.
  105. . See Deborah Zalesne, The Contractual Family: The Role of the Market in Shaping Family Formations and Rights, 36 Cardozo L. Rev. 1027, at 1056 n.133 (2015).
  106. . 660 S.E.2d 58 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008).
  107. . Id. at 65.
  108. . Id. at 60.
  109. . Id.
  110. . Id. Mason and Dwinnell hoped to list both of their names as parents on the birth certificate, but the hospital refused. Id.
  111. . Id.
  112. . Id. at 62.
  113. . Id. at 73.
  114. . John Rustin, It Doesn’t Take a Village, N.C. Fam. Pol’y Council (May 16, 2013), https://www.ncfamily.org/it-doesnt-take-a-village/.
  115. . Id.
  116. . Courtney G. Joslin, De Facto Parentage and the Modern Family, Fam. Advoc., Spring 2018, at 31, 33.
  117. . See Ira Mark Ellman et al., ALI Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution 119 (2002).
  118. . See id.
  119. . Estroff v. Chatterjee, 660 S.E.2d 73, 78, 80 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008); see also Price v. Howard, 484 S.E.2d 528, 537 (N.C. 1997) (recognizing an equitable parent).
  120. . In re J.B., 864 S.E.2d 285, 292 (N.C. 2021) (recognizing that a child “needs consistency and stability”); In re S.M.M., 845 S.E.2d 8, 13 (N.C. 2020) (“The juvenile needs . . . stability.”).
  121. . See Mason v. Dwinnell, 660 S.E.2d 58, 59 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008); Estroff, 660 S.E.2d at 80; Price, 484 S.E.2d at 537 (recognizing an equitable parent).
  122. . Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 670 (2015).
  123. . See id.
  124. . Id. at 668 (quoting United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 772 (2013)).
  125. . See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (recognizing that the right to “establish a home and bring up children” is among the “privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men”).
  126. . See Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 668.
  127. . Id.
  128. . Michelle Roberts, First ‘Three Person Baby’ Born Using New Method, BBC (Sept. 27, 2016), https://www.bbc.com/news/health-37485263.
  129. . Quinn, supra note 77, at 176.
  130. . See infra example accompanying notes 31–53.
  131. . See Jason J. Reed, The Façade of a Best Interest Standard: Moving Past the Presumption to Ensure Decisions Are Made for the Right Reasons, 29 Wis. J.L. Gender & Soc’y 149, 150 (2014); Price v. Howard, 484 S.E.2d 528, 530 (N.C. 1997).
  132. . See Price, 484 S.E.2d at 530.
  133. . 484 S.E.2d 528 (N.C. 1997).
  134. . Id. at 537.
  135. . 316 S.E.2d 246 (N.C. 1984).
  136. . See id. at 251–52.
  137. . Id. at 251.
  138. . 923 A.2d 473 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007).
  139. . Id. at 479.
  140. . Ctr. on Budget & Pol’y Priorities, North Carolina TANF Spending (2025), https://perma.cc/PP42-XNBW.
  141. . 2024 WIC State Plan Posted for Public Comment, N.C. Dep’t Health & Hum. Servs. (Aug. 10, 2023), https://www.ncdhhs.gov/blog/2023/08/10/2024-wic-state-plan-posted-public-comment.
  142. . See Annual Report Tables Dashboard: NC Medicaid Funding and Expenditures, N.C. Dep’t Health & Hum. Servs., https://medicaid.ncdhhs.gov/reports/dashboards/annual-report-tables-dashboard (last visited Apr. 27, 2025).
  143. . Elaine Sorensen, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., The Child Support Program is a Good Investment 2 (2016), https://acf.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ocse/sbtn_csp_is_a_good_investment.pdf.
  144. . Mark Lino, The Cost of Raising a Child, U.S. Dep’t of Agric.: USDA Blog (Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.usda.gov/media/blog/2017/01/13/cost-raising-child.
  145. . See Diane Benoit, Infant-Parent Attachment: Definition, Types, Antecedents, Measurement and Outcome, 9 Paediatrics & Child Health 541, 541 (2004) (“Attachment theory is one of the most popular and empirically grounded theories relating to parenting.”).
  146. . Id.
  147. . Id.
  148. . Id. at 543 (“Children with disorganized attachment are more vulnerable to stress, have problems with regulation and control of negative emotions, [and] display oppositional, hostile, aggressive behaviors and coercive styles of interaction.”).
  149. . Id.
  150. . Id.
  151. . Id.
  152. . See id.
  153. . Heidi Keller, Universality Claim of Attachment Theory: Children’s Socioemotional Development Across Cultures, 115 Procs. Nat’l Acad. Scis. U.S.A. 11414, 11415 (2018).
  154. . Marian J. Bakermans-Kranenburg, The Limits of the Attachment Network, 180 Child & Adolescent Dev. 117, 118 (2021). Research suggests that children might be able to form relationships with up to five adults. Id. at 120.
  155. . See, e.g., In re S.M., 869 S.E.2d 716, 726 (N.C. 2022).
  156. . Bakermans-Kranenburg, supra note 154, at 121 (“[N]ot every caregiver is an attachment figure, and not every social relationship is an attachment relationship.”).
  157. . Gray, supra note 55.
  158. . See Cook v. Harding, 879 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 2018) for an example of the importance of careful drafting in surrogacy agreements.
  159. . See, e.g., Christine Schuster, Finding the Balance in Tri-Parenting Agreements, SuperLawyers, https://www.superlawyers.com/resources/family-law/parental-rights/finding-the-balance-in-tri-parenting-agreements/ (Apr. 25, 2025). Eric Wrubel, a family law attorney, notes, “We are starting to see more and more of it, largely because people are mobile and you can have children in so many different ways.” Id.; see also Faith Karimi, Three Dads, a Baby and the Legal Battle to Get Their Names Added to a Birth Certificate, CNN (Mar. 6, 2021), https://www.cnn.com/2021/03/06/us/throuple-three-dads-and-baby-trnd/index.html.
  160. . 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
  161. . Id. at 70.
  162. . Id. at 58, 75.
  163. . See id.
  164. . See Douglas NeJaime, The Constitution of Parenthood, 72 Stan. L. Rev. 261, 305 (2020) (citing Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)).
  165. . 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
  166. . Id. at 431, 434.
  167. . Id. at 433 (quoting Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 260–61 (1971) (White, J., dissenting)).
  168. . Id.
  169. . Articles 7 and 8, referenced in the text of the UPA and paraphrased here, lay out specific requirements for assisted reproduction and surrogacy agreements.
  170. . Unif. Parentage Act § 613(a) (2017).
  171. . While this Comment focuses on the evolving legal recognition of nontraditional families, it is important to note that these families and their members continue to face challenges and setbacks in certain political contexts. The recognition and support of diverse family structures should be embraced as a shared and unifying value, as the well-being of every family enriches society as a whole.
  172. . Wake Forest University School of Law, J.D. 2025. Wofford College, B.A. 2021. I am grateful to Jennifer Tharrington and Professor Marie-Amélie George for their insights on this topic. Special thanks to Jim Thompson for his mentorship, invaluable feedback, and advocacy for innovation in family law. Thank you to Christine Chapman, Valerie Harley, and Ivey Fidelibus for their unwavering support and encouragement. I also thank the editors of the Wake Forest Law Review for their careful edits.

By: Emily Mundt

In the wake of his scourge against diversity, equity, and inclusion (“DEI”) in federal spaces, President Trump has turned his attention to what he believes is  one of the primary perpetrators of DEI in the private sector, big law. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has demanded information about employment practices from 20 of the largest–and most prestigious–law firms, including Kirkland & Ellis; Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom; and Latham & Watkins.[1] These firms have been targeted for their use of DEI in the hiring process, including, but not limited to, the use of diversity associate positions for law students or attendance at diverse networking events to attract higher numbers of diverse applicants.[2]

This is not the first instance in which the President has attacked the private sector and big law. In another wave of executive orders, Trump has both stripped the security clearance of “one attorney at Covington & Burling and all attorneys with clearances at Perkins Coie and Paul, Weiss”[3] and barred their attorneys’ ability to enter federal buildings, including the federal courthouses in which they litigate.[4] In a memorandum entitled, “Preventing Abuses of the Legal System and the Federal Court,” Trump urged the attorney general to “efficiently and effectively” hold accountable those “lawyers and law firms that engage in actions that violate the laws of the United States or rules governing attorney conduct.”[5] Citing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) 11, the memorandum suggested that attorneys who “harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation”[6] should be sanctioned to the fullest extent of the law.  The memorandum claimed that “too many attorneys and law firms have long ignored these requirements when litigating against the Federal Government or in pursuing baseless partisan attacks.”[7]

Notably, those firms attacked in the security clearance stripping have reputations–and careers–built on federal litigation. According to a March 6 Executive Order “addressing risks from Perkins Coie,” the firm’s loss of clearance stems from its 2016 representation of Hillary Clinton, during which, according to the Order, “Perkins Coie hired Fusion GPS, which then manufactured a false ‘dossier’ designed to steal an election.”[8] “This egregious activity is part of a pattern. Perkins Coie has worked with activist donors including George Soros to judicially overturn popular, necessary, and democratically enacted election laws, including those requiring voter identification.”[9] Additionally, Perkins Coie allegedly “racially discriminates against its own attorneys and staff, and against applicants . . . It proudly excluded applicants on the basis of race for its fellowships, and it maintained these discriminatory practices until applicants harmed by them finally sued to enforce change.”[10]

As for Paul, Weiss, a March 14 Executive Order cited the firm’s history in litigating the January 6 Insurrection, stating “[i]n 2021, a Paul Weiss partner and former leading prosecutor in the office of Special Counsel Robert Mueller brought a pro bono suit against individuals alleged to have participated in the events that occurred at or near the United States Capitol on January 6, 2021 . . .”[11] The March 14 Order specifically targets pro bono work, claiming:

Global law firms have for years played an outsized role in undermining the judicial process and in the destruction of bedrock American principles.  Many have engaged in activities that make our communities less safe, increase burdens on local businesses, limit constitutional freedoms, and degrade the quality of American elections.  Additionally, they have sometimes done so on behalf of clients, pro bono, or ostensibly “for the public good” — potentially depriving those who cannot otherwise afford the benefit of top legal talent the access to justice deserved by all.  My Administration will no longer support taxpayer funds sponsoring such harm.[12]

Firms personal ties to the President seem to have been spared the “chilling” of the executive orders. Jones Day and other “elite Trump-friendly firms,” such as “Sullivan & Cromwell, which agreed to appeal his Manhattan criminal conviction, and Troutman Pepper Locke, which represented Trump family members in the New York Attorney General’s civil fraud trial against the Trump Organization, are also missing from the EEOC list.”[13]

What these orders mean for the future of big law in North Carolina is uncertain. North Carolina has long been a key battleground state for the presidential election, with 16 electoral college votes that swing between Democrat and Republican. In 2024, the President narrowly defeated Democratic candidate Kamala Harris by 3.3 percentage points, or 183,048 votes.[14] With North Carolina, specifically Charlotte, becoming a “magnet” for big law expansion, whether the President will continue his policies of targeting DEI or not may depend entirely on whether such actions would further alienate potential Republican voters, especially since North Carolina is trending to be a key battleground state in the 2026 Senate elections. Furthermore, according to 2023 Census Bureau statistics, only 60.6 of North Carolina residents are White (Non-Hispanic), meaning potentially 39.4% of the state population would benefit from DEI programs.[15] These programs are essential not only to expanding the workforce, which stood 4.675,559 million strong in 2020,[16] but also for securing job placements for diverse postgraduate students in North Carolina, where White doctoral students, including law students, still outnumber diverse students 1.26 to 1.[17] What remains to be seen is whether the President will abandon his DEI policies in order to win over an increasingly diverse and politically important state.


[1] Lauren Hirsch, The Nonprofit Caught in the Fray of Trump’s Attacks on Big Law, N.Y. Times (Mar. 28, 2025), https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/22/business/dealbook/trump-dei-seo-wall-street.html; Rebecca Beitsch, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Targets Law Firms over DEI Practices, The Hill (Mar. 18, 2025), https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/5200887-eeoc-equal-opportunity-employment-commission-law-firms-dei-trump/.

[2] Craig Savitzky, A Look at Diversity in Big Law, Unveiling a Path Forward, Leopard Solutions (July 18, 2024), https://www.leopardsolutions.com/a-look-at-diversity-in-big-law-unveiling-a-path-forward/.

[3] Rebecca Beitsch, Law Firms Divided Over Response to Trump Orders, The Hill (Mar. 25, 2025), https://thehill.com/regulation/court-battles/5211686-trump-administration-targets-law-firms/.

[4] Id.

[5] Memorandum for the Att’y Gen., Preventing Abuses of the Legal System and the Federal Court, The White House (Mar. 22, 2025), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/03/preventing-abuses-of-the-legal-system-and-the-federal-court/.

[6] Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1).

[7] Memorandum, supra note 5.

[8] Exec. Order No. 14230, Addressing Risks from Perkins Coie LLP, The White House (Mar. 6, 2025), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/03/addressing-risks-from-perkins-coie-llp/.

[9] Id.

[10] Id.

