By Luul Lampkins

Earlier this year, Vans, Inc. (“Vans”) brought a trademark infringement lawsuit against MSCHF Product Studio Inc. (“MSCHF”) seeking a preliminary injunction related to its Wavy Baby sneakers.[1] In response, a federal judge ordered MSCHF to stop shipping the shoes and to cancel any outstanding orders.[2] Vans argued that the Wavy Baby sneakers “blatantly and unmistakably incorporate[d] Vans’ iconic trademarks and trade dress” in violation of the Lanham Act.[3]

MSCHF—a Brooklyn-based art collective—designed the Wavy Baby sneakers in collaboration with rapper “Tyga.”[4] Aside from Wavy Baby’s undulating soles and “waviness,” the “non-functional” shoes seem to resemble Vans’ Old Skool sneakers.[5] MSCHF’s founder and CEO, Gabriel Whaley, described the sneakers as a “‘liquified’ version of a classic skate shoe silhouette, but with almost all function warped and stripped away.”[6] Further, Tyga posted a video suggesting that the Old Skools could be transformed into Wavy Baby by heating them in the microwave.[7]

This is not the first time that MSCHF’s shoes have been at the center of a legal dispute. In 2021, Nike sued MSCHF over its “Satan Shoes,” arguing that they were “likely to cause confusion and dilution and create an erroneous association between MSCHF’s products and Nike.”[8] The parties ultimately settled one week after a judge granted Nike a temporary restraining order against MSCHF.[9]

In response to this lawsuit, MSCHF asserted a First Amendment defense, which is “an affirmative defense that requires a court to balance the defendant’s expressive interests against the public’s interest in avoiding confusion.”[10] MSCHF argued that Wavy Baby sneakers are protected under the First Amendment because they constitute social commentary that “challenged the sneakerhead culture Vans participates in, questioned consumerism, and confronted the tension between a virtual and digital world.”[11] MSCHF also explained that the shoes were meant to be a “parody and critique [of] modern culture.”[12]

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals heard this case on September 28, 2022. On appeal, MSCHF’s attorney argued that the district court failed to follow the Second Circuit’s precedent in Rogers v. Grimaldi.[13] In Rogers, the court articulated a two-prong test for the protected uses of trademarks. First, the work at issue must be “artistically relevant.”[14] Second, the work at issue may not be explicitly misleading.[15]

MSCHF contended that the Wavy Baby sneakers are protected under Rogers because they satisfied both prongs of the test. First, MSCHF argued that Wavy Baby is a work of artistic expression.[16] To support this position, MSCHF pointed to artist Daniel Arsham’s statement: “[t]here is not a single artist who would say MSCHF is not an artist, or that the Wavy Baby sneakers are not art.”[17] Further, MSCHF argued that Wavy Baby’s references to Vans’ marks are artistically relevant because they constituted “a parody of and commentary on Vans, whether or not Vans thinks MSCHF’s message was successfully communicated.”[18] MSCHF explained that there was an “artistic—i.e., noncommercial—association” between MSCHF and Vans rather than an “inten[t] to associate with the mark to exploit the mark’s popularity and good will.”[19]

MSCHF also argued that the Wavy Baby sneakers were not explicitly misleading.[20] Vans disagreed, arguing instead that the sneakers were likely to give rise to “consumer confusion,” thus rendering the sneakers “explicitly misleading as to source.”[21] MSCHF contended that Vans misunderstood the holding in Rogers, which explained that “a use is not explicitly misleading unless it is an ‘explicit indication,’ ‘overt claim,’ or ‘explicit misstatement as to the source of the artwork.”[22] To support its contention, MSCHF explained that Wavy Baby shoes are “larger and have a far different visual impression than Old Skool sneakers, and they come with a prominent parody warning label.”[23]

This case has brought up questions about the scope of the Second Circuit’s opinion in Rogers. While Vans argues that “courts have concluded that commercial products fall outside Rogers’ scope,” MSCHF asserts that the First Amendment still applies in this context.[24]

As the parties to this lawsuit await an ultimate decision from the Second Circuit, it is important to note the broader implications of this decision. This case illustrates the difference between a parody and a satire. Not all references to an existing mark are parodies. A parody must “make it clear that it does not originate from the mark owner” by commenting on the mark.[25] Satire, on the other hand, “comments on society at large or social trends in general” and must “justify its use of the mark beyond just the humor of doing so.”[26]

Parodies and satire are generally considered protected speech—even if they are communicated through a pair of sneakers. Nonetheless, these references to existing marks are only entitled to First Amendment protection if they comport with the requisite standards.

[1] Vans, Inc. v. MSCHF Prod. Studio, Inc., 22CV2156WFKRML, 2022 WL 1446681 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 2022).

[2] Nina Pullano, Vans-Inspired Sneaker Orders Held Up by Federal Judge, Courthouse News Serv. (Apr. 29, 2022),

[3] Complaint at 3, Vans, Inc., 2022 WL 1446681,

[4] David H. Siegel, The Usual MSCHF, Nat’l Law Rev. (Apr. 29, 2022),

[5] Id.

[6] Declaration of Gabriel Whaley at 19, Vans, Inc., 2022 WL 1446681,  

[7] Tyga (@tyga), TikTok (Apr. 11, 2022),  

[8] Bryan Pietsch, Nike Sues Over Unauthorized ‘Satan Shoes,N.Y. Times (Mar. 28, 2021),

[9] Id.

[10] Reply Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 14–15, Vans, Inc., 2022 WL 1446681.

[11] Declaration of Gabriel Whaley, supra note 6, at 19.

[12] Id.

[13] 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989). See Oral Argument at 6:28, Vans, Inc., 2022 WL 1446681,

[14] Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1000 (2d Cir. 1989)

[15] Id.

[16] Reply Brief for Defendant-Appellant, supra note 10, at 3.

[17] Id.

[18] Id. at 22.

[19] Id. at 23.

[20] Id. at 24.

[21] Id.

[22] Id.

[23] Id. at 25.

[24] Id. at 11.

[25] Siegel, supra note 4.

[26] Id.

By Blake Witty

This Sunday, nearly one in three Americans[1] will turn to their televisions to watch Patrick Mahomes and the Kansas City Chiefs take on Tom Brady and the Tampa Buccaneers in Super Bowl LV.[2]  The Super Bowl has become a mainstay in American culture and is arguably the most followed and prestigious event on the American sports calendar.  Being such a massive event, one would expect that many small businesses would try to use the Super Bowl name to attract football fans and customers alike to events.  However, this is not the case because of the National Football League’s (“NFL”) aggressive defense of the trademarked phrase “Super Bowl.”[3]  This blog post will look at the NFL’s recent history showcasing its fervent desire to protect its trademark and also explore whether the NFL actually has the right to go as far as it does (and if it’s even worth it for them).

The NFL has had the Super Bowl trademark since 1969 and has sent many cease and desist letters to businesses allegedly violating the trademark over the years.[4]  The most prominent example of the NFL flexing its trademark muscle was all the way back in 2007 when the League sent a cease and desist letter to the Fall Creek Baptist Church in Indianapolis, which caused the church to cancel their event.[5]  The League claimed the church was violating NFL rules because the church was charging patrons $3 to come watch the game.[6]  While the NFL has since eased its protocols by allowing places of gathering to use the Super Bowl moniker, these places of gathering still cannot charge admission fees to events that are advertised with the phrase “Super Bowl.”[7]

There have also been examples of the NFL having success in court in restraining suppliers from using its intellectual property, including the Super Bowl trademark.  For example, in NFL Properties, LLC v. Does 1 Through 100[8], the NFL successfully obtained permission by the court to seek a seize and desist order to stop the defendants from selling counterfeit merchandise and tickets with NFL trademarks ahead of Super Bowl 50.[9]  More recently, in NFL Properties, LLC v. Does 1–200[10], the NFL was granted a temporary restraining order, seizure order, and order to show cause when the defendants were also purported to be planning to sell counterfeit merchandise and tickets that bore NFL trademarks, including the Super Bowl trademark, ahead of last year’s Super Bowl.[11]  Further, in NFL Properties, LLC v. Humphries[12], the NFL won a default judgment to dispose of, once again, counterfeit items that bore NFL trademarks.[13]  Finally, in Titlecraft, Inc. v. NFL Properties, LLC[14], the NFL was granted a motion for summary judgement when a company manufactured custom wood trophies that were too similar in appearance to the legendary Vince Lombardi trophy awarded to each Super Bowl champion.[15]  The court held the aspects of the two trophies were similar enough to grant the NFL summary judgment for copyright infringement.[16]  While these cases are not centered on the issue of use of the NFL’s Super Bowl trademark by small businesses, they do show one thing: the NFL has had its share of successes in court in regard to protecting its trademarks.

Even considering all of these successes, how far can the NFL really go to protect its trademarks, especially the Super Bowl trademark?  Some commentators argue that the NFL can go quite far, while others are not as convinced.  For example, one commentator advises to not use the words “Super Bowl” at all to promote a business or watch party and to not use the names of the teams competing in the game to advertise.[17]  Another asserts that bars and restaurants should not use “Super Bowl” to advertise their showings of the game and that sweepstakes or giveaways should also avoid using it.[18]  Yet others think the NFL has really strayed out of bounds.[19] One article argues that one cannot trademark factual information and the NFL would only have a trademark infringement claim if a company claimed endorsement from the NFL or used the phrase “Super Bowl” in a very vague way.[20]  For example, few would suspect that a small bar that advertised a Super Bowl watch party is actually sponsored by the NFL.[21]  This potential confusion is what trademarks are truly intended to protect against.[22]  It is also important to note that there is a trademark concept called “nominative fair use.”[23]  Under this doctrine, a trademarked phrase or logo is permissible to use as long as there is no suggested relationship between the advertiser and the trademark’s owner.[24]  That is why this post and all these other articles are able to use the Super Bowl name.[25]  Maybe these small businesses or bars could also use this doctrine to argue for the use of the Super Bowl name. These small businesses or bars perhaps could say that there is no way a person could reasonably believe that the business or bar was sponsored by the NFL. The NFL would definitely object to this, but it could be an interesting argument.