[11] Exec. Order No. 14237, Addressing Risks from Paul Weiss, The White House (Mar. 14, 2025), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/03/addressing-risks-from-paul-weiss/.

[12] Id.

[13] Jacob Shamsian, Trump Targeted 20 of the Biggest Law Firms over Their Diversity Programs. A GOP Favorite is Missing from the List., Bus. Insider (Mar. 21, 2025), https://www.yahoo.com/news/trump-targeted-20-biggest-law-092501746.html.

[14] North Carolina President Results: Trump Wins, NBC News (Nov. 5, 2024), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2024-elections/north-carolina-president-results.

[15] North Carolina, DATA USA, https://datausa.io/profile/geo/north-carolina?completionsUniversities=carnegie_DOC&genderRaceOptions=raceOption&pums5WorkforcePyramid=pums5Race1 (last accessed Apr. 1, 2025).

[16] Id.

[17] Id.

By: Murray McLoud

Background on Measles and the MMR Vaccine

Measles is an extremely contagious virus that spreads via air droplets after an infected individual breathes, sneezes, or coughs.[1] Contracting measles does not require close contact with an infected individual—instead, it can occur by breathing in contaminated air droplets or touching an infected surface.[2] To make matters worse, the virus “remains active and contagious in the air for up to two hours.”[3] As a result, a measles patient can quickly infect anywhere from twelve to eighteen individuals they come into contact with.[4] Once someone contracts the measles virus, they do not merely experience a simple rash or fever. Instead, a measles diagnosis can result in severe health consequences including pneumonia, encephalitis,[5] or even death.[6]

Before the development of a vaccine, nearly all children contracted measles before reaching their sixteenth birthday.[7] The United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) even estimates that during the 20thcentury, there were three to four million cases of measles infections.[8] Due to this extreme number of infections, Dr. John Enders set out to create a vaccine and succeeded in 1963.[9] His measles, mumps, and rubella (MMR) vaccine proved to be highly effective, leading to a declaration that measles was eliminated from the United States in 2000.[10]Currently, the MMR vaccine is 97% effective after two doses and can prevent children from contracting this deadly disease throughout their lifetime.[11] Thus, to protect children from contracting measles, parents should ensure their child receives the MMR vaccine.

North Carolina’s Stance on Vaccinations

Under North Carolina (NC) law, every child in the state must be immunized against measles.[12] Further, children are not allowed to attend school if their parents do not present the school with a certificate of immunization showing the child received the measles vaccine.[13] There are two exemptions to this general rule: for medical[14] or religious reasons.[15] The medical exemption is very straightforward because it can only be granted after a licensed NC physician submits a certification to the state that the immunization at issue will be detrimental to the child’s health.[16] On the other hand, the religious exemption is less straightforward in its description of the necessary requirements.

First, this exemption does not require a religious leader, notary, or an attorney to submit a certification to the state for approval detailing how the immunization goes against a person’s “bona fide religious beliefs.”[17] Instead, parents are only required to write a statement to the school about their religious objections.[18] Second, helpful judicial applications or interpretations of this exemption are lacking.[19] For example, there are very few, if any, cases that give guidance on what “bona fide religious belief” truly means.[20] Plus, while N.C. Admin. Code 41A.0403 specifies that non-religious exemptions for personal belief or philosophy are not allowed in North Carolina,[21] it does not provide any explanation for what “not founded upon a religious belief” really means.[22] The lack of specificity when it comes to what qualifies as a religious belief provides parents with a potential loophole to NC’s vaccine requirements.[23] Due to the increased use of this “loophole,” in 2015, legislators even tried to pass Senate Bill 346 to remove the religious exemption as a statutorily provided option because too many parents were using this exemption to avoid vaccinating their children.[24]

House Bill 380 and Its Potential Effect on Measles Outbreaks in NC

Ten years after the death of Senate Bill 346, NC legislators have proposed a new bill, House Bill 380. This bill aims to introduce an idea that goes beyond anything the legislators of Bill 346 would have ever considered. House Bill 380 seeks to add “conscientious objections” to the list of allowable vaccine exemptions for the current student vaccine requirements.[25] Conscientious objections are defined as “a personal disapproval of participating in some specific conduct . . . on moral grounds,” which “may or may not be based on religion.”[26] This new exemption seems to contradict NC’s administrative rules and regulations specifying that non-religious personal belief exemptions are not allowed. If this bill passes and parents abuse this exemption, it could result in a resurgence of measles outbreaks in NC.

For instance, although the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services has declared the MMR vaccine as “crucial to avoiding potentially deadly diseases,”[27] many parents still find reasons to refuse to vaccinate their children. Consequently, there have been numerous measles outbreaks in the United States throughout the 2000s.[28] If passed, Bill 380 could potentially increase the number of unvaccinated students in North Carolina because parents would no longer have to rely on the religious “loophole” exemption to avoid vaccinating their children; instead, their objections would only need to be based on “reasons of conscience.”

The ongoing measles outbreak in Texas exemplifies what could occur in North Carolina if House Bill 380 becomes law. So far this year, 378 measles cases have been confirmed, which is nearly 100 more than the total cases reported for 2024.[29] Texas, which permits a conscientious exemption,[30] is responsible for 309 of these cases, including 211 identified in Gaines County.[31] According to the 2023-2024 data, Gaines County has a conscientious exemption rate of nearly 18%, the highest in the state.[32] Consequently, two schools in Gaines County report vaccination rates of 46.15% and 82.65%,[33] both significantly below the 95% needed for herd immunity.[34] These statistics clearly indicate a correlation between the number of exemptions granted and the severity of the outbreak.

In 2021-2022, the vaccination rate for kindergarteners in NC was 96%,[35] which is above the percentage required for herd immunity. However, in 2023-2024, the vaccination rate dropped to 93.5%.[36] During this time, non-medical exemptions rose from 1.9% to 3.1%.[37] If House Bill 380 passes and NC begins to authorize conscientious exemptions for students, the overall exemption rate will increase; this could lead to a continuous decline in the overall vaccination rate, potentially putting North Carolina at risk of a major measles outbreak similar to the one currently affecting Texas. Such an outbreak could result in major health consequences for the general public or even death for unvaccinated individuals.


[1] Measles, World Health Organization [WHO] (Nov. 14, 2024) https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/measles.

[2] Id.

[3] Id.

[4] Aliza Rosen, Measles Outbreaks in the U.S. Highlight the Importance of Vaccination, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg Sch. of Pub. Health (Feb. 26, 2025), https://publichealth.jhu.edu/2025/what-to-know-about-measles-and-vaccines.  

[5] Measles Symptoms and Complications, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention (May 9, 2024), https://www.cdc.gov/measles/signs-symptoms/index.html (Encephalitis is a condition that causes swelling of the brain, which can lead to lifelong intellectual disabilities or hearing loss).   

[6] Id.

[7] History of Measles, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention (May 9, 2024), https://www.cdc.gov/measles/about/history.html.

[8] Id.

[9] History of Measles: Outbreaks and Vaccine Timeline, Mayo Clinic, https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/history-disease-outbreaks-vaccine-timeline/measles (last visited Mar. 23, 2025).

[10] Id.

[11] About Measles, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention (May 29, 2024), https://www.cdc.gov/measles/about/index.html.

[12] N.C. Gen. Stat. § 130A-152 (2023).

[13] N.C. Gen. Stat. § 130A-155 (2007); see also 16 Stong’s N.C. Index 4th, Health § 79 (2025).

[14] N.C. Gen. Stat. § 130A-156 (2007).

[15] N.C. Gen. Stat. § 130A-157 (2002).

[16] Immunization Exemptions in NC, N.C. Dep’t. Health & Hum. Servs. (Mar. 12, 2025) https://www.dph.ncdhhs.gov/programs/epidemiology/immunization/schools/exemptions.

[17] N.C. Gen. Stat. § 130A-157 (2007) (“Upon submission of a written statement of the bona fide religious beliefs and opposition to the immunization requirements, the person may attend the college, university, school or facility without presenting a certificate of immunization.”); see also Immunization Exemptions in NC, supra note 16.

[18] Immunization Exemptions in NC, supra note 16.

[19] In re Stratton, 571 S.E.2d 234, 236 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (“Since its amendment and enactment in 1967, G.S. § 130A-157 has not been judicially applied or interpreted.”).

[20] Brian Champion, The Religious Exemption Loophole: A Building Public Health Crisis in North Carolina, 98 N.C. L. Rev. Forum 59, 68 (2020).

[21] 10A N.C. Admin. Code 41A.0403 (2020) (“For example, under North Carolina’s vaccine exemption statute, the parent or guardian of the child must not state any sort of personal or philosophical reason for seeking a religious exemption.”).

[22] Champion, supra note 20, at 68.

[23] Id.

[24] Jason DeBruyn, Across NC, More Parents Are Using Religious Exemption to Avoid Vaccinating Children, WUNC Radio (Aug. 15, 2019), https://www.wunc.org/health/2019-08-15/across-nc-more-parents-are-using-religious-exemption-to-avoid-vaccinating-children (“those claiming a religious exemption has been on the rise.”); see also Laura Leslie, NC Vaccine Bill Dead, WRAL News (Apr. 1, 2015), https://www.wral.com/14554219/.

[25] H.R. 380, Gen. Assemb. (N.C. 2025).

[26] Conscientious Objection, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024).

[27] Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., Measles Outbreak is Call to Action for All of Us, U.S. Dep’t. Health & Hum. Servs (Mar. 3, 2025), https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2025/03/03/measles-outbreak-call-to-action-for-all-of-us.html.

[28] Measles Vaccination: Know the Facts, Infectious Diseases Soc’y of Am. (Nov. 25, 2024),   https://www.idsociety.org/public-health/measles/know-the-facts/.

[29] Measles Cases and Outbreaks, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention (Mar. 21, 2025), https://www.cdc.gov/measles/data-research/index.html.

[30] Texas Immunization Exemptions, Tex. Dep’t of State Health Servs., https://www.dshs.texas.gov/immunizations/school/exemptions (Last visited Mar. 23, 2025); see also Champion, supra note 20, at 66 (citing States with Religious and Philosophical Exemptions from School Immunization Requirements, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (June 14, 2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/school-immunization-exemption-state-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/8WNB-3AC3]).

[31]Measles Outbreak, Tex. Dep’t of State Health Servs. (Mar. 21, 2025), https://www.dshs.texas.gov/news-alerts/measles-outbreak-2025.

[32] Conscientious Exemptions, Tex. Dep’t of State Health Servs., https://www.dshs.texas.gov/immunizations/data/school/conscientious-exemptions (Last visited Mar. 23, 2025).

[33] School Coverage, Annual Reports of Immunization Status, Tex. Dep’t of State Health Servs., https://www.dshs.texas.gov/immunizations/data/school/coverage (Last visited Mar. 23, 2025).

[34] Mariah Ellis, Local Pediatricians Say North Carolina Is ‘Vulnerable’ to Measles Outbreak, CBS 17 News (Mar. 13, 2025), https://www.cbs17.com/news/north-carolina-news/local-pediatricians-say-north-carolina-is-vulnerable-to-measles-outbreak/.

[35] Vaccination Coverage and Exemptions among Kindergartners, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention (Oct. 2, 2024), https://www.cdc.gov/schoolvaxview/data/index.html.

[36] Id.

[37] Id.

 

By Andy Harp

It is no secret that legal writing can be difficult to read. It becomes even more of an ordeal when a sentence with a very simple proposition is followed up by three lines of citation. Reading a judicial decision becomes an acrobatic endeavor, dodging a “quoting” here and an “abrogated by” there. Sometimes, I will admit, my brain tries to simply skip past the lines of citation to the next sentence. This habit sometimes leads me to miss important substantive sentences nestled in a valley between two mountainous citation sentences. Recently, courts have attempted to vanquish this plague through the use of cleaned up citations.[1]

Citing Bluebook rule 5 as the main culprit, most courts now recognize the ability for writers to remove distractions from citations involving a quote from another case.[2] Here’s an example of what this looks like:

The test for abuse of discretion requires the reviewing court to determine whether a decision “‘is manifestly unsupported by reason,’ or ‘so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.’” Little v. Penn Ventilatory Co., 317 N.C. 206, 218, 345, S.E.2d 204, 212 (1986) (quoting White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 777, 324 S.E.2d 829, 833 (1985) and State v. Wilson, 313 N.C. 516, 538, 330 S.E.2d 450, 465 (1985)).

Becomes:

“[O]r so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.” Little v. Penn Ventilator Co., 317 N.C. 206, 218, 345 S.E.2d 204, 212 (1986) (cleaned up). [3]

The North Carolina legal system has somewhat embraced this new era of citation, with hundreds of reported opinions including this new citation technique.[4] Indeed, this (cleaned up) parenthetical may revolutionize readability in the legal world, but there are still so many questions. When should one use this mechanic? Why does it matter at all? Where should citation scholars draw the line?

Why do we cite things at all? Legal arguments are built on credibility.[5] The cornerstone of credibility is falsifiability–the ability for someone to go in and verify the foundation of an argument.[6] Especially in the age of AI, where court filings have been submitted citing cases that never actually existed,[7] it is important to take a step back and remember that the law imparts real effects on real people. If a judge cannot verify a claim, cases get lost, and lives get damaged.[8] The ability to trace an advocate’s line of reasoning through their citations is more important today than ever before.[9] But surely there are times where an author can trim back some of the unnecessary citations while still remaining credible, right?

Naturally, those with built-up credibility and large audiences can afford to exchange exactness for readability.[10] Therefore, it is unsurprising that the Supreme Court feels qualified to utilize the (cleaned up) parenthetical.[11] This technique found its way into our highest court through the 2021 case Brownback v. King.[12] In Brownback, Justice Thomas legitimized the (cleaned up) movement by following a proposition with the citation “Id., at 501-502, 121 S. Ct. 1021, 149 L. Ed. 2d 32 (cleaned up).”[13] According to Bluebook rule 5.2(e), the full version of the citation should have looked like Id., at 501-502, 121 S. Ct 1021 (quoting Restatement (third) of Judgments § 19, Comment a, at 161 (Am. L. Inst. 1980).[14] Mercifully, that beast was slain at the hands of (cleaned up).[15] The revolution had begun.

The American court system persists because of its credibility.[16] Courts employ teams of dedicated professionals to fact check and double check their sources.[17] Additionally, courts often write for broad audiences–ones that may include laypeople trying to figure out how a ruling may affect them.[18] Therefore, there are times when it is more important to let a reader to follow the idea of a holding instead of tracing a citation’s lineage. Readers can take the assertions of a court at face value in a way that advocates asserting a claim in court cannot.[19]

The North Carolina Supreme Court has fully embraced the internal use of (cleaned up).[20] Section 1.7 advises employees of the court to “consider a ‘cleaned up’ quotation . . . when quoting something with an embedded quotation, especially if doing so would markedly improve the readability of the quoted content.”[21] If you have spent time in the NC court system, you may be familiar with this mechanic. So, if the courts can do it, should lawyers and advocates begin using (cleaned up) and other Bluebook alterations in their court filings? This is not wise. Sure, some judges may not mind the occasional de-cluttering of a citation or two, but remember, courts are designed to ensure the accuracy of the claims presented before it.[22] The goal of an advocate is to effectively convey the client’s argument to the court.[23] With a vocational creed of “better safe than sorry”,[24] we should give the court the most direct path to our argument’s support. One could probably get away with the (cleaned up) parenthetical for the less contested aspect of their claim, but for the most part, they should stick to the Bluebook.


[1] Laura Graham, (Cleaned Up) Citations: A Bold New Option to Bluebook Rule 5, N.C. Bar Ass’n (Aug. 16, 2023), https://www.ncbar.org/nc-lawyer/2023-08/cleaned-up-citations-a-bold-new-option-to-bluebook-rule-5/.

[2] Id.

[3] Id.

[4] Id.

[5] Peter W. Martin, Introduction to Basic Legal Citation, Cornell U. L.  Sch. (2020), https://www.law.cornell.edu/citation/1-200#:~:text=What%20is%20%22legal%20citation%22%3F,of%20abbreviations%20and%20special%20terms.

[6] Julia Simon-Kerr, Law’s Credibility Problem, 98 Wash. L. Rev. 179, 180–81 (2023).

[7] Lyle Moran, Lawyer cites fake cases generated by ChatGPT in legal brief, Legal Dive (May 30, 2023), https://www.legaldive.com/news/chatgpt-fake-legal-cases-generative-ai-hallucinations/651557/.

[8] See Julia Simon-Kerr, Law’s Credibility Problem, 98 Wash. L. Rev. 179, 180–83 (2023).

[9] See id.

[10] See Laura Graham, (Cleaned Up) Citations: A Bold New Option to Bluebook Rule 5, N.C. Bar Ass’n (Aug. 16, 2023), https://www.ncbar.org/nc-lawyer/2023-08/cleaned-up-citations-a-bold-new-option-to-bluebook-rule-5/.

[11] Id.

[12] Id.; 592 U.S. 209 (2021).

[13] 141 S. Ct. at 748.

[14] The Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation R. 5 (Columbia L. Rev. Ass’n et al. eds., 21st ed 2000).

[15] Laura Graham, (Cleaned Up) Citations: A Bold New Option to Bluebook Rule 5, N.C. Bar Ass’n (Aug. 16, 2023), https://www.ncbar.org/nc-lawyer/2023-08/cleaned-up-citations-a-bold-new-option-to-bluebook-rule-5/.

[16] See Julia Simon-Kerr, Law’s Credibility Problem, 98 Wash. L. Rev. 179, 180–83 (2023).

[17] Judge’s Chambers, The Courthouse: A Guide to Planning & Design, N.C. Sup. Ct. (last visited Jan. 24, 2025), https://www.ncsc.org/courthouseplanning/the-courthouse/judges-chambers#:~:text=The%20group%20of%20private%20offices,and%20size%20of%20the%20court.

[18] Ryan C. Black et al., Supreme Court Opinions and Audiences, 54 Wash U. J. L. & Pol’y 169, 169–70 (2017).

[19] See Julia Simon-Kerr, Law’s Credibility Problem, 98 Wash. L. Rev. 179, 180–83 (2023).

[20] Office of Administrative Counsel, Supreme Court of N.C., The Guidebook: Citation, Style, and Usage at the Supreme Court of North Carolina, § 1.7 (3d ed. 2023).

[21] Id.

[22] See Julia Simon-Kerr, Law’s Credibility Problem, 98 Wash. L. Rev. 179, 180–83 (2023).

[23] See id.

[24] See Laura Graham, (Cleaned Up) Citations: A Bold New Option to Bluebook Rule 5, N.C. Bar Ass’n (Aug. 16, 2023), https://www.ncbar.org/nc-lawyer/2023-08/cleaned-up-citations-a-bold-new-option-to-bluebook-rule-5/.

 

By Emily Gordon

When North Carolina residents voted in the 2024 election, they might have been surprised to see a ballot measure regarding a proposed amendment to the state constitution.[1] Prior to the election, the North Carolina State Constitution allowed “every person born in the United States and  every person who has been naturalized” to vote in an election.[2] The proposed initiative asked if voters would be “for” or “against” removing the naturalization provision, modifying the voter qualification to read that “only a citizen of the United States who is 18 years of age and otherwise possessing the qualifications for voting shall be entitled to vote in any election in this state.”[3] 

At first glance, the proposed amendment was a mere restatement of what the law already declared.[4] And that’s just it–while the amendment proposed changing the language of North Carolina’s constitution, the law would remain unchanged: it is illegal for a non-citizen to vote in either a federal or statewide election.[5] 

North Carolina was one of a handful of states that voted on an amendment targeting noncitizen voting.[6] Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Missouri, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Wisconsin also asked voters to consider amending their state constitutions to explicitly bar non-citizens from voting in a state or federal election.[7] 

Background

On June 27, 2024, the General Assembly of North Carolina passed House Bill 1074, allowing the proposed amendment to appear on the ballot in the 2024 federal election.[8] The measure was largely championed by the NCGOP, which controlled the state legislature.[9] NC House Rules Chairman Destin Hall said that “[t]ightening our election laws so that only U.S. citizens are voting in this country ensures that those making decisions about our country’s future have a vested interest in its well-being.”[10] The amendment was likely proposed in response to the NCGOP’s growing concerns over voter fraud by undocumented immigrants in both the 2016 and 2020 election.[11] Trump notoriously alleged that thousands of non-citizens had voted in the 2020 election, particularly in the state of Arizona, and claimed that such illegal voting led to his unsuccessful reelection.[12]

Critics of the amendment, led by Democrats, were strongly opposed to the proposed new language.[13] Reiterating that it is already illegal for noncitizens to vote in federal and state elections, opponents found the amendment unnecessary.[14] ACLU North Carolina further noted that 44% of immigrants in North Carolina are naturalized U.S. citizens, believing the amendment was spurred by “fearmongering” and “hateful rhetoric” towards naturalized immigrants in North Carolina.[15] Moreover, the NC ACLU viewed the amendment as a tactic to discourage naturalized immigrants from exercising their fundamental right to vote.[16] Similarly, Democracy NC believed the proposed amendment was part of a Republican agenda to create distrust “about immigrants and voting to sow doubts” about the upcoming election, “opening the door to confusion” amongst naturalized citizens.[17] 

Opponents of the amendment also turned to various studies refuting Republican claims of noncitizen voting in prior elections.[18] Analyzing the Heritage Foundation’s database of voter fraud cases brought by prosecutors, the Washington Post found only 85 cases of noncitizen voting allegations from 2002 to 2023.[19] Another study by the Brennan Center for Justice after the 2016 election found only 30 cases of suspected noncitizen voting in the election, out of 23.5 million votes from 42 different jurisdictions.[20] In North Carolina, a 2016 election audit found that suspected noncitizen voters, based on data from the state’s Division of Motor Vehicles, were citizens 98% of the time.[21] ACLU North Carolina additionally commented that “[b]ipartisan election officials confirmed that the 2020 election results were credible, accurate, and secure.”[22]

Results

            North Carolinians overwhelmingly voted in favor of the amendment, with 77.6% of votes “for” the amendment and 22.4% “against,” as of the time of writing.[23]  Of the 100 counties in North Carolina, only two had a majority of votes against the amendment: Durham and Orange County.[24] Notably, those whose who voted against the amendment in these counties only won by a slim majority: 53% and 52%, respectively.[25] In all other counties, proponents of the amendment won the vote by a majority of at least 66%.[26] Camden County and Bladen County had the highest percentage of  favorable votes as 93% of their constituents voted in favor of the amendment.[27] 

            All 8 states with similar constitutional amendments on their ballots adopted the language, making it explicitly illegal for noncitizens to vote in their jurisdictions. [28]

Implications

With the amendment taking effect, opponents will need to work harder to fight against the potential spread of misinformation about naturalized citizens.[29] Without explicit language allowing naturalized citizens to vote, it is possible that the amendment could be viewed as a substantive change to NC’s voting laws.[30] Likewise, the amendment may have confused other voters into believing that non-citizens could legally vote in the election prior to the amendment.[31] Educating newly naturalized citizens of their rights and encouraging them to vote, as well as educating Americans on currently existing law, will be key to battling any misleading information. Furthermore, opponents to the amendment worry that such language could open the door to interpretation of who qualifies as a “citizen,” potentially stripping away birthright citizenship from people who were born in the U.S. to parents without American citizenships.[32] Trump has explicitly said that if reelected, he would end birthright citizenship via executive order.[33] 

 Proponents of the amendment hoped that the language change would help North Carolinians feel more secure in the state’s election results.[34] North Carolina House Speaker Tim Moore echoed this sentiment, stating that the alleged “efforts to allow non-citizens to vote would undermine the public’s confidence in our electoral system and leave the door open for chaos and election fraud to take hold.”[35] Referring to the amendment as a “safeguard,” he further clarified his belief that “this amendment to our constitution would further strengthen election integrity in North Carolina.”[36] 

Across the country, North Carolina and the seven other states that voted in favor of adopting the amendment during the 2024 election join seven states with pre-existing language in their state constitutions explicitly prohibiting noncitizen voting.[37] Those states include Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Louisiana, North Dakota, and Ohio.[38] Considering this, it would be unsurprising to see more and more states propose similar amendments to their state constitutions in the next election, particularly in states led by Republican supermajorities. 


[1] What is the ‘citizens-only’ amendment on the 2024 ballot in North Carolina?, ABC11 (Oct. 22, 2024), https://abc11.com/post/2024-election-what-is-citizens-amendment-ballot-north-carolina/15450474/. 

[2] Id.

[3] Id.

[4] Vote No on NC’s Citizens-Only Ballot Measure, ACLU North Carolina (Sept. 25, 2024), https://www.acluofnorthcarolina.org/en/news/vote-no-ncs-citizens-only-ballot-measure.

[5] Id.

[6] Kaanita Iyer, 8 states will vote to bar noncitizen voting, CNN projects, something already illegal in federal elections, CNN (updated Nov. 6, 2024), https://www.cnn.com/2024/11/03/politics/noncitizen-voting-ballot-measures-election/index.html.

[7] Id.

[8] H.R. 1074, 156th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2023). 

[9] ABC11, supra note 1.

[10] NCGOP Commends General Assembly for Placing Citizen-Only Voting Constitutional Amendment on 2024 Ballot, NCGOP (July 1, 2024), https://www.nc.gop/ncgop_commends_general_assembly_for_placing_citizen-only_voting_constitutional_amendment_on_2024_ballot.

[11] Id.

[12] Laura Doan, Trump falsely claims noncitizen voter fraud is widespread. Here are 5 facts., CBS News (October 30, 2024), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-noncitizen-voter-fraud-fact-check/.

[13] Nicole Acevedo & Sakshi Venkatraman, Citizens-only ballot measures make newly naturalized Americans voting for the first time feel on edge, NBC News (Oct. 22, 2024), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/citizens-only-ballot-measures-make-newly-naturalized-americans-voting-rcna176092.

[14] Id.

[15] Id.

[16] ACLU North Carolina, supra note 4.

[17] Vote “Against” Constitutional Amendment, Democracy NC, https://democracync.org/resources/vote-no-on-citizens-only-amendment/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2024).