So what’s the actual answer here?  Does the NFL have as broad of trademark rights as it purports, or does it have a weaker case than it lets on?  It appears to me that the NFL likely does have a ton of latitude. Much of the reasoning behind this conclusion is that a small restaurant or bar would likely need to assert its trademark use defense in court: a tall ask given the NFL’s vast legal team.[26]  As one commentator puts it: “any small business owner would be an eleventy-billion-point underdog in a courtroom match-up.”[27]  So while there could potentially be a case, the NFL’s legal resources in addition to their past court successes make any legal challenge difficult.

But there is also the question, is all this even worth it for the NFL? Instead of using the Super Bowl name to advertise, many companies have come up with their own slogans, the most common of which is probably “The Big Game.”[28]  Further examples include Budweiser using the term “Bud Bowl”[29] or Animal Planet using “Puppy Bowl.”[30]  Fans and consumers clearly know what is being referenced and these phrases are not trademarked so there is no infringement.  There is also a risk of bad publicity if the NFL keeps sending cease and desist letters to small businesses and churches.[31]

So should the NFL actually care about its Super Bowl trademark as much as it does?  They probably still should.  For example, if the NFL allows one small company to use the Super Bowl name, this single snowflake could form a snowball in which others want to use the name, leading to an avalanche that the NFL might not be able to stop.[32]  And again, with the NFL having such a large amount of legal resources[33], it probably is not that much of an inconvenience.  To top it off in regard to any bad publicity: the NFL probably does not “care about a few fans who get annoyed.”[34]

Thus, the answer to our overall question is yes, the NFL probably does have the latitude to defend its Super Bowl trademark as much as it does (or it at least has the resources to defend its actions) and yes, all this is probably worth it for the NFL.  So if you are thinking about hosting a watch party at your local bar or planning some sort of gathering for the game in which you’ll charge admission, it might be a good idea to not use the name “Super Bowl.”  Just like all of us, the NFL is watching.

[1] Helen Coster, Super Bowl TV Audience Rises Slightly to 99.9 Million Viewers, Reuters (Feb. 3, 2020, 3:19 PM),

[2] Cody Benjamin, 2021 Super Bowl Sunday: Everything to Know About Super Bowl LV with Time, TV, Odds, How to Watch and More, CBS Sports (Feb. 2, 2021),

[3] James Leggate, NFL’s Super Bowl Trademark Is Why Some Companies Call It ‘The Big Game’, Fox Business (Jan. 28, 2020),

[4] Id.

[5] Marcus Baram, NFL Sacks Super Bowl Church Parties, ABC News (Apr. 14, 2009, 8:22 AM),

[6] Id.

[7] Michelle Kaminsky, Super Bowl Legal Blitz: Inside the NFL’s Legendary Trademark Defense, Forbes (Jan. 30, 2018, 6:20 AM),

[8] NFL Properties, LLC v. Does 1 Through 100, No. 16-CV-00474, 2016 WL 9223833 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2016).

[9] Id. at *1, *3.

[10] NFL Properties, LLC v. Does 1–200, No. 20-CV-20265, 2020 WL 7493120 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 28, 2020).

[11] Id. at *2–3.

[12] NFL Properties, LLC v. Humphries, No. C 16-474, 2016 WL 2606708 (N.D. Cal. May 26, 2016).

[13] Id. at *1–2, *4.

[14] Titlecraft, Inc. v. NFL Properties, LLC, No. 10-758, 2010 WL 5209293 (D. Minn. Dec. 20, 2010).

[15] Id. at *1, *4.

[16] Id.

[17] Superb Owl or Super Bowl Trademarks, Intell. Prop. Ctr. (Feb. 1, 2019),

[18] Wilkinson Barker Knauer, LLP, As Super Bowl Approaches, Advertisers Should Be Aware of the NFL’s Efforts to Protect Its Golden Goose – 2018 Update on Super Bowl Advertising and Programs, Lexology (Jan. 11, 2018),

[19] Timothy Geigner, It’s That Time of Year: No, the NFL Can’t Stop Every Business From Using ‘Super Bowl’ in Every Instance, Techdirt (Jan. 31, 2020, 9:34 AM),

[20] Id.

[21] Kaminsky, supra note 7.

[22] Id.

[23] Wilkinson Barker Knauer LLP, supra note 18.

[24] Id.

[25] Leggate, supra note 3.

[26] Kaminsky, supra note 7.

[27] Id.

[28] Geigner, supra note 19.

[29] Leggate, supra note 3.

[30] About Puppy Bowl, Animal Planet, (last visited Feb. 2, 2020).

[31] Baram, supra note 5.

[32] Leggate, supra note 3.

[33] Kaminsky, supra note 7.

[34] Baram, supra note 5.

Post image of quarterbacks Patrick Mahomes and Tom Brady created by Wake Forest Law Review Online staff using official NFL imagery, courtesy

By Mary-Kathryn Hawes

Glossier, a millennial favorite beauty brand, is attempting to trademark its signature “millennial pink” used on the pink bubble-wrap pouches that their products arrive in.  Emily Weiss (who millennials may recall had a brief stint on the popular MTV series “The Hills” as the Teen Vogue New York intern[1]) parlayed her successful beauty blog into Glossier, an independent beauty company valued at over $1.2 billion.[2]  Launched in 2014, Glossier is somewhat unique for not only surpassing the ever-popular Kylie Cosmetics in value,[3] but Glossier also raised nearly $200 million in venture capital investments to date.[4]

With this meteoric rise, Glossier has sought to protect its intellectual property rights, receiving trademarks for their crowd favorite products Boy Brow and Balm Dotcom in 2017[5] and 2019,[6] respectively. On 09 May 2019,[7] Glossier filed a § 1(a) application to register their signature pink zip-top, bubble-wrap pouches as a trademark.[8] Specifically, Glossier described the mark as consisting “of the color pink and a translucent circle patterns displayed on the bag are claimed as a feature of the mark which is displayed on bags.”[9]

Trademark Primer

Trademarks include “any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof . . . to identify and distinguish his or her goods.”[10]  Thus, trademarks primarily serve as source identifiers.[11] While the traditional trademark may be a word or design mark, the Lanham Act also extends trademark protection to trade dress, which can include features such as size, shape, and color, among others.[12] Marks that are inherently distinctive, whose “intrinsic nature serves to identify a particular source of a product”, are eligible for registration on the Principal Register.[13]

Conversely, other marks, such as those that are merely descriptive[14] or merely a surname[15], are eligible for registration on the Principal Register once the applicant demonstrates that the mark has become “distinctive of the applicant’s goods in commerce.”[16] For example, the mark “ORANGE” used for an orange stand is merely descriptive because it describes a characteristic of the good.[17] The mark does not immediately signify source to a consumer. However, over time, such descriptive marks can come to signify source[18] and thus, the mark can become eligible for registration on the Principal Register with a showing of acquired distinctiveness, or secondary meaning. Five years of continuous use in commerce provides prima facie evidence that the mark has acquired distinctiveness.[19]

As noted in the seminal case of Qualitex v. Jacobson, marks that consist of a color cannot be inherently distinctive and require proof of secondary meaning.[20] While color doesn’t immediately signify source to consumers, over time, colors can become source identifiers. Thus, colors are eligible for trademark registration if the color is not functional[21] and is shown to have secondary meaning in connection with the applicant’s goods or services.[22]

After an applicant files for trademark registration, the examining attorney at the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) examines the mark and issues a response to the applicant within 6–12 months. The examining attorney can either permit the mark to be registered on the Principal Register or notify the applicant in writing of the statutory grounds for rejection.[23] Generally, the applicant has six months to respond to this initial office action.[24] After reviewing the applicant’s response, the examining attorney will either publish the mark for registration[25] or issue a second, final office action rejecting the mark.[26]

Glossier’s Trademark Battle

In the initial office action issued on 24 July 2019, the United States Patent and Trademark Office refused registration of the mark because it appeared to be a functional design for the packaging.[27] While Glossier claimed the “translucent circle patterns” as a feature of the mark, the examining attorney found in the examination of the submitted sample that the circles were air bubble cushioning.[28] Because the bubble wrap served a protective feature for the goods stored within, the examining attorney found that “a central feature of applicant’s bags has a specific utilitarian advantage.”[29]

Further, the examining attorney attached an Amazon webpage for bubble wrap mailing envelopes that are used for protecting items as a similar item to Glossier’s zip-top pouches.[30]  Finding that the mark was not inherently distinctive, the examining attorney found that the mark was not eligible for registration on the Principal Register without proof of acquired distinctiveness.[31]

On 23 January 2020, Glossier filed their response to the initial office action, arguing that the proposed mark “consists of the claimed color pink as applied to a very particular type and configuration of product packaging . . . the air bubbles and the packaging itself are not claimed as features of the mark.”[32] Thus, Glossier is seeking to just trademark the color millennial pink on the pouches and not the air bubbles.[33] While this argument likely gets rid of the functionality bar to their registration, Glossier must still prove that millennial pink has gained secondary meaning.[34]

Given that Glossier claims a first use date of 06 October 2014, Glossier first made a § 2(f) claim in their response that they have acquired distinctiveness.[35] Further, Glossier argues that the color pink is not functional, given that there is no distinct advantage to making the packaging pink and there are other colors available for competitors to use on their packaging.[36] Thus, Glossier argues that the only remaining factor is whether the color pink, as a mark, has acquired distinctiveness.[37]

Whether a mark has acquired distinctiveness is a fact-specific inquiry. The Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure provides a nonexclusive list of different types of evidence that used in the past to prove secondary meaning:

  • Long Use of the Mark in Commerce[38]
  • Advertising Expenditures[39]
  • Affidavits or Declarations Asserting Recognition of Mark as Source Indicator[40]
  • Survey Evidence, Market Research, and Consumer Reaction Studies[41]
  • Parodies and Copies[42]

“No single evidentiary factor is determinative.”[43] In its response, Glossier used these factors to argue that the pink pouch has acquired distinctiveness. 