[18] Doan, supra note 12.

[19] Glenn Kessler, The truth about noncitizen voting in federal elections, Wash. Post (March 6, 2024), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2024/03/06/truth-about-noncitizen-voting-federal-elections/.

[20] Douglas Keith et al., Noncitizen Voting: The Missing Millions, Brennan Center for Justice (May 5, 2017), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/noncitizen-voting-missing-millions.

[21] Emily Vespa, What to know about the citizen-only voting amendment on North Carolina’s Ballot, News & Observer (Oct. 31, 2024), https://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-government/election/voter-guide/article294655104.html.

[22] ACLU North Carolina, supra note 4.

[23] North Carolina Constitutional Amendment H1074/S630 Election Results: Require Citizenship to Vote, N.Y. Times, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2024/11/05/us/elections/results-north-carolina-constitutional-amendment-h1074s630-require-citizenship-to-vote.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2024).

[24] Id.

[25] Id.

[26] Id.

[27] Id.

[28] Adam Edelman, Ballot measures targeting noncitizen voting approved in 8 states, NBC News (Nov. 6, 2024), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2024-election/ballot-measures-targeting-noncitizen-voting-approved-8-states-rcna178888.

[29] Will Doran, Citizen-only voting amendment passes with strong support among NC voters, WRAL News (updated Nov. 6, 2024), https://www.wral.com/story/citizen-only-voting-amendment-passes-with-strong-support-among-nc-voters/21705796/.

[30] Id.

[31] Id.

[32] Id.

[33] Ted Hesson, Trump vows to end birthright citizenship for children of immigrants in US illegally, Reuters (May 30, 2023), https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trump-vows-end-birthright-citizenship-children-immigrants-us-illegally-2023-05-30/.

[34] NCGOP, supra note 10.

[35] Id.

[36] Id.

[37] Laws permitting noncitizens to vote in the United States, Ballotpedia, https://ballotpedia.org/Laws_permitting_noncitizens_to_vote_in_the_United_States#States_where_noncitizen_voting_is_prohibited (last visited Nov. 6, 2024).

[38] Id.

By Alexis Furgal

A regulatory sandbox is a “controlled environment” in which companies reward innovative contributions regulatory freedom with.[1] Essentially, companies enjoy (temporarily) fewer regulatory hurdles to overcome during the sprint to bring novel technologies and services to market.[2] On one hand, regulatory sandboxes foster innovation and promote advancement because companies are free to “trial run” the efficacy of–and consumer response to–their product in the marketplace.[3] On the other hand, regulatory sandboxes allow regulators to closely observe company activity and consumer response, in order to more closely tailor new regulations to the nuances revealed through the simulated market. [4]

In North Carolina, the banking and insurance industries are “major economic driver[s].”[5] Due to its technological and financial prestige, growing job opportunities, and affordability, North Carolina is uniquely poised to become a national leader in the financial technology and insurance industries. [6] As such, North Carolina joined the ranks as one of only a few states driving innovation by implementing a regulatory sandbox.[7] The first iteration of its sandbox—introduced in 2019—failed because it prioritized “innovation at the expense of consumer protection.”[8]  However, two years later, the idea was revisited by the N.C. General Assembly, with increased consumer protections built in, and this time proved fruitful.[9] In October 2021, the North Carolina Regulatory Sandbox Act of 2021 (the “Act”) was signed into effect.[10] At the time, North Carolina was one of only ten states that took such a bold approach. [11]

The Act created a framework for pioneering companies to make a case for their product or service and specify which regulations would prevent their ideas from becoming a reality. [12] The applicable State agency is then authorized, under the Act, to temporarily waive the requested requirements as they see fit, to allow the applying company a greater chance of success. [13] The Act also created the Innovation Council—a panel of 11 statutorily-designated members of various, but relevant, backgrounds—to both manage day-to-day operations and promulgate permanent sandbox rules.[14] In order to participate in the sandbox, companies must submit an application to the Council, detailing the ins and outs of their product, business model, consumer protections, risk-management strategies, and more.[15] If accepted, the company is entitled to 24 months sans (approved) regulations to offer their product to the public and strengthen their company’s continued viability before being re-subject to all applicable regulations. [16]

Unlike some of the other states that implemented comparable regulatory sandboxes, North Carolina’s sandbox does not have a statutory end date. [17]  For example, Hawaii’s regulatory sandbox recently—and right on schedule—came to an end,[18] and Utah is now in second phase of its own sandbox. [19] Although the end-date and ultimate impact of North Carolina’s regulatory sandbox is largely still inconclusive, one thing is clear: the Innovation Council remains diligently committed to furthering the goals of the Act.

Pursuant to the authority vested in it by N.C.G.S. 169, the Innovation Council has released notice of proposed permanent rules (Council Rules).[20] These Council Rules are scheduled to take effect in March 2025.[21]

While the Act left much of the application, review, and waiver process up to the Innovation Council’s discretion,[22] the Council Rules clearly delineate the sandbox application process, including voting mechanisms, mandatory opportunity for public comment, and optional company presentation of products and service to the Innovation Council for review.[23]

Interestingly, the Council Rules also incorporate an additional dimension to the application process: an “expression of interest” opportunity for companies to receive a preliminary review of their proposed product and waived requirements.[24]

Under the Act, company applications must be submitted to the Innovation Council, which then selects and refers applicants to the relevant State agencies.[25] If accepted into the program, the company is eligible to be granted a waiver of applicable statutory or regulatory requirements, provided such waiver is not broader than necessary, as determined by the applicable State agency.[26] However, per the Council Rules, it appears the Council may have increased its discretion in the review process relative to the State agencies. Under section .0106 of the Council Rules, State agencies will be provided with an opportunity to review company applications and provide recommendations, but, if the review is not provided within 45 days, the Council, “in its discretion, may deem the [] application acceptable.”[27]

Moving forward, both the content of the proposed Council Rules and responses to calls for the expansion of North Carolina’s regulatory sandbox to other industries[28] will be critical to watch.


[1] Matthew C. Christoph, Note: Criminal Justice Technology and the Regulatory Sandbox: Toward Balancing Justice, Accountability, and Innovation, 84 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 971, 975 (2023).

[2] Id.

[3] Kyle A. Conway, Comment: Blockchain Technology: Limited Liability Companies and the Need for North Carolina Legislation, 45 Campbell L. Rev. 127, 139 (2022).

[4] Id

[5] N.C. Gen. Stat. § 169-2 (2021).

[6] Kristen Smithberg, Recent College Grads Could Fare Well in These Four Markets, Globest.com (Jul. 31, 2024), https://www.globest.com/2024/07/31/recent-college-grads-could-fare-well-in-these-four-markets/.

[7] Conway, supra note 3, at 139.

[8] North Carolina’s Proposed Regulatory Sandbox Needs Work, The FinReg Blog (May 28, 2019), https://sites.duke.edu/thefinregblog/2019/05/28/north-carolinas-proposed-regulatory-sandbox-needs-work/.

[9] Conway, supra note 3, at 139.

[10] Id. at 138.

[11] Id. at 139.

[12] N.C. Gen. Stat. § 169 (2021).

[13] Bill Patterson, N.C. Legislative Analysis Division, Analysis of: House Bill 624: North Carolina Regulatory Sandbox Act (2021), https://dashboard.ncleg.gov/api/Services/BillSummary/2021/H624-SMTG-122(e4)-v-2.

[14] Id.

[15] N.C. Gen. Stat. § 169 (2021).

[16] Id.

[17] Manjeet Mane, Hawaii’s Regulatory Sandbox for Crypto Companies Concludes Today, Cryptometer.io (Jul. 1, 2024), https://www.cryptometer.io/news/hawaiis-regulatory-sandbox-for-crypto-companies-concludes-today/#:~:text=A%20total%20of%2011%20companies%20were%20approved%20to,period%20from%20July%201%20to%20December%2030%2C%202024.

[18] Hilary R. Sledge-Sarnor et al., Hawaii’s Money Transmitters Modernization Act Will No Longer Apply To Cryptocurrency Activities, Mondaq (Feb. 22, 2024), https://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/fin-tech/1427532/hawaiis-money-transmitters-modernization-act-will-no-longer-apply-to-cryptocurrency-activities#authors.

[19] Sandbox Phase 2, Utah Office of Legal Services Innovation, https://utahinnovationoffice.org/sandbox-phase-2/#:~:text=The%20Utah%20Supreme%20Court%E2%80%99s%20legal%20regulatory%20Sandbox%20is,narrow%20the%20access-to-justice%20gap%20without%20increasing%20consumer%20harm.

[20] N.C. Innovation Council: Financial and Insurance Regulatory Sandbox (proposed effective date Mar. 1, 2025) (to be codified at 04 N.C. Admin. Code 25C.0100-.0111) [hereinafter Council Rules].

[21] Id.

[22] N.C. Gen. Stat. § 169 (2021).

[23] Council Rules, supra note 20.

[24] Id.

[25] N.C. Gen. Stat. § 169-6(a) (2021).

[26] N.C. Gen. Stat. § 169-3 (2021).

[27] Council Rules, supra note 20.

[28] Jon Sanders, Let’s Broaden North Carolina’s Regulatory Sandbox, Locke (Feb. 12, 2024), https://www.johnlocke.org/lets-broaden-north-carolinas-regulatory-sandbox/.

 

By Alex Gracia

As of September 16, 2024, indigent prisoner-plaintiffs in North Carolina must be weary when their civil rights claims are dismissed.[1] The failure to do so could result in the loss of important financial protections afforded to them.[2]

Background

The Federal Reserve reports that 37% of all adults would not be able to cover a $400 emergency expense with cash or its equivalent.[3] While some of those people could pay using another method, 13% of all adults cannot afford the emergency expense “by any means.”[4] To initiate a lawsuit in a federal district court, prospective plaintiffs must pay fees totaling $402,[5] which can pose an insurmountable financial burden to filing suit in federal court. This $402 fee is made up of a $350 statutory filing fee,[6] and an additional $52 miscellaneous fee “[f]or filing any document that is not related to a pending case or proceeding.”[7] With these conditions in place, it can be difficult for indigent plaintiffs to seek justice for their injuries.[8] This is especially true for prisoners who want to bring claims against prison officials. Among prisoners, 57% of men and 72% of women were considered in poverty before they were arrested.[9]

Luckily, the common law has a rich history of allowing indigent plaintiffs to bring their claims in forma pauperis (IFP), which allows them to avoid prepaying court fees.[10] The IFP doctrine was formalized by Congress in 1892,[11] and is today codified as 28 U.S.C. § 1915.[12] The statute permits a federal court to authorize proceeding IFP when a litigant offers a good faith affidavit stating “that the person is unable to pay” prefiling fees.[13]

However, Congress noticed that there were too many meritless suits being brought IFP by prisoners in the federal courts.[14] As stated by the Supreme Court, “[w]hat this country needs, Congress decided, is fewer and better prisoner suits.”[15] To meet that end, Congress enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA).[16] Among other things, the PLRA sought to reduce frivolous prisoner litigation by introducing a “three-strike rule,” which bars a prisoner from proceeding IFP if they have “on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal . . . that was dismissed on the grounds that it [was] frivolous, malicious, or fail[ed] to state a claim upon which relief may be granted . . . .”[17] Thus, after three “strikes,” a prisoner loses their ability to proceed IFP, which could mean that they are “out” of federal court.[18]

Heck Dismissals

When a prisoner believes that their rights have been violated by a prison official, they may choose to bring a “civil action for deprivation of rights,” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.[19] If their § 1983 suit is successful, a prisoner can secure monetary damages or other equitable relief.[20]

There is a wrinkle, however. Sometimes, prisoners bring claims that, if successful, would undermine the legality of their imprisonment in the first place.[21] The Supreme Court dealt with this problem in Heck v. Humphrey.[22] In Heck, a prisoner brought a § 1983 claim against prosecutors and investigators for unlawful investigation, destroying exculpatory evidence, and using illegal voice identification procedures at trial.[23] The district court found that the prisoner’s claim called into question the validity of his imprisonment, so it dismissed his complaint without prejudice.[24] The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision by finding that a § 1983 action that calls into question the legality of the conviction is more properly characterized as an application for habeas corpus, which requires all state remedies to be exhausted before it can be heard.[25]

When Heck reached the Supreme Court, the Court held that for a § 1983 claim to be cognizable, the plaintiff must show that his or her conviction has been reversed, expunged, invalidated, or questioned.[26] The Court found that, when evaluating a prisoner’s §1983 claims, courts must “consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the validity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed . . . .”[27] This requirement became known as the “favorable termination” requirement.[28]

Heck Dismissals and PLRA Strikes

Does a dismissal under Heck give a prisoner-plaintiff a PLRA strike? The Supreme Court has declined to specify,[29] and the circuit courts are now split on the question.[30] The Third, Fifth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits have held that a Heck dismissal qualifies as a dismissal for failure to state a claim because the favorable termination requirement is effectively an element of a § 1983 claim.[31] On the other hand, the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have taken the alternate position that a Heck dismissal is sometimes, but not always, a strike.[32]