First, Glossier points out that the mark has been used continuously since 2014 and in 2018, sales under the mark generated more than $100 million in revenue.[44] Glossier also attached 98 sworn declarations from Glossier customers who attested that they “immediately recognize the color pink as applied to the Glossier Pink Pouch indicates that the cosmetics and skincare products originate from Glossier and not from any other source.”[45]

Additionally, Glossier attached exhibits demonstrating their advertising and marketing of the pink pouch.[46] Interestingly, as evidence of the applicant’s success in educating the public to associate the proposed mark with a single source, Glossier pointed to third party social media posts.[47] Consumers post and tag images of their Glossier pink pouches, which Glossier argues simultaneously demonstrates that consumers already associate the pink pouch with Glossier and reinforces the connection between Glossier and the pink pouch.[48]

Glossier also provided evidence of unsolicited media coverage, linking various articles touting the “most notorious” and “popular” pink pouch.[49] Given that the existence of parodies and copies of the proposed mark can be evidence of secondary meaning, Glossier pointed to Jimmy Choo’s 2016 pink handbag that resembled pink bubble wrap.[50] Glossier noted that many fashion insiders believed that Jimmy Choo’s handbag was intended to mimic Glossier’s pink pouch.[51]

Ultimately, Glossier asserted that the “abundance of evidence demonstrates that the color pink, as applied to bags featuring lining of translucent circular air bubbles and a zipper closure, has acquired source-indicating significance in the minds of the relevant consumers. When consumers see the Pink Pouch, they immediately recognize it as emanating from Glossier.”[52] Thus, Glossier contends that their mark is eligible for registration on the Principal Register with a claim of secondary meaning.[53]

What Happens Next:

After the examining attorney reviews Glossier’s response, the attorney will either issue a second, likely non-final rejection or publish the mark for opposition if Glossier successfully argues that millennial pink serves as a source identifier.

Ultimately, it’s up to the PTO to determine whether millennial pink serves as a source identifier, and thus, is eligible for trademark registration. Regardless of the outcome, there is at least one important takeaway from Glossier’s quest to trademark the millennial pink as used in conjunction with their pink pouch.

Glossier’s proposed trademark underscores the importance of social media in analyzing secondary meaning in this increasingly digital age. Glossier explicitly used evidence of third-party social media posts to demonstrate their advertising and marketing. Unsurprisingly, the pouch is “Instagrammable” and these micro-impressions created by the social media posts all contribute to the pink pouch becoming a source identifier in the minds of consumers. As we move into an increasingly digital age, the PTO will likely continue to see these creative arguments.

[1] Jonah Waterhouse, Fashion Stars You Completely Forgot Cameoed in ‘The Hills,’ Harper’s Bazaar (Jan. 10, 2018, 11:13 PM),

[2] Bridget March, Glossier is Now Valued at More Than $1.2 Billion, Harper’s Bazaar (Mar. 20, 2019),

[3] #2 Kylie Jenner, Forbes, (last updated Feb. 17, 2020) (noting that Kylie Cosmetics is currently worth at least $900 million).

[4] Kate Clark, Glossier Triples Valuation, Enters Unicorn Club With $100M Round, TechCrunch (Mar. 19, 2019, 1:17 PM),

[5] BOY BROW, Registration No. 5,170,111.

[6] BALM DOTCOM, Registration No. 5,646,307.

[7] Unfortunately, 09 May 2019 was a Thursday, not a Wednesday.

[8] U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88/422,357 (filed May 09, 2019).

[9] Id.

[10] 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2018).

[11] Id. See also New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 305 n.2 (9th Cir. 1992) (“In economic terms, trademarks reduce consumer search costs by informing people that trademarked products come from the same source.”).

[12] § 1127. See also Sally Beauty Co. v. Beautyco, Inc., 304 F.3d 964 , 977 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 764 n.1 (1992)).

[13] Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 768.

[14] 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1) (2018).

[15] 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(4) (2018).

[16] 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (2018).

[17] Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976).

[18] See,e.g., Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163 (1995).

[19] § 1052(f).

[20] Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 163.

[21] The functionality doctrine forbids use of a product’s feature as a trademark when doing so will put a competitor at a significant, non-reputational disadvantage because the feature is either essential to the use or purpose of the article or it affects the cost or quality of the good or service. Id. at 169.

[22] TMEP § 1202.05 (Oct. 2018).

[23] TMEP § 705 (Oct. 2018).

[24] TMEP § 705.08 (Oct. 2018).

[25] TMEP § 713 (Oct. 2018).

[26] TMEP § 714.03 (Oct. 2018). Notably, the second office action is typically a final office action. However, if an applicant raises a claim of acquired distinctiveness in their response to the initial office action, then the applicant has generally presented a new issue. TMEP § 714.05(a)(i) (Oct. 2018). Thus, if the examining attorney finds that the response still does not overcome the grounds of refusal, then the examining attorney should issue another non-final office action. Thus, it is possible for applicants to receive more than two office actions. TMEP § 715.03(b) (Oct. 2018).

[27] Office Action Outgoing, United States Patent & Trademark Office (July 24, 2019),

[28] Id.

[29] Id.

[30] Id.

[31] Id.

[32] Response to Office Action, United States Patent & Trademark Office (Jan. 23, 2020),

[33] Id.

[34] Id.

[35] Id.

[36] Id.

[37] Id.

[38] TMEP § 1212.06(a) (Oct. 2018).

[39] TMEP § 1212.06(b) (Oct. 2018) (noting that while large scale advertising expenditures are significant to indicate use of the mark, “[t]he ultimate test in determining whether a designation has acquired distinctiveness is applicant’s success, rather than its efforts, in educating the public to associate the proposed mark with a single source”).

[40] TMEP § 1212.06(c) (Oct. 2018) (“[S]urvey[s] must show that the consuming public views the proposed mark as an indication of the source.”).

[41] TMEP § 1212.06(d) (Oct. 2018).

[42] TMEP § 1212.06(e)(vi) (Oct. 2018).

[43] TMEP § 1212.06 (Oct. 2018).

[44] Response to Office Action, United States Patent & Trademark Office (Jan. 23, 2020),

[45] Id.

[46] Id.

[47] Id.

[48] Id.

[49] Id.

[50] Id.

[51] Id.

[52] Id.

[53] Id.

image by skeeze from Pixabay

By Laura Jordan

A few years ago, the federal government dissected a certain four-letter word.[1] It was prodded to see if it would “shock . . . the sense of truth, decency, or propriety” of the American public.[2] It was weighed to determine if it would “giv[e] offense to the conscience or moral feelings.”[3] And it was placed under the microscope to judge its “disgraceful[ness]” and “offensive[ness].”[4] That four-letter word survived the scrutiny and is alive and kicking today.[5] In fact, it was the scrutiny measures themselves that ultimately received the knife, cut out as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court over the summer.[6]

The four-letter word under debate was not one of the typical variety tossed around in casual settings, but it was close enough.[7] Plaintiff Erik Brunetti was trying to trademark the name “FUCT” as the title of his clothing brand.[8] He claimed that the four letters were to be pronounced individually, as in “F-U-C-T.”[9] However, as Justice Kagan pointed out in the majority opinion, “[Y]ou might read it differently and, if so, you would hardly be alone.”[10] The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) certainly did, and they rejected Brunetti’s application.[11]

The PTO’s statutory authority to govern the trademark registration process is found in the Lanham Act, which is codified in 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051 et seq.[12] Under § 1051, the PTO is allowed to subject the proposed trademark to scrutiny under the “factors set forth in subsections (a) through (e)” within § 1052.[13] In particular, § 1052(a) allowed the PTO to scrutinize whether the proposed trademark “comprise[d] immoral . . . or scandalous matter.”[14] If so, the trademark could be rejected.[15] The PTO decided that FUCT fit squarely within the proscribed category, deploring it as “highly offensive,” “vulgar,” and sexually reprehensible.[16] Brunetti pushed back against the rejection and won in the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The circuit court found that the PTO’s ban against “immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter” was not in line with the First Amendment.[17]

The Supreme Court then took the statutory phrase under consideration, turning to its 2017 decision in Matal v. Tam[18] for guidance.[19] In Matal, the Court examined whether the PTO could refuse registration to trademarks that “‘disparage’ any ‘person[], living or dead’” within § 1052(a).[20] Simon Tam, of the band “The Slants,” had fought a lengthy battle to trademark the band’s name in order “to ‘reclaim’ and ‘take ownership’ of stereotypes about people of Asian ethnicity.”[21] However, the PTO rejected the trademark, reasoning that “the fact that an applicant may be a member of that group or has good intentions underlying its use of a term does not obviate the fact that a substantial composite of the reference group would find the term objectionable.”[22] Ultimately, the Court decided that “if a trademark registration bar is viewpoint-based, it is unconstitutional” and that the PTO’s “disparagement bar was viewpoint-based.”[23]

With that holding in mind, the Court reasoned that “if the ‘immoral or scandalous’ bar similarly discriminates on the basis of viewpoint, it must also collide with our First Amendment doctrine.”[24] Looking to dictionary definitions of “immoral” and finding results such as “inconsistent with rectitude, purity, or good morals,” the majority found that this statutory language is entirely viewpoint-based.[25] It upholds “conventional moral standards” while rejecting as impure other ideas that may not be as mainstream.[26] The Court lightheartedly pointed out that a mark such as “ALWAYS BE CRUEL” would not survive this scrutiny.[27] In the past, the PTO has taken the traditional side of morally-contested arguments, rejecting drug-positive trademarks such as “YOU CAN’T SPELL HEALTHCARE WITHOUT THC” and “BONG HITS 4 JESUS” while registering “SAY NO TO DRUGS—REALITY IS THE BEST TRIP IN LIFE.”[28] Thus, the immoral-or-scandalous bar, as written, allowed the government to approve some viewpoints over others.[29]

In arguing that the immoral-or-scandalous bar is constitutionally sound, the Government attempted to narrow the phrase to only “marks that are ‘vulgar’—meaning ‘lewd,’ ‘sexually explicit or profane.’”[30] If it were so narrow, then it would be constitutionally sound.[31] But the majority rejected this reasoning and found that the phrase encompasses much more:

It covers the universe of immoral or scandalous—or (to use some PTO synonyms) offensive or disreputable—material. Whether or not lewd or profane. Whether the scandal and immorality comes from mode or instead from viewpoint. To cut the statute off where the Government urges is not to interpret the statute Congress enacted, but to fashion a new one.[32]

In striking down the statutory phrase, the majority therefore paved the way for the “FUCT” trademark.[33]

So, with this decision, can Americans now trademark whatever the FUCT they want to? Justice Sotomayor seemed to worry about that perhaps unintended consequence.[34] In her concurrence in part and dissent in part, she wrote,

The Court’s decision today will beget unfortunate results. With the Lanham Act’s scandalous-marks provision, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a), struck down as unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination, the Government will have no statutory basis to refuse (and thus no choice but to begin) registering marks containing the most vulgar, profane, or obscene words and images imaginable.[35]

However, Justice Alito stood up in his concurrence for the sanctity of free speech, arguing that “[a]t a time when free speech is under attack, it is especially important for this Court to remain firm on the principle that the First Amendment does not tolerate viewpoint discrimination.”[36]

Whichever side you are on, now might be the best time to go get that trademark registered.