Relevant for North Carolinian prisoners, the Fourth Circuit picked a side of the split in September 2024.[33] In Brunson v. Stein, Brunson was imprisoned after being convicted of a sexual-abuse offense.[34] He had “previously filed four § 1983 suits that were all dismissed under Heck.”[35] The district court concluded that the Heck dismissals were for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, so Brunson had more than three PLRA strikes on his record.[36] Thus, it did not authorize Brunson to proceed IFP.[37] After paying the $402, Brunson’s case proceeded as normal and the district court dismissed his claim.[38] When Brunson appealed his claim, he applied to forgo prepaying fees by arguing that Heck dismissals were not strikes under the PLRA.[39]

The Fourth Circuit held that “a dismissal under Heck is necessarily a dismissal for ‘failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted’ and qualifies as a PLRA strike.”[40] It considered the language of Heck’s holding: “a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been . . . invalidated.”[41] If a prisoner-plaintiff’s claim invokes Heck, they must show that their conviction has been invalidated or face dismissal.[42] Without showing favorable termination, the court reasoned, an element of the claim must be missing.[43] In other words, the complaint has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.[44] Because this type of dismissal is a PLRA strike,[45] Brunson’s four previous Heck dismissals disqualified him from proceeding IFP.[46]

The consequences of Brunson could be drastic for indigent prisoners in North Carolina and the greater Fourth Circuit. What could be perceived as a “flood of nonmeritorious claims,”[47] from prisoners could also reasonably be perceived as the natural effect of the high quantity of pro se plaintiffs in prisons. For more than twenty years, over 90% of prisoner civil rights or conditions claims were brought by prisoners pro se.[48] With very little legal training or experience, many indigent prisoners may bring claims when they perceive a violation of their rights without understanding the procedural intricacies of habeas corpus petitions or 42. U.S.C. § 1983 claims.[49] After repeated attempts, they may be forced to pay or strike themselves out of federal court.[50]

Interestingly, a solution may already be found within the text of the federal IFP statute.[51] It states that “[t]he court may request an attorney to represent any person unable to afford counsel.”[52] With court-appointed counsel, prisoner-plaintiffs may have better luck proceeding IFP in their attempts to redress their grievances with prison and state officials. Still, for whatever reason, most prisoners proceed pro se.[53] With that being the case, indigent prisoner-plaintiffs in North Carolina must tread carefully around the new IFP landscape established by Brunson.


[1] See Brunson v. Stein, 116 F.4th 301 (4th Cir. 2024).

[2] Id.

[3] Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Economic Well-Being of U.S. Households in 2023 33 (2024), https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/2023-report-economic-well-being-us-households-202405.pdf.

[4] Id. at 32.

[5] See Brunson, 116 F.4th at 305.

[6] 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a).

[7] District Court Miscellaneous Fee Schedule, U.S. Cts., (Dec. 1, 2023), https://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/fees/district-court-miscellaneous-fee-schedule.

[8] See Rosa v. Doe, 86 F.4th 1001, 1003–4 (2d Cir. 2023) (noting that these conditions existed in 2022).

[9] Bernadette Rabuy & Daniel Kopf, Prisons of Poverty: Uncovering the Pre-incarceration Incomes of the Imprisoned, Prison Policy Initiative (July 9, 2015), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/income.html.

[10] See Rosa, 86 F.4th at 1004 (describing the in forma pauperis tradition existing as early as 1295 in English ecclesiastical courts).

[11] Act of July 20, 1892, ch. 209, 27 Stat. 252.

[12] See Rosa, 86 F.4th at 1005.

[13] 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).

[14] See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 203 (2007).

[15] Id. (citing Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002)).

[16] Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321.

[17] 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

[18] See id.

[19] 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

[20] See id. (“Every person who . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person . . . to the deprivation of any rights . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .”).

[21] See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 483 (1994).

[22] Id.

[23] See id. at 479.

[24] See id.

[25] See id. at 479–80.

[26] See id. at 486–87.

[27] Id. at 487.

[28] Id. at 492 (Souter, J., concurring).

[29] See Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez, 140 S. Ct. 1721, 1724 n.2 (2020) (declining to address the question).

[30] See Brunson v. Stein, 116 F.4th 301, 305–06 (discussing the “entrenched circuit split” on the issue).

[31] See, e.g., Garrett v. Murphy, 17 F.4th 419, 427 (3d Cir. 2021); Colvin v. LeBlanc, 2 F.4th 494, 499 (5th Cir. 2021); Smith v. Veterans Admin., 636 F.3d 1306, 1311–12 (10th Cir. 2011); In re Jones, 652 F.3d 36, 38 (D.C. Cir. 2011).

[32] See, e.g., Cotton v. Noeth, 96 F.4th 249, 257 (2d Cir. 2024); Polzin v. Gage, 636 F.3d 834, 838 (7th Cir. 2011); Washington v. L.A. Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 833 F.3d 1048, 1056 (9th Cir. 2016).

[33] See Brunson v. Stein, 116 F.4th 301 (4th Cir. 2024).

[34] See id. at 304.

[35] Id.

[36] See id. at 304–05.

[37] See id.

[38] See id. at 305.

[39] See id.

[40] Id. at 306.

[41] Id. (quoting Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994)).

[42]See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486–87.

[43]See Brunson, 116 F.4th at 307.

[44]See id.

[45]See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

[46]See id. at 309.

[47] Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 203 (2007).

[48] Margo Schlanger, Prison and Jail Civil Rights/Conditions Cases: Longitudinal Statistics, 1970-2021, U. of Mich. L. Sch., Pub. L. & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, April 2022 4, https://ssrn.com/abstract=4085142.

[49] See Margo Schlanger, Trends in Prisoner Litigation, as the PLRA Enters Adulthood, 5 U.C. Irvine L. rev. 153, 153–54 (2015) (“The PLRA conditioned court access on prisoners’ meticulously correct prior use of onerous and error-inviting prison grievance procedures.”).

[50] See id. at 155.

[51] 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1).

[52] Id.

[53] See Schlanger, supra note 48, at 4.

By Vivian Bolen

Most dog owners in the United States view their dogs as a part of their family, yet legally, dogs are still property.[1] The law has not kept up with the emotional value we attach to companion pets like cats and dogs, and when pet-owning spouses divorce, they are forced to reckon with the law treating their pet as property.[2] This adds emotional injury to an already difficult time for pet owners.

I. Custody of Pets in a Divorce

In family law matters, most states treat the custody of pets during a divorce like any other division of property.[3] In a divorce, the couple can either divide their assets privately outside of court, or the court will step in to decide how their assets should be split, which includes determining which spouse will retain ownership of any pets involved.[4] Pets are treated just like any other type of property owned by the divorcing couple even though they mean so much more to their owners. In recognition of the deep emotional value owners attach to their pets, some courts have started to consider the best interests of the animal during custody disputes over pet ownership.[5]

II. Legal Trends in Pet Custody

Eight states and the District of Columbia have now adopted laws requiring courts to consider a pet’s well-being in custody disputes.[6] In 2017, Alaska became the first state to require judges to consider the well-being of a pet in custody cases, and several other states have since followed suit.[7] While this departure from the typical property analysis to pet custody is still a minority rule,[8] this new focus on a pet’s best interests demonstrates a shift in how pet custody is treated by courts. This shift towards analyzing the pet’s well-being more closely aligns state law with the cultural view of companion pets as members of the family in the U.S.[9]

III. Pet Custody Trends in North Carolina

Despite this shift towards a pet-centric analysis, North Carolina remains in the majority of states and uses a traditional property analysis when determining a pet’s custody.[10]

A. Determining Pet Custody Outside of Court

Even in states like North Carolina where courts do not consider the best interests of the pet, spouses can still take steps to ensure the well-being of their pet remains at the forefront of custody considerations.[11] Couples can make pet custody decisions outside of court through private agreements like pet custody agreements or prenuptial agreements.[12] Pet custody agreements are modeled after child custody agreements and can include who the pet will live with, whether there will be split custody of the pet, and who will be responsible for expenses related to the pet.[13] Prior to marriage, couples can enter into a prenuptial agreements that include clauses detailing what would happen to a pet if they ever chose to get divorced.[14] Keeping the pet custody question of court allows pet owners to have more control over their decision and take their pet’s well-being into account. Although determining pet custody outside of court has its advantages, it also requires a couple to come to an agreement, which may be difficult when both spouses have a deep emotion investment in a pet.[15] When a couple is unable to determine who should retain custody of a pet in a divorce, a court will make the decision for them.[16]

B. Determining Pet Custody in Court

Because pet custody determinations are not mentioned in any North Carolina General Statute, judges are left without any guidance as to how they should analyze who retains ownership of the pet beyond the traditional property analysis for dividing assets.[17] In the absence of any guidelines, North Carolina judges can consider which spouse primarily takes care of the pet, has the best living situation to care for a pet, and can afford the pet’s expenses.[18] While judges have discretion to consider the emotional bond between owners and their pet, they are not required to consider this factor in their analysis.[19] While this discretion might empower some judges to consider the best interests of the pet, spouses must decide whether to agree upon pet custody outside of court or hope that a presiding judge will consider on their pet’s best interests. Prioritizing the best interests of the pet in pet custody disputes is gaining traction in the legal world, and law firms in North Carolina are beginning to acknowledge the importance of considering the pet’s best interests.[20]

While considering the best interests of the pet  is becoming more popular, only a handful of states currently use this test.[21] Perhaps one day North Carolina will require the consideration of a pet’s well-being in custody disputes, but in the meantime, spouses who wish to prioritize their pet’s best interests can rely on out-of-court custody determinations.[22]  


[1] Stanley Coren, Are Dogs Truly (and Legally) Members of the Family?, Psychology Today (Nov. 17, 2023), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/canine-corner/202311/could-dogs-be-legally-considered-members-of-the-family.

[2] Id.

[3] Id.

[4] Jonathan Breeden, Who Gets the Dog in the Divorce in North Carolina?, Breeden Law Office (May 15, 2024), https://www.breedenfirm.com/legal-blog/who-gets-the-dog-in-the-divorce/#:~:text=The%20court%20will%20determine%20who,to%20develop%20a%20custody%20agreement.

[5] Id.

[6] Sara Murphy, Who gets the dog in the divorce? Now a judge might decide., Washington Post (Sept. 8, 2024), https://www.washingtonpost.com/home/2024/09/08/pet-custody-cases-on-the-rise/.

[7] Nicole Pallotta, Alaska Legislature Becomes First to Require Consideration of Animals’ Interests in Custody Cases, Animal Legal Defense Fund (Jan. 20, 2017), https://aldf.org/article/alaska-legislature-becomes-first-to-require-consideration-of-animals-interests-in-custody-cases/.

[8] Murphy, supra note 6.

[9] Coren, supra note 1.

[10] N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20 (describing how courts should divide assets in a divorce without any mention of pets).

[11] Pet Custody After a Divorce or Separation, Caulder & Valentine Law Firm, https://www.cauldervalentine.com/pet-custody-after-a-divorce [hereinafter Pet Custody]; Untangling Heartstrings: Navigating Pet Custody in North Carolina, Divorces, Collins Family & Elder Law Group (Jan. 8, 2024), https://www.collinsfamilylaw.com/blog/2024/january/untangling-heartstrings-navigating-pet-custodyi/#:~:text=The%20court%20determines%20which%20spouse,the%20pet%20as%20marital%20property [hereinafter Untangling Heartstrings].

[12] Id.

[13] Pet Custody, supra note 11.

[14] Untangling Heartstrings, supra note 11.

[15] See Understanding Pet Custody in North Carolina, Triangle Divorce Lawyers, https://triangledivorcelawyers.com/understanding-pet-custody-in-north-carolina/.

[16] Breeden, supra note 4.

[17] See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20.

[18] Id.

[19] See Breeden, supra note 4.

[20] Untangling Heartstrings, supra note 11; Who Gets the Family Pet in a North Carolina Divorce?, Blood Law, PPLC (Aug. 31, 2023), https://www.blood-law.com/blog/2023/august/who-gets-the-family-pet-in-a-north-carolina-divo/; Pet Custody and Divorce in North Carolina, King Law Offices, https://kinglawoffices.com/family-law/divorce/pet-custody-and-divorce-in-north-carolina/; Rose H. Stout, Is My Beloved Pet Just an Asset to be Divided?, Smith Debnam Narron Drake Saintsing & Myers, L.L.P. (May 29, 2017), https://www.smithdebnamlaw.com/article/beloved-pet-just-asset-divided/.

[21] Murphy, supra note 6.

[22] Pet Custody, supra note 11; Untangling Heartstrings, supra note 11.

By Mary Grace Hutzler

In recent years, Name, Image and Likeness (NIL) regulations have been a source of dramatic change in the landscape of high school athletics.[1] These regulations, which are a much-needed change from the burdensome rules of the past, enable student-athletes to profit from their personal brands.[2] The NIL debate erupted when collegiate players were finally given the chance to earn money through endorsements, sponsorships, and other opportunities.[3] However, the position for high school athletes, particularly in North Carolina, is still difficult.[4] A recent lawsuit filed in Wake County has brought this intricacy to light,[5] and we could soon see significant changes to the NIL rights of public high school athletes across the state.

Current NIL Laws in North Carolina

Following the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in NCAA v. Alston[6], the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) implemented an interim policy that lifted the previous restrictions on student-athletes receiving endorsement benefits.[7] While collegiate athletes in North Carolina now have greater autonomy in controlling and profiting from their personal brand, the situation remains more restrictive for high school athletes. In 2023, the North Carolina High School Athletic Association (NCHSAA), which governs public high school athletics, passed a policy that allows student-athletes at public North Carolina high schools to profit from NIL deals.[8] This effort was quickly met with push-back from the State as the legislature passed an amendment stripping the NCHSAA of their power to regulate NIL activities.[9] This act transferred the authority to regulate these activities to the North Carolina State Board of Education.[10] On July 1, 2024, the State Board enacted a controversial policy banning student-athletes at public schools from entering into most NIL agreements.[11]

Much of the concern over NIL benefits lies in the risk of creating an uneven playing field for high school athletes by favoring those at larger schools in more affluent areas.[12] However, in their attempts to prevent this disparity, the State Board’s ban has created an even larger one.[13] Athletic programs at private schools in North Carolina are governed by their own athletic association which implemented a policy earlier this year allowing their students to participate in NIL agreements.[14] This makes North Carolina the only state in which private school student-athletes are afforded the privilege to profit off their name, image and likeness while public school student athletes are prohibited from doing the same.[15] Additionally, there has been a recent influx of legislation passed in other states allowing NIL deals for high school athletes, and  38 states now permit this practice.[16] The State Board’s ban has thus inadvertently created an incentive for high-performing student-athletes to transfer to private schools, move to different states, or graduate early in order to benefit from lucrative NIL deals.[17] Student-athletes who are  not afforded the luxury of making these changes remain at a disadvantage as they lose out on the ability to monetize their personal brand.[18] This disparity has fueled the ongoing debate about fairness and equity in high school athletics.[19]

The Rolanda Brandon v. North Carolina State Board of Education Lawsuit

The mother of five-star high school quarterback Faizon Brandon recently filed a lawsuit against the State Board of Education to challenge their ban on NIL deals for public high school athletes.[20] In the complaint filed in Wake County, Rolanda Brandon argues that these regulations unfairly restrict the rights of high school athletes to benefit from their own names, images, and likenesses¾rights that are guaranteed to other individuals, including collegiate athletes, under state and federal law.[21] Brandon’s case points to the current inequality between public and private school athletes as well as the ban’s inconsistency with the legislation of most states as a glaring illustration of the unjust divide that results from restrictive NIL regulations.[22]

While the complaint touches on commonly cited constitutional issues surrounding NIL regulations, namely the restriction on one’s right to publicity and right to contract, the cause of action is rooted in a different legal argument.[23] Brandon contends that the State Board did not possess the legal authority to enact an outright ban on NIL activities.[24] The argument ultimately comes down to the interpretation of the language used in Senate Bill 452 which directed the State Board to adopt rules governing “student amateur status requirements, including rules related to the use of a student’s name, image and likeness.”[25] Brandon argues that the legislature’s choice to include the word “use” indicates that it did not anticipate that the State Board would ban all use of student-athletes’ NIL, only that they would regulate it’s use.[26]

The success of Brandon’s argument is uncertain as it must overcome the generous discretion courts typically grant to government agencies.[27] The NIL market for high school athletes is largely uncharted territory in North Carolina, which generates a level of concern that the court may find justifies the temporary ban.[28]

The Future of NIL Laws in North Carolina

Regardless of the legal outcome of Brandon’s lawsuit, it seems increasingly likely that North Carolina NIL laws will be changing in the near future. Shortly after the lawsuit was filed, the State Board heard a proposal involving changes to the current rule that would allow public high school athletes to benefit from NIL deals, effectively reversing the current ban.[29] In a major step towards change, the Board advanced the proposed rule to a public comment period and a vote has been scheduled for January of next year.[30]

The current system is under significant pressure as student-athletes are grappling with the decision to leave the public school system to reap the financial benefits of NIL elsewhere.[31] A change in the law that would bring North Carolina in line with the overwhelming majority of states would thus benefit both student-athletes and public schools. As North Carolina navigates the complexities of NIL regulations and grapples with the implications of recent legal challenges, it stands to redefine the landscape of high school athletics in the state, ensuring that all athletes have equal access to the opportunities that come with their name, image, and likeness.


[1] Adam Epstein et al., An Evolving Landscape: Name, Image, and Likeness Rights in High School Athletics, 77 Vand. L. Rev. 845, 889 (2024).

[2] Id. at 849.

[3] Id. at 855.

[4] Id. at 861.

[5] Complaint, Brandon ex rel. F.B. v. N.C. State Bd. of Educ., No. 24CV026975-910 (N.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 23, 2024).

[6] NCAA v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141 (2021) (holding that the NCAA’s restrictions on education-related benefits were in violation of antitrust laws).

[7] Epstein, supra note 1, at 855.

[8] Juli Kidd, NCHSSA Board of Directors Concludes Spring 2023 Meeting, North Carolina High School Athletic Association (May 3, 2023), https://www.nchsaa.org/nchsaa-board-directors-concludes-spring-2023-meeting/.

[9] Angela Doughty, Whistle Blown: Time Out on North Carolina Student Athlete NIL Deals, JD Supra (July 13, 2023), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/whistle-blown-time-out-on-north-1117565/; see also 2023 Bill Text NC S.B. 636 (establishing oversight of high school interscholastic athletic activities).

[10] S.636, 2023 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2023).

[11] Shaquira Speaks, No More NIL for NC Public High School Athletes Under State Board Decision, Queen City News (June 14, 2024, 10:31 PM), https://www.qcnews.com/news/u-s/north-carolina/no-more-nil-for-nc-public-high-school-athletes-under-state-board-decision/.

[12] Brayden Stamps & Gretchen Stenger, Proposed Rules Would Allow NIL for Public High School Athletes in North Carolina, Fox8 WGHP (Sept. 5, 2024, 11:55 AM), https://myfox8.com/sports/triad-high-school/proposed-rules-would-allow-nil-for-public-high-school-athletes-in-north-carolina/.

[13] See Grace Raynor, How a 5-star QB Could Change North Carolina’s NIL Laws: What I’m Hearing in CFB Recruiting, The Athletic (Sept. 18, 2024), https://www.nytimes.com/athletic/5773853/2024/09/18/north-carolina-nil-recruiting-faizon-brandon/?searchResultPosition=8.

[14] NC Private School Leaders Approve Policy Allowing Athletes to Profit Off NIL, WBTV (Feb. 2, 2024, 2:58 PM), https://www.wbtv.com/2024/02/02/nc-private-school-leaders-approve-policy-allowing-athletes-profit-off-nil/.

[15] Braly Keller, High School NIL: State-by-State Regulations for Name, Image and Likeness Rights, Opendorse (Sept. 16, 2024), https://biz.opendorse.com/blog/nil-high-school/.

[16] Id.

[17] Francesca Casalino, Call to the Bullpen: Saving High School Student Athlete Name, Image, and Likeness Rights, 29 Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports L.J. 263, 283 (2022).

[18] Id.

[19] See Raynor, supra note 13.

[20] Id.

[21] Complaint, supra note 5, at 7.

[22] Id. at 18.

[23] Id. at 7, 10.

[24] Id. at 5.

[25] S.452, 2023 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2023)

[26] Complaint, supra note 5, at 1.

[27] Michael McCann, North Carolina Mom’s NIL Suit Tied to ‘Use’ of Law’s Language, Sportico (Aug. 27, 2024, 11:41 AM), https://www.sportico.com/law/analysis/2024/faizon-brandon-university-of-tennessee-recruit-north-carolina-nil-ban-lawsuit-1234794842/.

[28] Id.

[29] Eli Henderson, North Carolina Advances NIL Rule for Public School Athletes, Sports Illustrated (Sept. 7, 2024), https://www.si.com/fannation/name-image-likeness/nil-news/north-carolina-advances-nil-rule-for-public-school-athletes.

[30] Id.

[31] Raynor, supra note 13.

By Jonah Auslander

The Kennedy name has been a staple of American politics going as far back as John F. Kennedy’s presidential victory in 1960.[1] Ever since the 1960 election, members of the Kennedy family have found themselves in the news for various reasons.[2] One Kennedy family member that has recently been a topic of discussion is Robert F. Kennedy Jr. (Kennedy)[3], son of Robert Kennedy and nephew of John F. Kennedy.

Kennedy rose to prominence as an environmental attorney, where he attacked big pollution and championed clean water and air initiatives.[4] But he has lately found himself at the heart of various controversies by supporting anti-vaccine initiatives, spreading John F. Kennedy death conspiracies, and blaming gender dysphoria on chemicals in the environment.[5] Despite his involvement in these controversies, Kennedy expressed presidential aspirations and announced his intention to challenge Joe Biden for the 2024 Democratic nomination[6]. Less than six months later, Kennedy changed tactics and announced that he would continue his presidential campaign as an Independent candidate.[7]

Once again, Kennedy shook up the political landscape on August 23, 2024 and announced that he would suspend his campaign and endorse former President Donald Trump.[8] Kennedy stated that he “no longer believe[d] that [he] ha[d] a realistic path to electoral victory,”[9] and that he would “now throw [his] support to President Trump.”[10] So as not to disadvantage President Trump, Kennedy attempted to withdraw his name from the presidential ballot in many battleground states. [11]

One of these states was North Carolina, which has given Kennedy headaches.[12] The North Carolina State Board of Elections rejected Kennedy’s request to remove himself from the ballot, citing that “it would not be practical to reprint ballots that have already been printed and meet the state law deadline to start absentee voting.”[13] The board also claimed that reprinting the ballots would leave North Carolina counties “without ballots until mid-September at the earliest and lead to significant additional costs.”[14] In an effort to force the hand of the North Carolina State Elections Board, Kennedy filed a lawsuit in  Wake County Superior Court alleging that the state had “irreparably harmed” him and interfered with his right to free speech by denying his request for removal from the ballot.[15]

However, on September 5, 2024, Wake County Superior Court Judge Rebecca Holt denied Kennedy’s request to stop the county elections boards from distributing ballots affixed with his name to their constituents.[16] Judge Holt cited a state law that directs the first absentee ballots for the Nov. 5 , 2024 elections be mailed to requesters starting on Friday, August 6.[17] After the ruling, a Kennedy representative stated that the decision would be appealed.[18] In anticipation of Kennedy’s appeal, Judge Holt ordered the election board to stop sending out absentee ballots before noon on Friday, August 6.[19] The North Carolina Court of Appeals sided with Kennedy and halted the election board distribution of ballots naming him as a presidential nominee in order “to prevent the dissemination of inaccurate ballots.”[20] The North Carolina State Elections Board then formally requested that the North Carolina Supreme Court reverse the Court of Appeals’ decision. But the North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s decision, stating that the Court “acknowledge[s] that expediting the process of printing new ballots will require considerable time and effort by our election officials and significant expense to the State. But that is a price the North Carolina Constitution expects us to incur to protect voters’ fundamental right to vote their conscience and have that vote count.”[21]

With the North Carolina Supreme Court taking Kennedy’s side,[22] Wisconsin and Michigan remain the only state refusing to remove Kennedy from the ballot.[23]


[1] Campaign of 1960, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum (last visited Sept. 6, 2024), https://www.jfklibrary.org/learn/about-jfk/jfk-in-history/campaign-of-1960.

[2] See Richard Cavendish, The Assassination of Robert Kennedy, History Today (June 6, 2008), https://www.historytoday.com/archive/months-past/assassination-robert-kennedy; Tina Cassidy, The Surprising Role Jackie Kennedy Onassis Played in Saving Grand Central, Bloomberg (Feb. 5, 2013), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-02-05/the-surprising-role-jackie-kennedy-onassis-played-in-saving-grand-central; Charity Group Recalls John Kennedy Jr., The New York Times (Dec. 8, 1999), https://www.nytimes.com/1999/12/08/nyregion/charity-group-recalls-john-kennedy-jr.html:; John A. Farrell, Ted Kennedy’s Complicated Legacy, From Chappaquidick to Senate Lion, Time (Oct. 29, 2022), https://time.com/6226087/edward-kennedy-biography/.

[3] Max Matza, RFK wins bid to remove name from ballot in two swing states, BBC News (Sept. 6, 2024), https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cx2lzly212do.

[4] Robert F Kennedy Jr. takes big business to task over pollution at SXSW Eco, The Guardian (Oct. 10, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2016/oct/10/robert-f-kennedy-jr-sxsw-eco-climate-change-big-business-economic-policy.

[5] Brigid Kennedy, A running list of RFK Jr.’s controversies, The Week (July 31, 2023), https://theweek.com/2024-presidential-election/1025265/a-running-list-of-rfk-jrs-controversies.

[6] Rashard Rose et al., Robert F. Kennedy Jr. files paperwork to run for president as a democrat, CNN (Apr. 5, 2023), https://www.cnn.com/2023/04/05/politics/robert-kennedy-president-democratic-nomination/index.html.