[1] See Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2297 (2019).

[2] Id. at 2298.

[3] Id.

[4] Id.

[5] Id. at 2302.

[6] Id.

[7] Id. at 2297.

[8] Id.

[9] Id.

[10] Id.

[11] Id.

[12] Id.

[13] 15 U.S.C. § 1051(d)(1) (2012).

[14] § 1052(a).

[15] § 1051(d)(1).

[16] Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2298.

[17] Id.

[18] See generally 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017).

[19] Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2298.

[20] Id.

[21] Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1754.

[22] Id.

[23] Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2299.

[24] Id.

[25] Id.

[26] Id. at 2300.

[27] Id.

[28] Id.

[29] Id. at 2301.

[30] Id.

[31] Id.

[32] Id. at 2301–02.

[33] Id.

[34] Id. at 2308 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

[35] Id.

[36] Id. at 2303–04 (Alito, J., concurring).

By Cole Tipton

SummitBridge National v. Faison

In this bankruptcy action, SummitBridge National (“National”) appeals the district court’s holding that it is barred from claiming attorney’s fees incurred after a bankruptcy petition was filed.  The contract between National and Ollie Faison (“Faison”) stated that Faison would pay “all costs of collection, including but not limited to reasonable attorneys’ fees.”  The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s holding and stated that the Bankruptcy Code does not preclude contractual claims to attorney’s fees that were guaranteed by a pre-bankruptcy contract.  The determination of the district court was reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

US v. Pratt

In this criminal action, Samual Pratt (“Pratt”) appeals his conviction of various counts of sex trafficking and child pornography due to evidentiary errors.  Pratt contends the district court should have suppressed evidence from his cellphone and should not have admitted certain hearsay statements.  First, the Fourth Circuit held that it was reversible error to admit evidence from Pratt’s cellphone because the phone was seized without consent and the government waited thirty-one days before obtaining a search warrant.  The Court stated that such a delay was unreasonable.  Second, the Fourth Circuit held that an unavailable witness’s hearsay statements were admissible because Pratt had procured the witness’s unavailability through phone calls and threats.  Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit vacated Pratt’s convictions on the two counts prejudiced by the cell phone evidence, vacated his sentence, and remanded.

Parker v. Reema Consulting Services, Inc 

In this civil action, Evangeline Parker (“Parker”) appeals the district court’s dismissal of her complaint against her employer, Reema Consulting Services, Inc. (“Reema”).  The central issue of the appeal was whether a false rumor circulated by Reema that Parker slept with her boss for a raise could give rise to liability under Title VII for discrimination “because of sex.”  The Fourth Circuit held that because the complaint alleged Reema spread the rumor and acted on it by penalizing the employee, a cognizable claim for discrimination “because of sex” was alleged.  The district court’s dismissal was reversed.

US Dep’t of Labor v. Fire & Safety Investigation

In this civil action, Fire & Safety Investigation Consulting Services, LLC (“Fire & Safety”) appealed the district court’s determination that they violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) for failing to pay overtime compensation.  Fire & Safety uses an alternative work schedule for its employees in which an employee works 12 hours per day for 14 days and then receives 14 days off.  Because employees under this plan will work 88 hours in one work week, Fire & Safety pays its employees a blended rate for all 88 hours that is supposed to account for the 48 hours of overtime worked, rather than paying 40 hours of standard pay plus 48 hours of overtime.  The Fourth Circuit held that this blended rate fails to observe the formalities required by the FLSA which requires all overtime hours be recorded and paid at one and one-half times the standard rate of pay for all hours worked over 40.  Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, including over $1.5 million in back wages and liquidated damages.

Trana Discovery, Inc. v. S. Research Inst.

In this civil action, Trana Discovery, Inc. (“Trana”) brought a fraud and negligent misrepresentation action against Southern Research Institute (“Southern”).  Trana alleged that Southern had provided false data in research reports of a new HIV medication it was researching.  The district court granted summary judgment for Southern on both claims.  The Fourth Circuit upheld the grant of summary judgement, stating that there was no genuine dispute of material fact due to an insufficiency of evidence regarding damages and the standard of care Southern was exacted to.  Accordingly, summary judgement was affirmed.

Jesus Christ is the Answer v. Baltimore County, Maryland

In this civil action, Jesus Christ is the Answer Church (“Church”) brought an action alleging violation of the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, the Maryland Declaration of Rights, and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Person Act.  Church alleged that Baltimore County, Maryland (“Baltimore”) had infringed upon their State and Federal rights by denying their modified petition for zoning variances to establish a church.  Several neighbors, who had expressed open hostility towards Church, opposed the petition.  After the petition was denied, Church filed an action in district court which was dismissed for failure to state a claim.  On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded because Church’s complaint contained facts sufficient to state a claim that was “plausible on its face.”  The Fourth Circuit held that the neighbors apparent religious bias towards Church was sufficient to plead a plausible Constitutional claim and violation of the Religious Land Use Act. 

Curtis v. Propel Property Tax Funding

In this civil action, Garry Curtis (“Curtis”) brought a suit on behalf of himself and similarly situated individuals against Propel Property Tax Funding (“Propel”), alleging violations of the Truth in Lending Act, the Electronic Funds Transfer Act, and the Virginia Consumer Protection Act.  Propel was engaged in the practice of lending to third parties to finance payment of local taxes.  The district court denied Propel’s motion to dismiss and certified two interlocutory questions.  Propel appealed, asserting that Curtis did not have standing and that he failed to state a claim for relief.  The Fourth Circuit upheld the district court’s ruling, finding that: 1) Curtis had standing because he was personally subject to the harms these consumer protection statutes were designed to protect against; and 2) Curtis had sufficiently pled violations of the lending acts because Propel was conducting consumer credit transactions.

US v. Charboneau

In this civil action, Blake Charboneau (“Charboneau”) challenges the determination that he is a “sexually dangerous person” under the civil commitment provisions of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006.  The district court held that Charboneau was a “sexually dangerous person” within the meaning of the act and committed him to the custody of the Attorney General.  On appeal, Charboneau raised two issues: 1) whether he must be diagnosed with a paraphilic disorder to be committed under the act; and 2) if the record supported the district court’s findings.  The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that an actual diagnosis was not necessary under the act and the record was sufficient under a clear error standard of review.

US v. Johnson

In this criminal action, Willie Johnson (“Johnson”) appealed a district court’s order to resentence him for bank robbery under the sentencing recommendation in his original plea agreement.  Johnson argued that the government’s original agreement not to seek a mandatory life sentence under the federal three-strikes law was not beneficial because his prior state crimes should not be counted for federal three-strikes treatment.  The Fourth Circuit held that state crimes are encompassed by the three-strikes program and the district court’s decision to honor the original sentencing recommendation was affirmed.

Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC v. 6.56 Acres of Land

In this civil action, owners of 6.56 acres of land appealed a district court judgement granted Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC (“Pipeline”) a preliminary injunction for access and possession of property it was acquiring through eminent domain.  The Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s application of the test set forth in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) for preliminary injunctions.  In doing so, the Court found that Pipeline had established it was likely to succeed on the merits, would suffer irreparable harm, the balance of equities was in its favor, and that an injunction served the public interest.  Accordingly, the district court was affirmed. B.V. v. US Patent & Trademark

In this civil action, and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) appeal the district court’s grant of summary judgment protecting the trademark BOOKING.COM. appeals the district court’s grant of attorney’s fees to the USPTO, and the USPTO appeals the court’s decision that BOOKING.COM is protectable.  The Fourth Circuit held that BOOKING.COM is not generic and can be registered as a descriptive mark with secondary meaning.  Moreover, the Court upheld the grant of USPTO’s expenses because the Lanham Act requires a party to pay “all the expenses of the proceeding” when a USPTO decision is appealed to the district court.  Thus, the district court’s judgment was affirmed.

US v. Jones

In this criminal action, James Eric Jones (“Jones”) appeals the district court’s denial of a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence.  Jones was originally sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) which requires a mandatory fifteen-year minimum sentence for defendants with at least three prior violent felony convictions.  However, Jones claims that he does not qualify for sentencing under the act because his South Carolina conviction for assaulting, beating, or wounding a police officer is not a violent conviction as defined by the ACCA.  The Fourth Circuit held that assaulting, beating, or wounding a police officer does not qualify under the ACCA because it includes conduct that does not involve violent physical force. Therefore, the district court’s judgment was vacated and remanded.