[7] Aaron Pellish, Robert F. Kennedy Jr. announces independent run for president, ending Democratic primary challenge to Biden, CNN (Oct. 9, 2023), https://www.cnn.com/2023/10/09/politics/kennedy-independent-campaign/index.html.

[8] Kathryn Watson, RFK. Jr. endorses Trump and suspends presidential campaign, CBS News (Aug. 23, 2024), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/rfk-jr-ends-presidential-bid/.

[9] Id.

[10] Jonathan J. Cooper et al., RFK Jr. suspends his presidential bid and backs Donald Trump before appearing with him at his rally, AP News (Aug. 23, 2024), https://apnews.com/article/rfk-jr-trump-speech-arizona-a2638f89ddcb5de03edbe4574ca17d45.

[11] Watson, supra note 8.

[12] Robert Tait, RFK Jr sues North Carolina elections board to remove his name from the ballot, The Guardian (Sept. 1, 2024), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/article/2024/sep/01/rfk-jr-sues-north-carolina-elections-board-over-ballot.

[13] Key Swing State Rejects Request to Remove RFK Jr. From Ballot, Newsweek (Aug. 29, 2024), https://www.newsweek.com/north-carolina-swing-state-robert-f-kennedy-jr-2024-election-1946391.

[14] Id.

[15] Nadine Yousif, RFK Jr sues to remove name from North Carolina ballot, BBC (Sept. 1, 2024), https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ckgw9dg55l9o.

[16] Gary D. Robertson, North Carolina judge rejects RFK Jr.’s request to remove his name from state ballots, AP News (Sept. 5, 2024), https://apnews.com/article/north-carolina-ballot-rfk-lawsuit-823b4e93686561e66fd085a540a40665.

[17] Id.

[18] Id.

[19] Id.

[20] Kennedy v. N.C. State Bd. of Elections, No. 235P24, 2024 N.C. LEXIS 755, *7 (N.C. Sept. 9, 2024).

[21] Id.

[22] Jordan Rubin, Robert F. Kennedy Jr. is of North Carolina ballot, thanks to GOP-majority state Supreme Court, MSNBC News (Sept. 10, 2024), https://www.msnbc.com/deadline-white-house/deadline-legal-blog/robert-f-kennedy-jr-north-carolina-ballot-removal-rcna170421.

[23] [23] Kyle Jones, RFK Jr. turn to appeals court in effort to be removed from Wisconsin ballot, Channel 3000 (Sept. 10, 2024), https://www.channel3000.com/news/rfk-jr-turns-to-appeals-court-in-effort-to-be-removed-from-wisconsin-ballot/article_25691004-6fa2-11ef-a709-03ff6dde572e.html; Jane C. Timm et al., RFK Jr. will appear on Michigan’s ballot, state Supreme Court rules, NBC News (Sep. 9, 2024), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2024-election/rfk-jr-will-appear-michigan-ballot-state-supreme-court-rules-rcna170289.

By Clay Shupak

State constitutions are not replicas of the United States Constitution: they are independent guarantors of liberty.  The North Carolina Supreme Court will soon decide two cases that could increase protections for economic liberty across the state, Singleton v. North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services[1] and Kinsley v. Ace Speedway Racing Ltd.[2]  Litigants in both cases have asserted rights under the Fruits of Their Labor Clause[3]—a unique provision of the North Carolina Constitution with no direct counterpart in the United States Constitution.[4]  The Court now faces a choice between lockstepping[5] with federal jurisprudence or returning to an interpretation of the clause that offers more robust protections for economic liberty.  The justices seem inclined not to give the Fruits of Their Labor Clause short shrift.[6]

The Fruits of Their Labor Clause

The Fruits of Their Labor Clause was added to the North Carolina Constitution during Reconstruction.[7]  The clause resides in the constitution’s Declaration of Rights between words lifted directly from the Declaration of Independence.[8]  The full provision states the “self-evident” truth that “all persons are created equal” and possess “inalienable rights” to “life, liberty, the enjoyment of the fruits of their own labor, and the pursuit of happiness.”[9]  Americans at the time would have viewed the clause as the recognition of an already existing right rather than the creation of a new right from whole cloth. [10]      

The drafters of the 1868 Constitution added the Fruits of Their Labor Clause as an anti-slavery provision.[11]  Steeped in Lockean natural rights theory,[12] the drafters believed that a special evil of slavery was that “another man” got “to hold and enjoy the fruits of [the slave’s] labor.”[13]  They feared that simply applying the Bill of Rights to the states would not be enough to secure the “civil and political rights” of freed Blacks.[14]  Thus, the drafters decided that safeguarding the right of all people to earn an honest living would require constitutional protection.[15]  By adding the Fruits of Their Labor Clause, the drafters sought to bring North Carolina’s Constitution into closer alignment with the natural law by securing rights omitted from the federal constitution.[16]

In its early years, the Fruits of Their Labor Clause was invoked to limited effect.[17]  Starting in 1940, however, plaintiffs wielded the clause to void laws that arbitrarily excluded citizens from working in their occupation of choice.[18]  During this time, courts took a “more aggressive” approach towards the clause, applying a higher level of scrutiny than rational basis review.[19]  But, by the second half of the twentieth century, affinity for the clause waned.[20]  In Treants Enterprises, Inc. v. Onslow County,[21] the North Carolina Supreme Court applied vanilla rational basis review to a challenge brought under the clause.[22]  Ever since, courts in North Carolina have followed Treants Enterprises’s approach.[23]

The Cases Pending Review at the North Carolina Supreme Court

The Court’s current approach to the Fruits of Their Labor Clause may soon change.  In Singleton and Ace Speedway, litigants and their amici have asked the Court to consider whether rational basis review is the appropriate test for the Fruits of Their Labor Clause.[24]  The cases arrive to the Court on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.  Both involve a challenge to public health laws.[25]  The challengers argue that rational basis review flies in the face of history and common sense.[26]  They contend that the Court’s current approach to the clause simply “mirrors the most deferential form of federal review,” allowing the government to prevail on flimsy rational justifications where factual inquiry is wholly optional.[27]  The government, on the other hand, argues that the Fruits of Their Labor Clause was “never understood to prevent the government from regulating businesses to promote public welfare.”[28]  Instead, according to the state, the clause was originally understood solely “as a condemnation of slavery.”[29]  The state contends that a highly deferential approach is necessary to avoid harm to public health and safety.[30]

The facts of Singleton and Ace Speedway illustrate the stakes of the debate.  In Singleton, the plaintiff is an ophthalmologist who runs a medical practice in the rural community of New Bern.[31]  Under North Carolina’s certificate of need laws, a physician must obtain an operating room permit from the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services before they can perform certain medical procedures.[32]  The plaintiff is bringing an as-applied challenge to North Carolina’s certificate of needs laws on grounds that they limit competition rather than promoting public health.[33]  Currently, he must drive to the only certified hospital in a three-county radius to perform routine eye surgeries that could be safely performed at his office.[34]  The hospital charges fees that increase the cost of surgery by thousands of dollars.[35]

By contrast, in Ace Speedway, the defendant is a NASCAR racetrack that is challenging a shut-down order issued by state health officials during height of the COVID-19 pandemic. [36]  The defendant contends that the shut-down order was issued in retaliation for the speedway owner’s public criticism of Governor Roy Cooper’s response to the pandemic.[37]  It points to nearby racetracks that were not ordered to shut down.[38]  And it contends that the government-mandated shut down infringed upon the right to earn a living.[39]  Interestingly, the ACLU and the Institute for Justice, advocates on opposite ends of the political spectrum, have filed briefs in support of the plaintiff.[40]

Implications: A Right with New Bite

A victory for the government challengers in either case could have significant ramifications for peoples’ economic liberties in North Carolina.  If the Court rejects the government’s argument for rational basis review, the Fruits of Their Labor Clause would gain new teeth.  Government regulations that burden a citizen’s right to earn a living would be subject to increased scrutiny.  The first domino to fall may be occupational licensing regulations that can show no benefit to public health, safety, or welfare.[41]  In the long run, a more muscular approach to the Fruits of Their Labor Clause may remove unnecessary hurdles to entering the work force,[42] promote the formation of small businesses,[43] and make goods and services cheaper for North Carolinians.[44]  What is more, the move would affirm a core tenant of American federalism.  As Justice Brennan observed, “the full realization of our liberties cannot be guaranteed”[45] if state constitutions do not function as independent bulwarks of liberty, distinct from the federal constitution.


[1] 876 S.E.2d 563 (N.C. 2022) (No. 260P22-1) (order granting review).

[2] 883 S.E.2d 455 (N.C. 2022) (No. 280PA22) (order granting review).

[3] N.C. Const., art. I, § 1.

[4] The plaintiff in Singleton is not asserting a claim directly under The Fruits of Their Labor Clause.  Instead, there, the plaintiff states a claim directly under North Carolina’s due process provision, the Law of the Land Clause.  See N.C. Const., art. I, § 19.  Nevertheless, as the plaintiff in Singleton states in an amicus brief filed in Ace Speedway, the Fruits of Their Labor Clause and the Law of the Land Clause protect one and the same right—the right to earn an honest living.  Brief of Dr. Jay Singleton as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellee at 2, Kinsley v. Ace Speedway Racing, Ltd., No. 260P22-1 (N.C. June 2, 2023), 2023 WL 4028053 [hereinafter I.J.’s Amicus Brief Supporting Ace Speedway].  Indeed, as North Carolina Supreme Court Justice Richard Dietz observed in a recent law review article, courts “often lump” the clauses together and “resolve them in the same analysis.”  Richard Dietz, Factories of Generic Constitutionalism, 14 Elon L. Rev. 1, 21, 29 (2022).

[5] For a discussion of why state constitutional law often moves in lockstep with federal jurisprudence and why it sometimes departs, see Jeffery S. Sutton, 51 Imperfect Solutions: States and the Making of American Constitutional Law 7–27 (2008).  

[6] At oral argument, concerns about restricting economic activity took center stage, with several justices questioning whether the government’s preferred reading of the North Carolina Constitution was protective enough.  See, e.g., Oral Argument at 8:28, Kinsley v. Ace Speedway Racing, Ltd., No. 260P22-1 (Nov. 7, 2023), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iEOWwyUnPZU.

[7] John V. Orth & Paul Martin Newby, The North Carolina State Constitution 47 (2d ed., 2013).

[8] Id.; The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.”).

[9] N.C. Const., art. 1, § 1 (emphasis added).

[10]Jud Campbell, Constitutional Rights Before Realism, 2020 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1433,1434–35, 1443 (2020). This understanding of rights carried forward into the twentieth century. See State v. Hay, 126 N.C. 999, 999 (N.C. 1900) (Douglas, J., Concurring) (explaining that Article I, Section 1 of the North Carolina Constitution “does not profess to confer these rights, but recognizes them as pre–existing and inherent in the individual by ‘right divine.’”).

[11] Richard Dietz, supra note 4, at 19–20; see also Joseph Ranney, A Fool’s Errand? Legal Legacies of Reconstruction in Two Southern States, 9 Tex. Wesleyan L. Rev. 1, 17 (2002). (discussing how “North Carolina . . . regulated black labor” during Reconstruction by “focus[ing] on apprenticeship laws.”).

[12] Locke’s famous labor theory of property is laid out in his Second Treatise on Government. See John Locke, Two Treatises on Government 305–06 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690).

[13] Dietz, supra note 4, at 20 (quoting Albion W. Tourgée, An Appeal To Caesar 244 (1884)).

[14] Id.

[15] Id.

[16] Id. at 20–21.

[17] Id. at 21.

[18] State v. Harris, 6 S.E.2d 854, 858 (N.C. 1940).

[19] Dietz, supra note 4, at 21.

[20] See e.g., State v. Warren, 114 S.E.2d 660, 663–64 (N.C. 1960) (upholding an occupational licensing regulation for real estate agents).

[21] 360 S.E.2d 783 (N.C. 1987).

[22] Id. at 785.

[23] See, e.g., Tully v. City of Wilmington, 810 S.E.2d 208, 215 (N.C. 2018) (applying the rational basis test).

[24] I.J.’s Amicus Brief Supporting Ace Speedway, supra note 4, at 2 (noting that Kinsley and Singleton both “ask[] the Court to clarify the test that applies under Art. I, §19 when the government restricts the right to earn a living”); Reply Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 2–3, Singleton v. N.C. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., No. 260PA22 (N.C. Feb. 5, 2024), 2024 WL 635933.

[25] I.J.’s Amicus Brief Supporting Ace Speedway, supra note 4, at 2.

[26] Id. at 11.

[27] Id. at 10.

[28] Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 40, Kinsley v. Ace Speedway Racing, Ltd. at 40, No. 260P22-1 (May 3, 2023), 2023 WL 3467853.

[29] Id. at 37.

[30] Id.

[31] Complaint at 1, Singleton v. N.C. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., No. 20 CVS 05150 (N.C. Super. Ct. April 23, 2020), 2020 WL 13064502 [hereinafter Singleton Complaint].

[32] Id. at 26.

[33] Id. at 10.

[34] Id. at 10, 19.

[35] Id. at 1, 14.

[36] Response to Petition for Discretionary Review, Kinsley v. Ace Speedway, Ltd. at 2, No. 260P22-1 (Sept. 6, 2022), 2022 WL 4486857.