8 Wake Forest L. Rev. Online 35

Cara Katrinak*

I. Introduction

The marijuana industry is growing like a weed. While recreational marijuana usage remains illegal under federal law, the recent trend towards legalization of the drug at the state level has enticed entrepreneurs and investors to enter the emerging marijuana market.[1] In 2016, Privateer Holdings announced that it was the first company in the space to raise $100 million dollars,[2] and, according to recent estimates, the legal marijuana market in the United States is expected to reach $20.6 billion in annual revenue by 2020, increasing the amount by 300 percent from 2015.[3]

Pioneers in the marijuana industry face many of the same business challenges posed by any other market, including securing financing and protecting assets, such as intellectual property.[4] However, marijuana start-ups must overcome the additional hurdle of the drug’s classification as an illegal substance under federal law.[5]

II. The Value of Trademarks in the Emerging Marijuana Market

Trademark law protects source identifiers, which help consumers differentiate between products, and prevents unfair competition by barring competitors from palming off on another’s goodwill.[6] While the United States has historically recognized common law trademark rights,[7] the Lanham Act, passed in 1946, is the modern basis for federal trademark protection.[8] Unlike other forms of intellectual property, whose legislation was passed pursuant to the “intellectual property” clause in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution, Congress passed the Lanham Act pursuant to the Commerce Clause of that same section.[9] Accordingly, trademark rights are not bound by the restrictions of the intellectual property clause, which permits Congress to grant individuals an “exclusive right” for only “limited times.”[10] Because the Lanham Act theoretically allows for owners’ rights to remain exclusive forever,[11] trademark rights are a highly valuable type of intellectual property in any industry.[12]

The Lanham Act’s primary method for trademark protection is registration.[13] While not every mark will satisfy the Act’s criteria for registration, those who want full protection should seek registration.[14] For example, the Act requires that a registered mark be distinctive or have acquired distinctiveness.[15] The United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) assesses a mark’s acquired distinctiveness by considering the mark’s use in commerce.[16] Therefore, the more crowded that a given market is, the more important that a mark be distinctive enough to be registrable and valuable (and vice versa).

While still in its early stages, the marijuana market is already highly competitive.[17] Like the beer and liquor market, the products being sold in the marijuana market are essentially the same.[18] Therefore, marijuana brands may want to focus advertising on a lifestyle or attitude instead of a product’s unique benefits, a strategy used by beer and liquor brands.[19] In terms of product differentiation, a strong, distinctive trademark will be incredibly important for the success of a marijuana brand. However, a mark that cannot be protected loses much of its value.[20] Because the marijuana market, which has been compared to the “Wild West,”[21] remains in flux with significant open legal questions,[22] emerging marijuana entrepreneurs should seek the strongest trademark protection possible.

III. Authority for Trademark Protection

Trademark rights are protectable under common law, state statutory law, and federal law via the Lanham Act. Accordingly, marijuana brands have a variety of legal sources through which to acquire and protect their trademark rights. However, federal protection via the Lanham Act is the most powerful source of trademark protection.[23] Unlike state and common law protection, which is limited in its geographic reach, federal protection encompasses the entire United States. Federal protection also enables registered mark holders to pursue a wider variety of remedies if their trademark rights are infringed, such as the ability to pursue a counterfeiting claim.[24] As a result, federal registration of a trademark will likely deter challengers to a mark from engaging in costly litigation.[25] Similarly, federal protection through mark registration lends a higher level of legal heft to demand letters, thus likely making them more effective.[26] Therefore, ideally, marijuana entrepreneurs would want to obtain federal protection through trademark registration if possible.

IV. Challenges Associated with Trademarks in the Marijuana Market

Marijuana brands seeking federal trademark registration face several challenges, the most obvious of which is that marijuana remains illegal under federal law.[27] Despite the trend towards legalization of marijuana at the state level, for federal trademark purposes, the trend has been moving in the opposite direction.[28] Marijuana-related trademarks generally come in three varieties: those for use in distribution with marijuana, those for products that have a use that may be related to marijuana, and those that may simply have a tangential or symbolic tie to marijuana and not a physical connection with actual use (for example, t-shirts featuring marijuana leaves).[29]

According to long-standing rule, a mark can be registered under the Lanham Act only for lawful purposes.[30] The United States Patent and Trademark Office’s test for lawful use for marijuana trademarks is whether the goods comply with the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”).[31] Currently, any connection to distribution of the drug is an absolute bar to registration. [32]

In keeping with the lawful use rule, the goods for which an applicant seeks to register a mark must have a lawful use under federal law.[33] The lawful use rule derives from two statutory provisions: sections 1051 and 1052 of the Lanham Act.[34] Section 1051(a)(1) provides that “[t]he owner of a trademark used in commerce may request registration of its trademark on the principal register.”[35] Section 1051(b) allows applicants to seek registration for marks for which they have a “bona fide intention to use the mark in commerce.”[36] The other relevant provision, section 1052(d), bars a mark from federal registration when it is likely to cause confusion with another mark that would have “concurrent lawful use in commerce.”[37] Section 1127 defines the word “commerce” as “all commerce which may lawfully be regulated by Congress.”[38] In 1965, 37 C.F.R. section 2.69 was promulgated on the basis of section 1127.[39] The rule says that “[w]hen the sale or transportation of any product for which registration of a trademark is sought is regulated under an Act of Congress, the [USPTO] may make appropriate inquiry as to compliance with such Act for the sole purpose of determining lawfulness of the commerce recited in the application.”[40]

A. The TTAB’s View of Lawful Use

Following the rule’s promulgation, a line of Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB”) decisions interpreted the Lanham Act to mean that “use in commerce” in section 1051 is only “lawful use in commerce,” meaning that the item’s use must not be unlawful under controlling federal law.[41] In In re Stellar in 1968, the TTAB upheld the USPTO’s refusal to register a mark for a breath freshener on the basis that the application failed to list the product’s net contents, a requirement of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.[42] Since the statutory provision at issue was section 1051 and not section 1052, this was arguably inferring an additional word, “lawful,” into the statute.[43]

The Board offered two arguably slim justifications for its decision.[44] First, the Board reasoned that “no trademark rights can accrue” from “unlawful shipments,” thus requiring a showing of use “which may lawfully be regulated by Congress.”[45] This oddly seems to imply that there exists some unlawful behavior which Congress cannot lawfully regulate.[46] Second, the Board stated that to hold otherwise was to put the “Patent Office in the anomalous position of accepting” federal registration on the basis of a use against which a statute specifically regulates.[47] In 1981, the TTAB seemed tempted to reverse course, acknowledging a “very persuasive argument” that there is no statutory basis for refusing registration because of “unlawful use.”[48] Regardless, Stellar is still controlling.[49]

B. The Federal Court’s View of Lawful Use

Federal courts, too, have embraced the TTAB view of lawful use. In Gray v. Daffy Dan’s Bargaintown in 1987, the Federal Circuit broadly stated that “[a] valid application cannot be filed at all for registration of a mark without ‘lawful use in commerce.’”[50] This would seem to apply to both sections 1051 and 1052.[51] However, the matter directly before the court was use in commerce under section 1052(d) for concurrent use purposes.[52] Some scholars have argued that “lawful use” in section 1052 should mean “good faith use.”[53] Further, principles of statutory construction suggest that the requirement was intended for section 1052 but not section 1051, given that section 1052 contains the word “lawful” and section 1051 does not.[54]

In 2000, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit cited Daffy Dan’s for the rule that the unlawful shipping of goods cannot establish use in commerce for trademark protections.[55] The court did not apply the rule, however, since unlawful use was not alleged.[56] In CreAgri v. USANA Health Services in 2007, the Ninth Circuit also adopted the Daffy Dan’s rule for two reasons.[57] First, the court reasoned, Congress would likely not have intended to extend benefits to a party who violated other federal laws.[58] Second, holding otherwise would incentivize people to rush to market without due concern for complying with relevant federal law.[59] Aside from the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, only a few federal courts have ruled on the lawful use requirement.[60]

C. The USPTO’s View of Lawful Use

Prior to 2009, the USPTO’s view of marijuana with respect to lawful use was arguably more liberal, but certainly not the absolute bar it currently represents.[61] It was not until 2009 that the office received a significant number of marijuana mark applications.[62] In a temporary step toward liberalization, in April of 2010, the USPTO announced a new category of trademarks for medical marijuana.[63] However, after criticism, the USPTO withdrew the category and called its announcement a “mistake.”[64]

In October of 2011, the USPTO explicitly instituted its own restrictive marijuana policy when it revised section 907 of the Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure to explicitly address marijuana.[65] Effectively adopting section 2.69 as the USPTO’s test, the revision reads:

[E]vidence indicating that the identified goods or services involve the sale or transportation of a controlled substance or drug paraphernalia in violation of the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”), 21 U.S.C. §§801-971, would be a basis for issuing an inquiry or refusal. Subject to certain limited statutory exceptions, the CSA makes it unlawful to manufacture, distribute, or dispense a controlled substance; possess a Schedule I controlled substance; or sell, offer for sale, or use any facility of interstate commerce to transport drug paraphernalia. Note that, regardless of state law, marijuana and its psychoactive component, THC, remain Schedule I controlled substances under federal law and are subject to the CSA’s prohibitions.[66]

The revision led the office to reject numerous marijuana applications that had previously been pending (and thus were not poised for immediate rejection).[67] Since 2011, connections to distribution of marijuana have remained an absolute bar.[68]

D. The Spectrum of Lawful Use

Despite this “absolute bar,” though, marijuana-related trademarks appear to exist on a spectrum of lawful use where the outer bounds are clearly defined but the middle ground is not. While any connection to the distribution of marijuana is an absolute bar,[69] marks with only symbolic connections to the drug and no connection to its actual use or distribution are registrable.[70] The success of applications for marks falling somewhere in the middle of this spectrum, such as an item that may be used to consume marijuana and may be evocative of the drug (such as a vaporizer that can be used for other legal products, like tobacco), depends on how the applicant crafts the registration application.[71] The application, however, must comport with the applicant’s honest knowledge of and intent for the product’s use.[72]

The USPTO takes a broad view of distribution, barring marks for products that contain cannabis, as well as those for marketplaces where cannabis-containing products are sold.[73] In 2016, the USPTO rejected the mark “Herbal Access” for use with a retail store when the application did not mention marijuana, but the applicant was a Washington state marijuana dispensary.[74] In 2014, the USPTO rejected the mark “KUSH EXPO” for use with “seminars, exhibitions and trade shows in the field of medical marijuana,” because the application identified the mark as being used in connection with a place where marijuana would be consumed or traded.[75] Therefore, if a mark owner wants federal protection for anything marijuana-related, it should not be involved in retail distribution at all.

In In re JuJu Joints, the TTAB took a hard line against registering any mark that has any explicitly stated connection to actual consumption of marijuana on the grounds that it does not constitute lawful use in commerce.[76] Applicant JuJu Joints had acknowledged that the vaporizing device for which it sought to register a mark was “marijuana-related” and “optimized” for such use.[77] The TTAB upheld the refusal to register the mark on the basis that the device was “primarily intended or designed for use in ingesting, inhaling, or otherwise introducing cannabis or marijuana into the human body.”[78] As such, the board concluded, that the vaporizing device “constitutes unlawful drug paraphernalia under the CSA.”[79] The applicant made numerous arguments in its favor, including the following: (1) that its device should be treated like those intended for tobacco products, (2) that the company marketed its device in states where marijuana is legal, (3) that its goods should be considered lawful under the Cole Memo[80] and (4) because marijuana has “‘accepted medical uses.’”[81] The court rejected the latter three of these arguments on the basis that they were irrelevant to marijuana’s continued status as a Schedule 1 drug under the CSA.[82]

The board also rejected the idea that JuJu Joints’ vaporizer should be evaluated like an e-cigarette because “each application must be considered on its own record to determine eligibility to register.”[83] This is crucial because the examining attorney will typically presume an applicant’s goods have a lawful use in commerce.[84] The board cited the Federal Circuit in In re Nett Designs, Inc. for the proposition that even if prior registrations had similar characteristics, the USPTO’s registration of those marks does not bind the TTAB.[85] Therefore, even if JuJu Joints had achieved registration, it would offer little certainty to future applicants on its own.

After the TTAB’s decision in JuJu Joints, an applicant has three potential choices for marks that may be related to marijuana usage. First, it may try the same route as JuJu Joints, expressing an explicit connection to the drug, and face almost certain rejection. Second, it may avoid connections to marijuana, but only if it can do this honestly and knowingly. Ideally, the applicant would want to expressly disavow connections to marijuana.[86] Third, it may back away from federal registration, either abandoning any pending application or choose not to register a trademark with the USPTO in the first place.[87]

V. Conclusion

The marijuana industry is a rapidly expanding business. Accordingly, brands looking to protect their trademark rights in marijuana products need to adhere to the current legal framework, while also anticipating how the legal landscape will change as the marijuana market continues to grow.

* Cara Katrinak is a third-year law student at the Wake Forest University School of Law. She received a bachelor’s degree in Art and Art History from the College of William and Mary. Snoop Dogg’s cannabis brand, Leafs by Snoop, sparked her interest in the expanding marijuana market and its relationship with intellectual property law.

  1. Jack Healy & Kirk Johnson, Next Gold Rush: Legal Marijuana Feeds Entrepreneurs’ Dreams, N.Y. Times (July 28, 2014),
  2. Its holdings include the Marley Natural cannabis brand using the licensed name of musician Bob Marley and Leafly, an online service described as the Yelp for marijuana. Tom Huddleston, Private Equity Fund Raises $100 Million for Cannabis Startups, Fortune (Nov. 4, 2016),
  3. Melia Robinson, The Legal Marijuana Industry Could Explode by 2020, Bus. Insider (Sept. 23, 2016, 2:31 PM),
  4. Gretchen L. Temeles et al., IP Protection and the Cannabis Industry: Strategies and Trends, The Legal Intelligencer (Apr. 2, 2018, 2:10 PM),
  5. Kieran G. Doyle, Commentary, Trademark Strategies for Emerging Marijuana Businesses, 21 Westlaw J. Intell. Prop. 1, 4 (2014).
  6. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 163–164 (1995).
  7. Blake W. Jackson, Note, Notorious: The Treatment of Famous Trademarks in America and How Protection Can Be Ensured, 3 J. Bus. Entrepreneurship & L. 61, 79 (2009).
  8. Id. at 80.
  9. Id. at 79.
  10. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Trademark, Patent, or Copyright?, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office,
  11. The Act, however, requires renewal of registered marks every ten years. 15 U.S.C. § 1058(a) (2012). See also U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, supra note 10.
  12. Doyle, supra note 5, at 3.
  13. Id.
  14. Sean K. Clancy, Branded Bud or Generic Ganja? Trademarks for Marijuana in Washington, 18 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 1063, 1085 (2015).
  15. Id.
  16. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (2012).
  17. Sean Williams, Legal Marijuana Prices Are Plunging in Colorado, but Not for the Reason You’d Expect, Motley Fool (Sept. 11, 2016, 9:07 AM),
  18. Beer Marketing and Differentiation, Stealing Share, (last visited Dec. 1, 2017).
  19. Vauhini Vara, The Art of Marketing Marijuana, The Atlantic (Apr. 2016),
  20. See In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“And while it is true that a trademark owner may use its mark in commerce even without federal registration, it has been widely recognized that federal trademark registration bestows truly significant and financially valuable benefits upon markholders.”).
  21. Olga Khazan, Laid-Back Hawaii’s Strict Approach to Marijuana, The Atlantic (Nov. 3, 2017)
  22. Doyle, supra note 5, at 3.
  23. Id.
  24. Id.
  25. Id.
  26. Id.
  27. Id.
  28. Christopher R. McElwain, High Stakes: Marijuana and the USPTO’s “[Lawful] Use” Registration Criterion 8 (2016),
  29. Id. at 3–7.
  30. Doyle, supra note 5, at 3.
  31. Id. at 1.
  32. See McElwain, supra note 28, at 14; see also In re Morgan Brown, 119 U.S.P.Q.2d 1350 (T.T.A.B. 2016) (“We have consistently held that, to qualify for a federal service mark registration, the use of a mark in commerce must be ‘lawful.’”).
  33. McElwain, supra note 28, at 2.
  34. See id.
  35. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(1) (2012).
  36. Id. § 1051(b).
  37. Id. § 1052(d).
  38. Id. § 1127.
  39. McElwain, supra note 28, at 8–9.
  40. 37 C.F.R. § 2.69.
  41. McElwain, supra note 28, at 9.
  42. Stellar Int’l, Inc., 159 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 48, 52 (T.T.A.B. 1968).
  43. McElwain, supra note 28, at 9–10.
  44. Id. at 10.
  45. Stellar, 159 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 50.
  46. McElwain, supra note 28, at 10.
  47. Stellar, 159 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 51.
  48. McElwain, supra note 28, at 21 n.151.
  49. Id. at 10.
  50. Gray v. Daffy Dan’s Bargaintown, 823 F.2d 522, 526 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
  51. See McElwain, supra note 28, at 10–11.
  52. Id. at 11.
  53. Id.
  54. Id.
  55. See United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Midland Fumigant, Inc., 205 F.3d 1219, 1225 (10th Cir. 2000).
  56. McElwain, supra note 28, at 11.
  57. See id.
  58. CreAgri, Inc. v. USANA Health Scis., Inc., 474 F.3d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 2007).
  59. Id.
  60. See McElwain, supra note 28, at 12.
  61. The oldest registration for marijuana in the USPTO’s Trademark Status & Document Retrieval System was for a drug in the form of cannabis extract registered in 1931. With two marijuana applications from the early 2000s, the USPTO sought more information instead of outright refusing registration. Id. at 4, 7–8.
  62. Id. at 5.
  63. Id.
  64. Id.
  65. Id. at 8.
  66. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 8-900 Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure (TMEP) 907 (2017).
  67. McElwain, supra note 28, at 8.
  68. Id.
  69. Id.
  70. See id. at 6.
  71. See generally Christiane Schuman Campbell, USA: Mark-ijuana: Trademarks and Branding Cannabis Products, Lexology (Apr. 18, 2017),
  72. Lying to the USPTO could invalidate the applicant’s mark and constitute fraud. Danielle Scott Grant-Keane, The Unattainable High of the Marijuana Industry, 90 Wis. Law. 14, 18 (2017).
  73. See McElwain, supra note 28, at 7, 14.
  74. In re Morgan Brown, 119 U.S.P.Q.2d 1350 (BNA) (T.T.A.B. 2016).
  75. McElwain, supra note 28, at 14.
  76. In re JJ206, LLC, DBA JuJu Joints, 120 U.S.P.Q.2d 1568, 1569 (T.T.A.B. 2016).
  77. Id.
  78. Id.
  79. Id.
  80. The Justice Department issued two memos, in 2009 and 2013 (the Cole Memo), that directed federal prosecutors to deemphasize enforcement of marijuana use. Brady Dennis, Obama Administration Will Not Block State Marijuana Laws if Distribution is Regulated, Wash. Post (Aug. 29, 2013),—for-now/2013/08/29/b725bfd8-10bd-11e3-8cdd-bcdc09410972_story.html.
  81. In re JJ206, LLC, 120 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1569.
  82. Id.
  83. Id.
  84. Grant-Keane, supra note 72, at 18.
  85. In re JJ206, LLC, 120 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1569.
  86. See Campbell, supra note 71 (discussing Humboldt Apothecary, a class 5 registration for “herbs and ingredients that are lawful pursuant to the CSA . . . none of which are cannabis . . . [or] comprise[] of marijuana”).
  87. This may be the strategy at play with Firefly Vapor, which has been called the “iPhone of vaporizers” and does not appear to have a registration or a pending application. Melia Robinson, A Former Apple Designer Has Created the iPhone of Vaporizers, Bus. Insider (May 25, 2016, 11:47 AM),


By: Mikhail Petrov

On March 23, 2016, in the published civil case of Belmora LLC v. Bayer Consumer Care AG, the Fourth Circuit considered whether the Lanham Act permits the owner of a foreign trademark to pursue false association, false advertising, and trademark cancellation claims against the owner of the same mark in the United States. Bayer Consumer Care AG (“BCC”) owns the trademark “FLANAX” in Mexico and has sold naproxen sodium pain relievers under that mark in Mexico since the 1970s. Belmora LLC owns the FLANAX trademark in the United States and has used it in the United State since 2004 in the sale of its naproxen sodium pain relievers. BCC and its U.S. sister company Bayer HealthCare LLC (which is licensed to sell naproxen sodium pain relievers in the United States under the brand name ALEVE) contend that Belmora used the FLANAX mark to deliberately deceive Mexican-American consumers into thinking they were purchasing BCC’s product.