[37] Brief for Defendants-Appellees at 38, Kinsley v. Ace Speedway, Ltd. at 38, No. 260P22-1 (June 2, 2023), 2023 WL 4028000.

[38] Id. at 35.

[39] Id. at 22.

[40] I.J.’s Amicus Brief Supporting Ace Speedway, supra note 4, at 2 (emphasizing the violation of Ace Speedway’s right to earn a living); Brief of ACLU of North Carolina Legal Foundation as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellee at 2, Kinsley v. Ace Speedway Racing, Ltd. No. 280PA22 (June 2, 2023), 2023 WL 4028007 (emphasizing the harm done to Ace Speedway’s free speech rights and the need for government accountability).

[41] Occupational licensing regulations were frequently struck down for violating the Fruits of Their Labor Clause in the recent past. See Dietz, supra note 4, at 21.

[42] Morris M. Kleiner & Evan J. Soltas, A Welfare Analysis of Occupational Licensing in the U.S. States, 90 Rev. Econ. Studs. 2481, 2483–84 (2023) (estimating that licensing an occupation for the first time would eliminate twenty-nine percent of jobs).

[43] Stephen Slivinski, Bootstraps Tangled in Red Tape, Goldwater Inst. (Feb. 10, 2015), https://www.goldwaterinstitute.org/bootstraps-tangled-in-red-tape (last visited Apr. 22, 2024) (discussing the negative impacts of occupational licensing on low-income entrepreneurs).

[44] See, e.g., Singleton Complaint, supra note 31, at 2 (stating that performing cataract surgery in Dr. Singleton’s office instead of the hospital required by certificate of need laws would cut costs from $6,000 to $1,800).

[45]  William J. Brennan Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489, 489 (1977).

By Nate Drum

From the very first day of law school, students are taught that every legal action can be placed into one of two distinct categories: civil cases and criminal cases.  This distinction implicates everything from the substantive rights of the parties, to the rules of procedure, to which courts have jurisdiction to hear the case.[1]  However, despite these fundamental differences, the distinction between civil and criminal is not always as clear as it first appears.  While this is apparent in a number of different areas of the law, none is clearer than North Carolina’s complex and often contradictory case law governing contempt of court proceedings.[2]

A recent case heard by the North Carolina Court of Appeals, Grier v. Grier,[3] highlights such a case where the law surrounding contempt proceedings continued to blur the line between civil and criminal law.  The issue presented was whether a party in a family law dispute (a civil proceeding) prosecuting a claim of criminal contempt of court (a criminal proceeding) could recover attorneys fees (civil penalty) as a sanction.[4]  In other words: does the overarching essence of the case determine what remedies and penalties are available or does the specific substance of the proceeding control?  For the time being, we are left without an answer.[5]

To understand this “nesting doll” dilemma, in which a party in a civil action initiates a criminal proceeding and seeks a civil remedy,[6] this article will provide a brief overview of the North Carolina rule governing the award of attorneys fees as a civil penalty, North Carolina laws governing criminal contempt proceedings, and a discussion about how these issues came together in Grier.[7]

Attorneys Fees Generally: A Civil Penalty

North Carolina follows the traditional “American Rule” regarding the award of attorneys fees,[8] holding that “a party can recover attorney[s] fees only if such a recovery is expressly authorized by statute.”[9]  Such statutory authorization has typically been narrowly crafted to only apply in certain types of cases.[10]  For example, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.6 authorizes the award of attorneys fees “[i]n an action or proceeding for the custody or support, or both, of a minor child . . . to an interested party acting in good faith who has insufficient means to defray the expense of the suit.”[11]  While the overwhelming majority of statutes authorizing the award of attorneys fees in North Carolina are only applicable in the civil context,[12] there are circumstances in which a criminal defendant may be ordered to pay the costs of attorneys fees.[13]  For example, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-455 authorizes the court to order a criminal defendant to pay the reasonable attorneys fees incurred by appointed counsel.[14]

Yet, even when awarded in the context of defense of a criminal proceeding, the award of attorneys fees is quintessentially a civil remedy.[15]  Rather than a criminal “punishment,” attorneys fees have typically been viewed by North Carolina courts as a civil penalty as most court-appointed attorneys fees are entered against criminal defendants in the form of a civil judgment.[16]

Criminal Contempt Proceedings Generally: A Criminal Proceeding

Black’s Law Dictionary defines contempt of court as follows: “The act of demeaning the court, preventig [sic] justice adminstration [sic], or disobeying a sentence of the court.   It is [generally] criminal [in nature] and can lead to fines or imprisonment.”[17]  However, North Carolina law surrounding contempt of court is somewhat more complicated than such a simple definition would lead one to believe.[18]  For example, in North Carolina, contempt of court can be either civil in nature or criminal in nature.[19]  What more, the overarching nature of the original action does not dictate the nature of the contempt proceeding.[20]  For example, a criminal defendant can be held in civil contempt of court,[21] just as a civil defendant can be held in criminal contempt of court.[22]  Further, a contemptnor defendant can be held in both criminal and civil contempt in the same proceeding, so long as each finding of contempt is based on separate and discrete conduct.[23]

However, determining whether a contempt proceeding is civil or criminal is of utmost importance for litigants because the nature of the proceeding will define the parties’ procedural and substantive rights (including what penalties can be imposed), the burden of proof required, and the right of appellate review.[24]  Though, as North Carolina courts have repeatedly recognized, “the demarcation between [civil and criminal contempt] may be hazy at best.”[25]  Therefore, North Carolina courts look to the purpose for which the proceeding was initiated, while considering the nature of the conduct being punished.[26]  Generally, “[c]riminal contempt is imposed in order to preserve the court’s authority and to punish disobedience of its orders.”[27]  Further, criminal contempt “is generally applied where the judgment is in punishment of an act already accomplished.”[28]

Upon a finding of criminal contempt, like all criminal statutes, the available penalties a trial court may impose are codified.[29]  Generally, a criminal contemptnor can be punished via a judicial censure, a fine, and/or imprisonment for up to thirty days.[30]  As noted in the statutory framework of the North Carolina general statutes, the provisions pertaining to criminal contempt were meant to preempt existing common law by providing a uniform and exclusive statutory scheme governing such proceedings.[31]     

Criminal Contempt in the Family Law Context: A Civil Action

The interaction of North Carolina law governing attorneys fees and contempt of court collided in Grier v. Grier.[32]  In this case, the contemptnor defendant, Mrs. Grier, was held in criminal contempt of court for violating the court’s child custody order.[33]  As a result of the finding, the prosecuting party, Mr. Grier, sought an award of attorneys fees from Mrs. Grier under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.6.[34]  Mrs. Grier challenged the award of attorneys fees as an improper remedy under the exclusive criminal contempt remedies enumerated at  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 5A-12.[35]  Ultimately, the question asked to the court was whether a party in a family law dispute (a civil proceeding) prosecuting a claim of criminal contempt of court (a criminal proceeding) could recover attorneys fees (civil penalty) as a sanction.

If the answer would be yes, how would that implicate the rule of lenity, holding that statutory ambiguity should be resolved in favor of the defendant?  Would that mean that the remedies provided in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 5A-12 are not exclusive, despite language to the contrary?

If the answer is no, would that create a bright line rule that the substance of a proceeding overwrites the overarching essence of the case?  Would that mean that the award of attorneys fees under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.6 would be limited only to those proceedings substantively connected to the custody proceeding and while excluding related disputes arising through the course of the litigation?  Would it create perverse incentives for litigants to force their opposing party to permit a violation of court orders or to engage in the costly prosecution of criminal contempt proceedings without a monetary remedy?

Unfortunately, the court declined to answer.[36]  While recognizing the challenging internal conflict within the laws, the court concluded that Mr. Grier did not meet the statutory requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.6 which required that he have “insufficient means to defray the expense of the suit.”[37]  Notably, the North Carolina Supreme Court has previously disposed of a similar case in which this exact question was raised on procedural grounds.[38]  So, until a case arises which cannot be disposed of on unrelated grounds, the question of whether a party in a civil case, prosecuting a criminal contempt charge, can recover a civil remedy of attorneys fees remains open ended.


[1] Lawsuits, North Carolina Judicial Branch, https://www.nccourts.gov/help-topics/lawsuits-and-small-claims/lawsuits (explaining the difference between civil and criminal cases).

[2] See Spencer L. Blaylock Jr., Contempt of Court — Civil or Criminal, 36 N.C. L. Rev. 221, 223 (1956) (observing that “much confusion” has arisen regarding North Carolina’s contempt of court statutory framework and that it has been consistently “applied by the lower courts and attorneys” in improper ways).

[3] Grier v. Grier, No. COA 22-37, 2022 N.C. App. LEXIS 832 (N.C. Ct. App. Dec. 6, 2022).

[4] Id. at *P12.

[5] Id. at *P13 (concluding that the court “need not decide” whether the attorneys fee award was statutorily permissible).

[6] Id. at *P10 (noting that an order “directing a party to pay attorney[s] fees in the context of a criminal proceeding is itself civil in nature”).

[7] Id.

[8] Ehrenhaus v. Baker, 776 S.E.2d 699, 704 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015).

[9] Wadsworth v. Wadsworth, 868 S.E.2d 636, 644 (N.C. Ct. App. 2021).

[10] Sullivan v. Woody, 882 S.E.2d 707, 211 (N.C. Ct. App. 2022) (noting that fee shifting statutes should be narrowly construed).

[11] N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.6 (2023).

[12] See Jim Gale, Awarding Attorneys’ Fees in North Carolina, UNC School of Government (2018 Superior Court Judges’ Summer Conference) (last visited Mar. 18, 2024), https://www.sog.unc.edu/sites/default/files/course_materials/09%20Attorneys%27%20Fees%20Awards%20in%20NC_Gale.pdf (listing all North Carolina statutes authorizing the award of attorneys fees).

[13] John Rubin, Are Attorney Fees’ Permissible?, UNC School of Government, https://www.sog.unc.edu/resources/faqs/are-attorneys%E2%80%99-fees-permissible

[14] N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-455(a) (2023).

[15] See Rubin, supra note 13.

[16] State v. Webb, 591 S.E.2d 505, 513 (N.C. 2004); see also State v. Jacobs, 648 S.E.2d 841, 842 (N.C. 2007) (noting that an order for attorneys fees, even in a criminal case, is a civil penalty).

[17] Contempt of Court, Black’s Law Dictionary(2d ed. 1910) (last visited Mar. 18, 2024), https://thelawdictionary.org/contempt-of-court/

[18] See, e.g., State v. Wendorf, 852 S.E.2d 898, 902 (N.C. Ct. App. 2020) (noting that in addition to the differences between civil contempt and criminal contempt, North Carolina recognizes a difference between “direct” and “indirect” contempt).

[19] Bishop v. Bishop, 369 S.E.2d 106, 108 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988).

[20] See Id. (noting that the same conduct may be criminal contempt, civil contempt, or both, and that the nature and purpose of the court’s “punishment” will be determinative, rather than nature of the overarching case).

[21] NC Prosecutors’ Resource Online, UNC School of Government (last visited Mar. 18, 2024), https://ncpro.sog.unc.edu/manual/204-3#:~:text=A%20person%20may%20be%20held,to%20comply%20with%20that%20order.

[22] Michael Crowell, North Carolina Superior Court Judges’ Benchbook, UNC School of Government (last visited Mar. 18, 2024), https://benchbook.sog.unc.edu/judicial-administration-and-general-matters/contempt (noting that a party to a civil case, an attorney in a civil case, or even a witness in a civil case can be held in criminal contempt of court).

[23] See, e.g., Adams Creek Assocs. V. Davis, 652 S.E.2d 677, 687 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007) (holding a defendant in civil contempt for violating a court order and then separately held in criminal contempt for threatening a witness); see also N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 5A-21(c), 5A-23(g) (2023) (prohibiting a defendant from being held in both criminal and civil contempt for the same conduct).

[24] See Hartsell v. Hartsell, 393 S.E.2d 570, 575 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990) (noting that civil contempt proceedings do not afford defendants the same procedural and substantive protections as criminal contempt proceedings); see also O’Briant v. O’Briant, 329 S.E.2d 370, 372 (N.C. 1985) (noting that criminal contempt proceedings trigger Constitutional safeguards applicable to all criminal proceedings).

[25] State v. Revels, 793 S.E.2d 744, 747 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016).

[26] O’Briant, 329 S.E.2d at 372.

[27] Id.

[28] Revels, 793 S.E.2d at 747.

[29] N.C. Gen. Stat. § 5A-12 (2023).

[30] Id.

[31] See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. § 5A-11(a) (2023) (providing that the statutorily enumerated grounds for criminal contempt “are exclusive, regardless of any other grounds for criminal contempt which existed at common law”).

[32] Grier v. Grier, No. COA 22-37, 2022 N.C. App. LEXIS 832 (N.C. Ct. App. Dec. 6, 2022).

[33] Id. at *P4–P5.

[34] Id. at *P6.

[35] Id. at *P12.

[36] Id. at *P13.

[37] Id.

[38] Reynolds v. Reynolds, 569 S.E.2d 645, 646 (N.C. 2002).