BCC registered the trademark FLANAX in Mexico for pharmaceutical products, analgesics, and anti-inflammatories. It has sold naproxen sodium tablets under the FLANAX brand in Mexico since 1976. BCC’s FLANAX brand is well known in Mexico and other Latin American countries, as well as to Mexican-Americans and other Hispanics in the United States. Belmora LLC began selling naproxen sodium tablets in the United States as FLANAX in 2004. The following year, Belmora registered the FLANAX mark in the United States. Belmora’s early FLANAX packaging closely mimicked BCC’s Mexican FLANAX packaging, displaying a similar color scheme, font size, and typeface. In addition to using similar packaging, Belmora made statements implying that its FLANAX brand was the same FLANAX product sold by BCC in Mexico. BCC points to evidence that the similarities resulted in Belmora’s distributors, vendors, and marketers believing that its FLANAX was the same as or affiliated with BCC’s FLANAX.

Procedural History

BCC successfully petitioned the U.S. Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB”) to cancel Belmora’s registration for the FLANAX mark based on deceptive use. Belmora appealed the TTAB’s decision to the district court. In the meantime, BCC filed a separate complaint for false association against Belmora under § 43 of the Lanham Act, and in conjunction with BHC, a claim for false advertising. After the two cases were consolidated, the district court reversed the TTAB’s cancellation order and dismissed the false association and false advertising claims.

Although the district acknowledged that Belmora’s FLANAX has a similar trade dress to BCC’s FLANAX and is marketed in such a way that capitalizes on the goodwill of BCC’s FLANAX, it nonetheless concluded that the Lehman Act does not allow the owner of a foreign mark that is not registered in the United States, and has never been used in the United States, to assert priority rights over a mark that is registered in the United States by another party and used in United States Commerce. BCC appealed the decision.

Rule of the Case

The plain language of § 43(a) of the Lahman Act does not require, as an element of the cause of action, that a plaintiff possess or have used a trademark in U.S. commerce. Under § 43(a), it is the defendant’s use in commerce — whether of an offending “word, term, name, symbol, or device” or of a “false or misleading description [or representation] of fact” that creates the injury under the terms of the statute.

What § 43(a) requires is that BCC was “likely to be damaged” by Belmora’s “use in commerce” of its FLANAX mark and related advertisements. The Supreme Court recently considered the breadth of this “likely to be damaged” language in Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., (a false advertising case arising from a dispute in the used printer-cartridge market). The Court concluded that § 43(a)’s broad authorization is framed by two background principles. First, a plaintiff’s claim must fall within the “zone of interests” protected by the statute, defined in §45 of the Lanham Act. Second, a statutory cause of action is limited to plaintiffs whose injuries are proximately caused by violations of the statute.

Reasoning of the Fourth Circuit

The Fourth Circuit first addressed the position, pressed by Belmora and adopted by the district court, that a plaintiff must have initially used its own mark in commerce within the United States as a condition precedent to a § 43(a) claim. The Fourth Circuit found that the district court erred in requiring BCC, as the plaintiff, to have pleaded its prior use of its own mark in U.S. commerce when it is the defendant’s use of a mark or misrepresentation that underlies the § 43(a) unfair competition cause of action.

Although the plaintiffs’ use of a mark in U.S. commerce was a fact in common in the foregoing cases, substantial precedent reflects that § 43(a) unfair competition claims come within the statute’s protectable zone of interests without the U.S. commerce precondition. The Supreme Court has pointed out that § 43(a) goes beyond trademark protection, is cases of generic mark and reverse passing off. See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp 539 U.S. 23, 29 (2003). These cases illustrate that § 43(a) actions do not require, implicitly or otherwise, that a plaintiff have first used its own mark in United States commerce. If such a use were a condition precedent to bringing a § 43(a) action, the generic mark and reverse passing off cases could not exist. Additionally, the plain language of § 43(a) makes no reference to U.S. commerce. Therefore, neither the Supreme Court in Lexman nor the Lanham Act’s plain language contain an unstated requirement that plaintiff have used a U.S. trademark in U.S. commerce to bring a Lanham Act unfair competition claim.

The Fourth Circuit then examined Lexmark’s two fold inquiry to determine whether BCC can make a § 43(a) claim. The first inquiry is whether the alleged acts of unfair competition fall within the Lanham Act’s protected zone of interests? If so, the second inquiry is whether BCC pleaded proximate causation of a cognizable injury.

BCC adequately pleaded a § 43(a) false association claim for purposes of the zone of interests prong. Lexmark advises that most of the Lanham Act’s enumerated purposes are relevant to false association cases. One such enumerated purpose is making actionable the deceptive and misleading use of marks. Here, BCC lost sales revenue because Belmora’s deceptive and misleading use of FLANAX conveyed to consumers a false association with BCC’s product. Further, by deceiving distributors and vendors, Belmora makes its FLANAX more available to consumers, which exacerbated BCC’s losses.

The Fourth Circuit then turned to Lexmark’s second prong, and concluded that BCC may plausibly have been damaged economically and in its reputation by Belmora’s alleged deceptive use of the FLANAX mark. Therefore, there was enough to conclude that BCC’s injuries were proximately caused by Belmora’s violations of the false association statute.


The Fourth Circuit conclude that BCC is entitled to bring its unfair competition claims under Lanham Act § 43(a) and its cancellation claim under § 14(3). The district court’s judgment was vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

By George Kennedy

On May 19, 2015, the Fourth Circuit issued a published opinion in the civil case of Radiance Foundation v. NAACP. The court held that an online article describing the NAACP as the “National Association for the Abortion of Colored People” did not infringe upon or dilute trademarks held by the NAACP (the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People). In so holding, the Fourth Circuit vacated the decision of the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Publication of the Article

In January 2013 the Radiance Foundation published an article entitled “NAACP: National Association for the Abortion of Colored People.” Appearing on the Radiance Foundation’s website, and several others, the article harshly criticized the NAACP’s position on abortion. The organizations that featured the article were non-profit, anti-abortion organizations which allowed site users to make donations.

Upon learning of the article’s publication, the NAACP sent Radiance a cease-and-desist letter on January 28, 2013. Radiance then brought a declaratory action seeking that the court find that Radiance had not infringed upon or diluted any of NAACP’s trademarks and that Radiance’s use of the marks was protected under the First Amendment.

The District Court Found for the NAACP

In a bench trial, the district court found for the NAACP and denied declaratory relief to Radiance. It held that Radiance had infringed upon the NAACP’s trademarks because it had used the marks in connection with goods and services and that the description of the NAACP as the “National Association for the Abortion of Colored People” was likely to create confusion among consumers. Furthermore, the district court held that the use of NAACP’s trademark created a likelihood of dilution of the trademarks owned by the NAACP by associating the NAACP and its marks with a pro-abortion position. Lastly, the district court held that Radiance’s use of the NAACP’s trademarks did not fall under any of the allowed exceptions of trademark dilution as set forth in the Lanham Act.

As a result, the district court issued a permanent injunction to Radiance, barring the organization from using the words “‘National Association for the Abortion of Colored People’ in a way that creates a likelihood of confusion or dilution.

The Fourth Circuit Vacated the Decision

In vacating the district court’s decision, the Fourth Circuit held that the district court erred in granting injunctive relief to the NAACP for two reasons. First, the Fourth Circuit held that the district court erred in finding that the NAACP had an actionable trademark infringement claim. Second, the Fourth Circuit held that the district court erred in finding that Radiance diluted the NAACP’s trademarks.

Radiance’s Article Did not Infringe Upon NAACP’s Trademarks

Trademark infringement is governed by the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1) and 1125(a). As the Fourth Circuit explained, these statutes exist to protect consumers from being confused by improperly used trademarks. However, trademark protection is limited by the Constitutional right to free speech, and as the Fourth Circuit noted, trademark laws may not “impinge the rights of critics and commentators.” For this reason, an actionable claim for trademark infringement requires more than just showing that a party other than the trademark holder used the trademark. Additionally, the trademark infringer must be shown to have used the trademark “in connection with” goods or services in a manner that is “likely to cause confusion.”

The Fourth Circuit held that Radiance did not use the NAACP’s trademarks “in connection” with goods or services, nor did they use the trademarks in a manner “likely to cause confusion.” While Radiance’s article did appear on websites which allowed users to make monetary donations, the Fourth Circuit held that there was not a clear enough connection with transactional activity for Radiance’s use of the NAACP’s trademarks to be considered “in connection” with goods or services. The Fourth Circuit reasoned it was not enough that the article merely appeared on a website in which monetary donations could be made. Instead, there needed to be a clear connection between the article itself and transactional activity for the “in connection” with goods and services requirement to be met.

Similarly, the Fourth Circuit also held that Radiance’s use of the NAACP’s trademarks was not likely to cause confusion. In its reasoning, the Fourth Circuit focused on the idea that trademark laws are not intended to protect the trademark holder from those who misunderstand its political views, and that it was unlikely that any readers of the article would have been confused about an affiliation between Radiance Foundation and the NAACP. As the Fourth Circuit argued, the article authored by Radiance was a scathing critique of the NAACP; it would not follow that the NAACP would author such an article.

Radiance’s Article Did Not Dilute the NAACP’s Trademarks

Lastly, the Fourth Circuit held that NAACP did not have an actionable dilution claim against Radiance. The law of dilution, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3), protects the integrity of the trademark by protecting the trademark’s reputation. While the Fourth Circuit conceded that the NAACP had established a prima facie case for dilution against Radiance, the Fourth Circuit held that Radiance’s use of the NAACP’s trademark was permissible under the “fair use” exception and the “non-commercial use” exception. The fair use exception allows a trademark to be used by someone other than the trademark holder to comment or criticize the trademark holder or its services. The Fourth Circuit held that Radiance used the trademark “NAACP” in conjunction with the “National Association for the Abortion of Colored People” as a way to criticize the NAACP and the policies for which it stands. Additionally, the Fourth Circuit held that the non-commercial use exception was satisfied because Radiance’s purpose in writing the article was not commercial gain, but to strongly criticize the policies and political positions of the NAACP. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit held that there existed no basis for either a trademark infringement claim or trademark dilution claim against Radiance. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit held that the district court erred in granting injunctive relief to NAACP on the basis of trademark infringement and trademark dilution.

The Fourth Circuit Vacated and Remanded for Further Proceedings

By Amanda Whorton

On April 23, 2015, the Fourth Circuit issued a published opinion in the civil case Shammas v. Focarino. The court held that 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b)(3) of the Lanham Act requires that a dissatisfied trademark applicant who elects to commence a de novo action in a federal district court to challenge a ruling of the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) must pay all reasonable expenses of the proceeding, regardless of whether he wins or loses. These expenses include attorney’s fees.

Plaintiff’s Trademark Application

In 2009, Milo Shammas (“Shammas”) filed a federal trademark application to register the mark “PROBIOTIC.” This mark was being used to market fertilizer products that his company, Dr. Earth, Inc., manufactures. An examining attorney for the USPTO denied his application based on the mark being “generic” and “descriptive.” Shammas appealed to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, which affirmed this decision.

Procedure for Trademark Applicant to Appeal Adverse Ruling

The Lanham Act, in 15 U.S.C. § 1071, sets forth two choices for a dissatisfied trademark applicant if he or she wants a review of an adverse ruling: The applicant can (1) under § 1071(a)(1), appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, or (2) under § 1071(b)(1), commence a de novo action in a federal district court.

With the first option, the appeal is taken “on the record.” The court gives considerable favor to the USPTO’s factual findings unless they are “unsupported by substantial evidence.” However, if the dissatisfied applicant seeks the second option and no party opposes the application, the applicant must name the Director of the USPTO as a defendant. Because this option is a much more expansive and expensive procedure (due to the court reviewing the record de novo), the applicant, under § 1071(b)(3), must pay all the reasonable expenses of the proceeding, regardless of whether he prevails.

The District Court Grants Director of USPTO’s Request

Shammas elected the second option and after losing the case, the Director sought all expenses, including fees, to pay the salaries of the USPTO attorneys and a paralegal who represented the Director in the action. The district court granted the Director’s request and required that Shammas pay $36,320.49 in expenses and attorney’s fees to the USPTO. The district court further held that expenses encompass attorney’s fees.

Shammas’ Appeal to the Fourth Circuit

Shammas appealed to the Fourth Circuit, arguing that the district court erred in awarding the Director attorney’s fees because it is contrary to the American Rule. The American Rule states that each party bears the burden of paying his or her own attorney’s fees if the underlying statute does not expressly provide for the losing party to pay the prevailing party’s attorney’s fees. Shammas argued that § 1071 doesn’t explicitly provide for the award of attorney’s fees.

The American Rule Does Not Apply

The Fourth Circuit reasoned that normally “expenses” is too broad a term and doesn’t include attorney’s fees. However, because Congress added the word “all” to modify “expenses” in § 1071(b)(3), this indicates that expenses shouldn’t be limited. While the statute doesn’t explicitly call for attorney’s fees, the structure of the Lanham Act and the legislative history point to a congressional intent to reduce the financial burden to the USPTO because de novo actions are time-intensive. The Fourth Circuit found that the American Rule did not apply in this case; § 1071(b)(3) calls for expenses to be imposed on the party regardless of whether he prevails.

Fourth Circuit Affirms District Court’s Ruling

Judge King dissented because the Lanham Act makes no specific reference to awards of attorney’s fees, which suggested that Congress did not intend to authorize these awards. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s award of attorney’s fees to the USPTO, holding that a dissatisfied trademark applicant who chooses to file a de novo proceeding must pay all reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, regardless of whether the applicant prevails or loses.

By Ashley Escoe

On Monday March 30, 2015, the Fourth Circuit released a published opinion regarding the civil case of Georgia-Pacific Consumer Products v. Von Drehle Corporation. In its opinion, the court agreed with von Drehle Corporation (“von Drehle”) and vacated the district court’s injunction and award of attorneys fees and also reversed the increase in damages and the award of prejudgment interest–all of which had been in favor of Georgia-Pacific Consumer Products (“Georgia-Pacific”).

Georgia-Pacific’s Claim of Trademark Infringement

Georgia-Pacific brought this trademark infringement case against von Drehle for designing and selling ten-inch paper-towels specifically for use in Georgia-Pacific’s “enMotion” motion sensor towel dispensers. Georgia-Pacific owns the trademark “enMotion” and alleged that von Drehle had violated the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a), for contributory trademark infringement because the von Drehle towels were “likely to cause confusion and . . . deceive End-User Customers.”

Georgia-Pacific brought three separate actions against von Drehle for selling these ten-inch paper-towels: in the Western District of Arkansas, the Northern District of Ohio, and the Eastern District of North Carolina. The first to rule on this issue was Arkansas, which concluded that von Drehle towels made for use in an enMotion dispenser were not likely to cause confusion, and therefore not an instance of trademark infringement. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The district court in Ohio then ruled against Georgia-Pacific as well, holding that Georgia-Pacific was precluded from litigating the same issue; the Sixth Circuit affirmed.

The Eastern District of North Carolina initially ruled against Georgia-Pacific based on von Drehle’s affirmative defense of claim and issue preclusion. However, on appeal the Fourth Circuit reversed this decision, concluding that von Derhle waived those defenses by failing to raise them in a timely manner. A jury awarded Georgia-Pacific the $791,431 in profits von Drehle made from the paper-towel sales. The district court trebled the jury verdict and awarded attorneys’ fees as well as prejudgment interest–totaling $4,887,283.51. The district court also granted Georgia-Pacific a permanent, nationwide injunction prohibiting von Drehle from selling its paper-towels.

On appeal, von Drehle challenged the geographical scope of the injunction and the monetary awards.

The Scope of the District Court’s Injunction Was Too Broad

The Fourth Circuit determined that the district court abused its discretion by granting a nationwide injunction. Generally, a district court has the authority to issue a nationwide injunction prohibiting trademark infringement. 15 U.S.C § 1116(a). In this instance, however, for the sake of inter-circuit comity, the court determined that the injunction should be limited to the states in the Fourth Circuit. The Sixth and Eighth Circuits have already ruled that von Drehle was not prohibited from selling its ten-inch paper towels, and the other Circuit courts that have not yet ruled on the issue should be free to resolve this matter for their jurisdictions. The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s injunction and remanded the issue.

Trebling the Damages Award Was Inappropriate

The Fourth Circuit concluded that the district court’s reliance on Larsen v. Terk Techs. Corp. was an erroneous conflation of 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) and § 1117(b). In Larsen, the issue was the use of a counterfeit mark and thus was governed by § 1117(b), which mandates treble damages for willful and intentional infringement. The instant case does not concern counterfeit marks, but rather is a general trademark infringement case governed by § 1117(a). Section 1117(a) does allow a court to adjust a jury award, but only if the award was inadequate or excessive and never solely to punish the defendant. Georgia-Pacific only requested an award of von Drehle’s profits, and that is precisely what the jury awarded; therefore, there was no basis for the district court to find the award inadequate. The Fourth Circuit reversed the increase in the damages award and ordered the jury award be reinstated.

A New Standard for “Exceptional” in Regard to Attorneys Fees

The district court granted attorneys’ fees to Georgia-Pacific, finding the case to be “exceptional” because von Drehle purposefully and willfully sold its towels to be used in Georgia-Pacific’s dispensers. However the Fourth Circuit noted that the district court failed to distinguish between willfully performing an act one believes to be lawful and willfully breaking the law. Further, after the district court made its ruling, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc. Though this decision did not define “exceptional” in the attorneys’ fees provision of § 1117(a), it defined an “exceptional case” in an identical provision of the Patent Act. The Supreme Court held that a district court may determine a case is exceptional by looking at the totality of the circumstances. The Fourth Circuit vacated the award of attorneys’ fees and remanded the issue for the district court to determine in light of the Octane Fitness standard.

Congress Did Not Intend for Prejudgment Interest in This Circumstance

Section 1117 is particular about what types of monetary relief are available for trademark infringement in specified circumstances. The Fourth Circuit concluded that if Congress did not include a certain type of monetary relief in a specified circumstance, then it was Congress’ intention that it not be available. Section 1117(a) does not provide for prejudgment interest in cases concerning recovery of a defendant’s profits. The court noted that it may be possible to recover prejudgment interest under § 1117(a) as an element of damages, but Georgia-Pacific only claimed von Drehle’s profits, not damages. Therefore the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s award of prejudgment interest.

The Fourth Circuit Vacated, Reversed in Part, and Remanded in Part the District Court’s Decision

The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s injunction and award of attorneys fees’ and remanded on these issues. It also reversed the increase in the damages award and the award of prejudgment interest.

Judge Shedd Disagrees with Limiting the Scope of the Injunction

Judge Shedd wrote separately, concurring in part and dissenting in part. Judge Shedd only disagreed with the decision to restrict the injunction to the Fourth Circuit. On appeal, injunctions are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Judge Shedd points out that the district court “applied the correct injunction standard, did not rely on a clearly erroneous finding of material fact, and did not misapprehend the law with respect to the underlying issues of this case.” The district court did not abuse its discretion, and the Fourth Circuit should affirm the injunction. Instead the majority of the panel relied on the doctrine of comity in determining that the nationwide scope of the injunction was too broad. The doctrine of comity is not a rule of law, but just a courtesy; and, according to Judge Shedd, relying on comity was not appropriate in this situation.